military threat to India if China took over Tibet because it would “affect the balance we are trying to create in India.” That balance was in terms of both the defense-development balance and the civil-military balance.36
While Nehru was uncertain about China’s external intentions, he was certain that India could not afford to provoke its northern neighbor. Thus it was the premier’s view that “our general attitude to the new China should be a friendly expectation and waiting to see what happens.”37 Nehru’s concern about provoking Beijing showed in his furious reaction to an article that led to Chinese communist press criticism of Indian interest in Tibet.38 It was also evident in his negative reaction to discussions about a US-sponsored Pacific Pact, which envisioned including India, to counter China’s potential “loss.”
Nehru saw pacts as provocative. He believed that the World Wars had demonstrated that pacts did more to exacerbate conflict than to prevent it. Furthermore, entangling alliances restricted freedom of action. Not everyone shared this perspective. His sister, Pandit, believed that at the very least, “inevitably one finds oneself aligned on one side or the other.”39 Nehru had expressed interest in developing a “regional understanding on a broad basis” with Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia.40 But he had no desire to include India in any grouping based on anticommunism. It was important for India to leave the door open to “normal friendly relations” with the Chinese communists. And any suggestion of Indian participation in an anticommunist grouping could “only rouse suspicion and hostility of new China.”41 Panikkar encouraged this approach, noting that Nehru’s refusal to join the pact had somewhat reduced hostility against India among the communist Chinese, who had been accusing Nehru of being complicit in US policy toward Asia.42
Nehru had no interest in a pact, but he welcomed the other option American policymakers were considering to support India vis-à-vis China: economic assistance. He perceived India’s main vulnerability as internal, its primary challenge as economic.43 If his government did not solve this problem “effectively and fairly rapidly,” it would threaten both India’s stability and its political system.44
Developments in China had been instructive; they did not leave Nehru unaffected as some have argued.45 He felt that, “in Asia at any rate, communism flourished only where the economic standards of the people were indefensibly low”46 and where governments “could not deliver the goods.”47 In China, the GMD had failed to deliver and lost the faith of the people.48 There were communists in India too, who were susceptible to external influence and seeking to “create trouble in every direction.”49 The crackdown Nehru approved against them was only part of the solution; his government had to show results. Patel, too, stressed the importance of India preventing its own China-like situation from developing.50
Nehru and Patel realized that their government could not deliver alone. Rapid and efficient development required foreign assistance, which the government welcomed despite some domestic opposition.51 For this, Patel thought one country was key, saying to Nehru, “we have to depend on the USA for our progress.” The prime minister thought developments vis-à-vis Britain, the Soviet Union, and the US would be crucial. He agreed that the latter was “of course, most important.” India needed to “take full advantage of [its] friendship” with the US both for economic assistance and to develop India’s military-industrial base.52 Given global uncertainty, he told Pandit that India needed this base and military equipment, and therefore needed cooperation with others to ensure that India did not “remain weak.” And the only countries that could help at the time were the US and UK.53 Close confidant V. K. Krishna Menon later recalled him saying, “Why not align with the United States somewhat and build up our economic and military strength?”54
In 1948, Indian policymakers used China to elicit support for aid to India. Chaos in China had created an opportunity. Nehru told Patel that because China would be unlikely to “play an effective part for a long time,” many countries would recognize that India was “the only other country” in Asia able to do so, and they would thus want to cultivate a relationship with it.55 An Indian diplomat, Rajeshwar Dayal, outlined for Delhi a way to capitalize on developments in China: “The China situation will alter the balance in Asia and it seems to me that this is a good time to take up seriously the question of opening trade talks with the USSR. One result will be to stir up the Ang[l]o-Americans who have been treating our requests for capital goods rather cavalierly.”56
The use of this tactic could be quite blatant. For example, in a pitch to Secretary of State George Marshall, Nehru noted that “in working for itself India was working for all of Asia, especially in view of the tragic course in China.” India’s UN representative implied to Commerce Secretary Charles Sawyer that developments in China had increased concerns about the potential spread of communism in India, and only economic development could stem its appeal. Bajpai indicated to American interlocutors that “following the collapse of China,” US aid was indispensable to maintain India as the “chief stabilizing influence in Asia.” Using similar logic, he had also broached the subject of military assistance with the acting secretary of state Robert Lovett.57
American aid was crucial both because the US had the technical and financial ability to help India’s development plans and because the Soviet Union was not an available source.58 In the initial years of Indian independence, Nehru had reached out to Moscow, seeking to diversify India’s relationships—and thus any potential dependence—and maximize the country’s aid options.59 But, although there was a debate in Moscow about India policy, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin saw India as an Anglo-American stooge, which Nehru resented. There were other irritants as well. The Indian prime minister believed Moscow was guiding the Indian communist party’s increasingly hostile approach.60 Nehru was also critical of “Russia’s active expansionism” and “apparent lack of any sense of ethics in international affairs.”61 In addition, Soviet offers and terms of assistance had fallen short.62 It was also harder to deal with differences since Indian policymakers had few avenues to communicate with officials from the Soviet Union or its satellites.63 It was in this context that Delhi looked to Washington, and Nehru traveled to the US in October 1949.
Colliding Positions (1949–1952)
The Indian prime minister’s visit would reveal crucial differences between India and the US on communism, the Soviet Union, and China. These disagreements would only intensify, with crucial implications for US-India relations over the rest of Truman’s term and even beyond it.
Red China or New China? Comparing Notes (1949–1950)
China was a key subject of discussion between American and Indian policymakers during Nehru’s visit. He outlined both his perception of and his preferred policy toward China. He felt Guomindang mismanagement had created the space for the communists. Communism, he believed, was “alien to the Chinese mind.” “Foreign domination” would be disliked, and nationalism, growing everywhere in Asia, would eventually return as the “governing force” in China—and, meanwhile, serve to limit Sino-Soviet cooperation. Nehru gave Acheson the impression that India was “leaning toward early recognition,” explaining that “India’s proximity to China” made it view this issue differently.64 Acheson did not believe that early recognition would give India any advantage. Moreover, it was not clear that the communists controlled all of China or that they had the backing of the Chinese people—both necessary elements before the US would even consider recognition. Furthermore, he worried about the impact of recognition on those still resisting the communists. Finally, he felt the Chinese government needed to outline its “international obligations” before expecting recognition.65
American policymakers
