the matter alone.” K. P. S. Menon worried about China exporting communism via Tibet when they took over and about the status of the India-Tibet boundary.152 But he told the American political counselor that India would not take the initiative on Tibet with China. If Beijing accepted Tibetan autonomy, Delhi would recognize Chinese authority over Tibet. In the meantime, India would continue and possibly expedite its sale of small arms to Tibet and even train Tibetan officers, but it would not welcome the establishment of a Tibetan liaison office in India. Menon also emphasized that India would not take military action if China attacked Tibet.153 Delhi also resisted Anglo-American pressure to increase aid to Tibet. Finally, Menon discouraged American involvement—and particularly any discussions in Delhi—on the grounds that it would convince Beijing of a US-India anti-China conspiracy. This could expedite a Chinese takeover of Tibet.154
The US was not particularly eager to spring to Tibet’s defense. Acheson had wanted to use the threat to Tibet to convince India to move away from its “unrealism [and] semi-detached attitude” toward the Chinese challenge.155 But the US had had no desire to become embroiled alone (i.e., without India and/or the UK) by holding out the prospect of aid to Tibet. Henderson had clarified to K. P. S. Menon that the US did not want to provoke a Chinese invasion or make it harder for the Indian government to persuade Tibetan officials to accept autonomy.156 Subsequently, Washington had looked for signs of change in India’s attitude and solicited Delhi’s views on potential US-UK-Indian coordination to meet Tibet’s defense requirements. But for Acheson, ideally India had to “bear primary responsibility.”157
Delhi, on its part, had continued to eschew any covert or overt actions that Beijing might see as provocative or as part of a joint US-India effort to counter China.158 Officials did not believe that India could offer effective resistance because of Tibet’s inaccessibility and Delhi’s limited resources. There were also serious doubts about Tibetan willingness to resist. Thus the Indian government had encouraged Tibetan officials to negotiate with China.159
The outbreak of the war in Korea had increased American interest in supporting Tibet. While clarifying that assistance would not extend to direct involvement if China invaded Tibet, US officials had suggested that Tibetan officials ask India to facilitate American aid.160 But the war had not made India any more likely to help. Nehru did not think it could deter a Chinese invasion of Tibet, though officials had tried to delay it.161 They had pursued the issue on “firm [but] friendly lines” in Beijing. Bajpai had given the British high commissioner and Henderson the gist of India’s message to China: that India had gone out of its way to establish friendly relations with China even though this had been detrimental to its other bilateral relations; a Chinese invasion of Tibet might make India reassess its view of Chinese intentions, as well as its support for Beijing’s entry into the UN.162
After the invasion in October 1950, Henderson blamed India, believing that Tibet had “lost heart” because of Delhi’s reticence.163 Nonetheless, while urging India to do more and offering to be helpful, Acheson did not want to pressure India lest Delhi blame Washington for any consequent Sino-Indian complications. He did hope that, along with Chinese “duplicity in dealing with GOI [the government of India] re Korea,” developments in Tibet would make India “reassess its views re character” of the regime in Beijing.164
Henderson warned Washington against giving the impression that it was trying to use the Tibet situation to sell India on alignment with the US. He further asserted, “If [a] rift should come [between China and India] … it should clearly come through force of events and not with help of outside powers.”165 Acheson subsequently instructed American officials not to appear to be trying to create a wedge between China and India.166
The Chinese invasion might not have caused a Sino-Indian split, but it did have an impact within India. A diplomat later noted the “deep anger” it generated.167 In parliament, there was also anxiety about Chinese intentions and Indian preparedness on both the opposition and treasury benches.168 Even some socialist politicians became disillusioned with China.169 Within the government, officials like Bajpai altered their assessments—the invasion of Tibet showed that China did not really care about India’s sensitivities. With Nehru’s approval, Bajpai instructed Panikkar to tell Beijing that its use of force was harmful for Sino-Indian relations, as well as China’s international position. Suggesting that China had misled it, India also sent an official note calling the Chinese action “deplorable.”170 After India received an accusatory response from China, Delhi responded defensively, denying that it had any ambitions in Tibet, but asserting that it had certain rights there.171
The invasion further fueled the Indian government’s internal debate about China. The different perceptions of and proposed strategies toward that country were evident in a letter from Patel to Nehru and in the latter’s subsequent note on Tibet. In Patel’s view, which was closer to the dominant assessment in the US, the invasion showed that China represented both an internal and external threat to India. He asserted that Beijing was hoodwinking Delhi. Furthermore, China did not see India as a friend despite Delhi’s recognition of the communist regime and its efforts to facilitate Beijing’s seating at the UN. Patel argued that nothing India did to convince China of its good intentions would change the Chinese leadership’s hostility toward India. Finally, he viewed China’s behavior as that of a “potential enemy,” one that was no longer separated by a Tibetan buffer and that in fact had territorial ambitions that included parts of India’s northeast and Burma.
Patel was critical of the government’s response to the invasion, seeing it as too placatory and weak. The deputy prime minister thought that Beijing would see accommodation as a sign of weakness, and that complacency and vacillation would increase the threat from China. Instead, Patel advocated “enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy.” He called for a threat assessment; analysis of India’s existing and required defense capabilities; reconsideration of Delhi’s support for Beijing at the UN; strengthening of India’s northeast and of Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim; internal security measures in India’s border states; improvement of transport and communication lines to the border; manning of key border posts; reassessment of India’s Tibet presence and its position on the McMahon Line; and, finally, re-examination of India’s external relations—including with the US.172
Despite Patel’s stature, Nehru was the ultimate decisionmaker on foreign policy. Initially after the invasion, a disappointed Nehru questioned broader Chinese intentions.173 But, as Henderson had predicted,174 the prime minister decided to stay the course after receiving what he interpreted as a less antagonistic note from China in mid-November. The missive, coupled with a Chinese military pause at the Xinjiang-Tibet border, seemed to leave the door open for Sino-Tibetan negotiations.175
Nehru stressed the long-term perspective: India needed a working relationship with a Chinese communist regime that was here to stay. He believed that Beijing desired India’s friendship and that Delhi should respond. This view was probably encouraged by Panikkar’s report earlier that year that Mao had told him, “India and China cannot afford to have war.” And the chairman’s outline of the two Asian nations’ similar problems would have done nothing to discourage the prime minister’s mirror imaging.176
In a November note, Nehru also interpreted the lack of a Chinese demand for complete withdrawal of Indian interests in Tibet as significant. He reiterated that India lacked the military capacity to prevent the takeover of Tibet. Any attempt at stopping the Chinese advance would likely fail and would lead to Chinese hostility toward India and constant insecurity at India’s borders. Nehru instead sought Tibetan autonomy, arguing that the limited but more feasible goal would be harder to attain if Sino-Indian relations were bad.
Nehru did not think there would be any real Chinese military invasion of India in the “foreseeable future.” For one, this would likely
