cabal directly controls local council and governments to “break” society and implement the New World Order (NWO). Such NWO claims are among the most popular conspiratorial myths within radical right milieus in Australia and globally. In general, and also within this specific group, they serve as a grand narrative that ties a range of beliefs around mostly unrelated issue—from immigration, Islam and anti-Semitism (absent in my interviews) to socialism, climate change, gender identity, vaccination, and government actions—into a seemingly coherent system.
Leaving aside the sometimes obscure and contradictory nature of the arguments put forward by the people in this group, what became clear is that their personal quest for the truth was a process with complex psychological and social implications. Again, there was this strong sense of pride in their claimed capacity to look behind “fake news” in mainstream media and deliberate indoctrination attempts by the government and its education system. Although they all shared the same convictions around NWO, none of the interviewed individuals wanted to appear as if they had simply adopted the views of others (not even of those in their own group). Instead, they all insisted on having done their own independent “research”, and they simply arrived at the same truth from different angles, which was further proof that their convictions were true. They felt empowered and a sense of recognition and self-worth as a result of their personal quest, but these processes have also strengthened their collective identity and belonging to a community (in-group) with supposedly superior knowledge.
The vast literature on (radical) political and social movements1 and violent extremism2 has highlighted that such psychological and social factor are often pivot in explaining the appeal of far-right ideologies and groups. The analysis of these interviews underscores this and demonstrates the interplay between these factors and the specific ideological narratives. The people in this group have found recognition, respect, and social connectedness through their radical right activism and their pursuit of the truth.
There were also other social dynamics at play. Whilst emphasizing their individual autodidactic efforts, the interviewed individuals also stated that, once they have done their own research, they would come together and share with each other. This was described by one person as ‘ripple effect’, and another one stated:
As we learned more, we developed…and we all come back together, it’s about networking too. We all share. [Person X] may find out more information to do with Islam and Christians, [person Z] may find out something about Communism…we all learn from each other.
Through these processes of information sharing and mutual exchange of personal experiences, they “often find common ground”. This is how initially unrelated fears and concerns around issues such as Islam, vaccination, and marriage equality are continuously solidified, expanded, and successively bundled together under a coherent grand narrative—in this case, the conspiracy myth of the NWO. The accounts of several members of this group highlighted these processes: ‘When we first came together it was just about Islam, but it is about so much more now’.
This process of “doing my own research” and sharing it within a group of likeminded others, as well as the outcome of these processes, i.e., the belief in an ideological meta-narrative that identifies a secrete global elite and their “puppets” in government as being responsible for all social ills, form an alternative system of knowledge. Similar to dogmatic interpretation of religious belief systems, it offers morally charged, simplistic answers to highly complex questions. This quasi-religious epistemology, whilst rooted in a combination of ultra-nationalistic and aggressively anti-egalitarian tropes, draws heavily on conspiratorial thinking. It is positioned in explicit opposition to the established “mainstream” epistemology, based on reason, science and provable facts, and controlled by the very same elites allegedly responsible for the demise of society. As such, this conspiracy theory-driven knowledge system reinforces boundaries between in-group and out-group, whereby strengthening internal solidarity and belonging and discrediting the others who are considered to be part of the establishment: local councils, governments, universities, and mainstream media. Any attempt by these “elite” agencies to challenge the in-group’s convictions, for instance through rational arguments or counternarratives, may backfire as it can be regarded as a deliberate manipulation attempt by the out-group and hence ‘perpetuate the original conspiracy theories’, as Holbrook recently argued.3
The alternative epistemologies within the radical right are powerful and difficult to refute from outside, also because they often serve a deeper psychological purpose for the individual. They offer something that people who feel disenfranchised may seek and feel they deserve but society has denied them: a sense of recognition, control and power in a social environment, both locally and globally, that is complexly interconnected, constantly changing and characterised by uncertainty and ambiguity.
Dr Mario Peucker is a Senior Fellow at CARR and senior research fellow at the Institute for Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities at Victoria University, Melbourne.
1 James M. Jasper, “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research,” Annual Review of Sociology 37, no. 1 (2011): 285-303.
2 Hedieh Mirahmadi, “Building Resilience against Violent Extremism: A Community-Based Approach,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, no. 1 (2016): 129-44; Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar and Greg Barton, “The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, no. 10 (2020): 854-85.
3 Donald Holbrook, “The Challenge of Conspiracy Theories for Strategic Communications,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 1 (2020): 26-36.
Radical Right Voters and Democratic Support
Nicolas Bichay
The rise of radical right parties is considered by many to be one of the largest modern threats to liberal democracy.1 There is a strong pattern of populist and radical leaders eroding constraints on the executive,2 diminishing press freedom,3 and harming the quality of elections to benefit themselves.4
But what about these parties’ voters? Do radical right voters exhibit overtly anti-democratic rhetoric? In other words, do voters of radical right parties knowingly hold and agree with anti-democratic attitudes? Or, rather, do they support these parties for other ideological reasons, while disagreeing with their anti-democratic tendencies?
On the one hand, it may simply be the case that voters support a radical right party for their policy proposals, for example their attention to immigration, the global economy, and promise of removing corrupt elites from government that, in their mind, other mainstream parties ignore. In such cases, cognitive dissidence may play a role in their determination that such parties are not really a threat to democracy and claims to the contrary are simply “fake news”. Or perhaps voters do believe these claims yet dub them a “necessary evil” worth the cost to restore the country to its “rightful place”.
On the other hand, there is a possibility that voters acknowledge the harms to democracy caused by the party they support and agree with these anti-democratic positions. The rhetoric of these
