there lives French people of different origins. This definition is the ideal one for many moderate Russian nationalists. Even the French secret service cannot find out the ethnic and religious origin of the people they are interested in. The maximum that they can obtain is the information about where the object of observation or its ancestors came from (if they are or were immigrants) to the country. In reality, ethnic minorities make up at least 10% of the population in France, but officially they do not exist. And if not, then there is nothing to protect the rights of what does not exist, in particular, secondary schools or religious schools for minorities are not needed, programs to support their cultural identity are not needed too. Integration programs in France are accelerated assimilation programs and nothing more. As a result, the vacuum was quickly filled with radical ideas, and France still holds the first place in terms of terror in Europe. Approximately 28% of Muslim emigrants living in the country of third or fourth generation do not like the idea “we are all French”, enthusiastically accepted by local liberals at one time.18 They still want to maintain their identity, and Islamists radicals, in conditions of self-elimination of the state, provide them with their own ways for this.
In Russia, the situation is even more complicated. These are not just hundreds of small autochthonous peoples, originally living in the territory of a large country. This is including the people living compactly on its national outskirts. And the problems that can arise on an interethnic basis can very quickly transform into the problem of maintaining the unity of the state. This already happened in the 1990s and it is unlikely that any of the Russians want to repeat that situation.
Throughout the post-Soviet years, Russia has been balancing between the supra-ethnic model of the nation-state, which was adopted in the USSR and which exists today in several other countries, and the outdated European model, which implies the creation of a nation based on the traditions of the ethnic majority.19 The fact that discussion about Russian ethno-amendments resumed today not only in social networks, but also at the level of power, is another argument in favour of the fact that the country has not made its choice in thirty years.
Does anyone have doubts that the Russian people and Russian culture are systemically important in Russia? No, just like there is no doubt about the meaning of the English language and British colonization in the US. But there it does not occur to anyone to fix in the US constitution the role of ethnic Britons as a state-forming ethnos. The role of the Russian people is noted in the Strategy of State Inter-Ethnic Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025,20 a fundamental document reflecting the state’s policy in the field of interethnic relations. It says: ‘Russia was created as a unity of peoples, as a state, whose backbone core has historically been the Russian people. The civilizational identity of Russia and the Russian nation, as a civil community, is based on the preservation of the Russian cultural dominance, the bearers of which are all the peoples of the Russian Federation, formed not only ethnic Russians, but also incorporating the culture of all the peoples of Russia’.
What would this really mean?
In a document such as the Strategy of State Inter-Ethnic Policy, such wording is quite possible. But to declare the ethnic Russians like a state-forming people in the constitution means to take a certain position on the model of the nation-state in Russia for many years to come, it means to announce to the whole world that the rest of the peoples historically living next to the Russians such as Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ossetians, etc. are not state-forming ones. This in itself is absurd: any indigenous people of any country can be state-forming. Take him out of the ethnocultural palette of the nation and it will be another country. Is it possible to imagine Britain without the Welsh, or Italy without the Tyrolean Germans, and Germany without the Frisians and Serbs? Similarly, it is impossible to imagine Russia without Tatars or Kalmyks. Will these Russian autochthonous minorities agree with their new status? Or will they also want to become a small state-forming people on the territory of their republics with all the ensuing consequences for the ethnic Russians and other non-titular nations?
It should also be remembered that the constitution is always oriented not to the ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups, but towards citizens. It is called upon to ensure social cohesion and unity of the political nation. Issues of blood (ethnicity), language, religion in such a situation are unifying factors only when there is full public consensus. Otherwise, this is not about unity, but about what separates the inhabitants of the same country. There are more than enough examples from Latvia and Estonia to India, Pakistan, and Israel. In Russia, there is consensus on the issue of the state language—it is owned by an absolute number of citizens. On the question of the state-forming people, there is no commonality of views. The RuNet already now, at the stage of discussion, has overflowed with accusations of each other of “dislike of the Russian people”: Russophobia, on the one hand, and chauvinism, on the other.
Fixing in the constitution the state-forming status of ethnic Russians, Russia will follow the path of many European nations that are experiencing today not just a migration crisis, but a crisis of a nation-state, when an outdated model of a nation conflicts with the objective realities of the modern global world and the expectations of minorities.21 For Russia, given the above features, that can be the path to the big problems in the inter-ethnic policy.
To quote Sergey Markedonov once again: ‘Ethnicization of politics is dangerous! Yes, today amendments about the firsts among equals can easily pass! But! But! They become a “sleeping danger” in order to wake up in moments of a crisis. Or we so believe in our monumental stability that we unlearned look at things openly and without blinkers? And lastly, Russia stood out positively against the background of other post-Soviet republics by the absence of a nation-wide ethnocracy. But to ethnicized the policy by our own hands?!’.22
As a result, the authorities tried to find a middle ground between the two antagonistic groups. An amendment was introduced in Duma on 2 March 2020, which, according to the authorities, was to be a compromise. P. 1, Art. 68 it is worded as follows: ‘The state language of the Russian Federation throughout its territory is the Russian language as the language of a state-forming people that is part of the multinational union of equal peoples of the Russian Federation’.
The amendment does not indicate what kind of people it is referring to. According to this wording, any people of Russia can claim this role, since, as already mentioned, the Russian language for all the peoples of the country is either native (as, for example, for Russian, Russian Ukrainians, Jews, Belarusians, etc.), or the second language of communication. Given that the preamble of the constitution speaks only about the multinational people of the Russian Federation, there will be no legal definition of a nation in the constitution. According to the authors’ intention, the calculation was probably that everyone would think up independently what people in Russia are the first among equals.
But in fact, both sides remained dissatisfied, and this is already evident from the new ongoing discussions in social media networks. Nationalists are unhappy that the Russian people are not mentioned anywhere. Proponents of the concept of a multinational people are unhappy with the mention of a certain state-forming people, the definition of which is not given. The idea suggests a corresponding bill, which, of course, will not add to social cohesion. In addition, both the one and the other group are unhappy with the vague wording.
The last question arises: why do the Russian authorities create these problems? Do they not delve into the essence of the problem or are they going in a fit of populism in accordance to a dangerous social trend? Do they not see the danger of a revival on this basis of the right-wing radicalism that they just destroyed as a political force just a year ago? If it is so, that is a mistake. It is worse if it was the result of a search for momentary solutions to current issues, such as ensuring a high
