The Radical Right During Crisis. Группа авторов
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However, the idea of creating a Russian autonomous republic in the central part of the country, where most ethnic Russians live, is unpopular among supporters of ethno-amendments. Their opinion was expressed by someone Ilya Maslyukov,8 who lives in Estonia, but who positions himself as an ethnic Russian. ‘Nobody is going to create a separate Russian republic’, he writes. ‘It (Russia) was already created by many of land collectors, from Ermak and Dezhnev to Khabarov and Krasheninnikov, and many other people. So, it turns out that all equal peoples live inside of the one big Russian republic. Many of them (equal peoples) asked themselves to protect their interests. And who didn’t ask ….. Mother History has already forgotten about them. So, everyone is equal. Therefore, Russians should be mentioned (in the text of constitution)’. True, Ilya does not know the answer to the question of whether Tatars, Chechens, and, for example, Circassians, who were conquered by Russian tsars in different periods of history, would agree with his idea.
But in any case, we see that this category of people understands that Russia is not the Soviet Union, this is the Russian republic, but to enclose the territory within itself is the height of the absurd. Therefore, the requirement to single out an ethnic majority in the constitution is the desire to simply affirm its leading role among other peoples of the country. The idea is not new: ‘we are all Russians (French, Germans, Spaniards, etc.), just of different ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds’. It lies at the heart of the European constitutional tradition, which is undergoing serious trials today.
In Russia, the popularity of this idea indicates the disappointment of a significant part of the population in the idea of the multi-ethnic “Russian Nation”, which was actively promoted in the corridors of the Kremlin by Russian Academy of Science’s Valery Tishkov.9 The idea is absolutely logical, it is based on the factor of multi-ethnicity of the Russian population and the principle of soil, a common territory that brings together hundreds of peoples and ethnic groups living in Russia. But the authors did not take into account that, in addition to the common territory and historical destinies of the modern nation, common values are necessary today, on the basis of which unification occurs. In multi-ethnic countries, these can be supra-ethnic values only.10
But ideologists of the modern Russian nation-building theory deny this, and with them, the power denies this too. Consequently, there remains one group of values that can unite, if not the whole nation, then at least part of it, as is happening in most European countries. It is about the language, culture, and traditions of the ethnic majority. These are simple values, attractive not only to representatives of this ethnic majority but also to a certain part of minorities. The European model of the nation is built on this basis, and this model is laid in the foundation of the European constitutional tradition.
The European point of view on the formation of a nation in Russia was expressed in social networks by the well-known defender of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, Stanislav Byshok, who believes that the construction of the Russian nation is possible only on the basis of Russian culture.11 At the same time, Byshok understands the limitations of his theory, since at least 20% of the population of Russia does not consider this value as unifying one within the framework of a big country. He argues that his ‘thought is not that Russian culture has such power that it can hold everyone and everything. The question is that there is no other holding factor. Within the framework of tough totalitarianism, it could be combined by force and ideology’. ‘When the power became less, and ideology showed its worthlessness, the design fell apart. Ideology ended, and Russian culture remained. Together with the Russians,” he writes.
In actuality, the politically active community was divided into two parts. One part believes that the Russian ethnic majority must be mentioned in the constitution of Russia as the “state-forming people”. The second one does not agree with it, because they see this as a risk for a multinational country. Part of the representatives of the second group, represented by the author of the concept of the Russian nation, Valery Tishkov, believes that it is necessary to mention the multi-ethnic Russian people in the constitution.12 Supporters of the amendments turned out to be in the lead, because, apparently, they unexpectedly received support … in the Kremlin. What will this mean for Russia’s domestic policy?
The policy ramifications of the amendment
As the political scientist Sergei Markedonov13 rightly emphasizes in his blog, supporters of ethno-amendments find almost ‘a complete lack of rational motivation’, because it is not clear what practical tasks are addressed by the entry in the basic law on ethnic Russian majority. And everyone understands that this largely symbolic step is the first stage and the second should follow it. But what should be the second step, so far, not even the nationalists understand. As one of them, a researcher at the Irkutsk Museum of the Decembrists,14 Vsevolod Naparte,15 said at a round table, ‘we understand that this step should be taken because we need to start somewhere, but what will be our second step? Regarding the second step, no one can say anything definite, although it is much more important’.
However, in order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyse the history of post-Soviet nationalist reforms in the post-Soviet space. In many of the former Soviet republics, these reforms began in the last years of the USSR: by the emergence of social movements for the preservation and development of the native language of the titular nations, and ended thirty years later by the destruction of the remnants of the federal structure, by the ban on education in the languages of national minorities, and by non-citizenship for those who were called “illegal emigrants of the Soviet period”. I admit that Russian constitutional nationalism will be more inventive, but the trends will still remain the same.
Moreover, no one calculates the possible consequences. ‘We are scolding Georgia and Ukraine (and rightly) for ethnicizing of their politics, but aren’t we preparing ourselves the same with our own ethno-amendments?’, Sergey Markedonov asks on Facebook.16 He continues: ‘What percentage of Abkhazians is in Georgia and (percentage) of Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan? Miserable! And they have the problems for a years! In our country, from Siberia to the Caucasus, there are a lot of autochthonous peoples who don’t know another homeland! We’ll we write about them in the list (in the constitution) or in a separate application? Why are the multinational people so bad? Not an ideal formula, but it is about civil and political loyalty, which is higher than the principle of blood. And it holds us together, but is not shared!’.
It is impossible to say better, but we should have in mind one more thing. The definition of an ethnic majority as state-forming people in the country’s basic law will mark the fact that Russia de jure will join the European constitutional tradition. Or, in other words, of the tradition of European constitutional nationalism, when norms included to the constitution put ethnic minorities in an unequal position.17
In this regard, it makes sense to consider the example of France. The country denies in principle the existence of ethnic, including autochthonous, minorities and even refuses because of it to join the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. For