required for a major attack on India. However, “gradual infiltration” across the border and Chinese occupation of disputed territory was possible—and indeed a risk. This required improving connectivity to India’s tribal areas in the northeast, which were not well integrated with the country, and preparation to prevent any Chinese infiltration. Furthermore, India needed to tackle the other real threat from China—the “infiltration of … ideas”—with ideas of its own.
The Indian prime minister believed that visible military strengthening on the scale that Patel envisioned was neither desirable nor feasible. Any attempt to build up India’s military on the Sino-Indian border would likely reinforce Chinese insecurity and be counterproductive—such preparation would serve as a provocation rather than a deterrent. Furthermore, Nehru asserted that India did not have the financial and military resources to prepare for an unlikely attack. Diverting significant resources to the Sino-Indian border would also undermine Indian defence vis-à-vis Pakistan, which he saw as the major potential threat. He believed, additionally, that Pakistan would take political or military advantage of Sino-Indian tensions. Even if India enhanced its defense capabilities or looked abroad for military supplies, it would then be left in a strategically “unsound” position with two major enemies.
Nehru did not rule out the possibility that the Chinese communists would be expansionist, but he did not believe this was inevitable. It depended on a number of factors, including the development of both countries and the extent to which China adopted communist characteristics. Sino-Indian conflict would be mutually destructive and would allow external actors to take advantage. Given this assessment and the level of India’s capabilities, while Delhi should prepare for contingencies, Nehru continued to believe that the best approach was reaching “some kind of understanding” with China, as long as Beijing desired the same.177 This belief underlay India’s subsequent Tibet and China policy.
Postinvasion, Acheson had hoped that, at the very least, India would participate in proposed UN action on Tibet—seen as having a propaganda purpose. The exercise might lead Delhi to realize how difficult it was to deal with Beijing and Moscow. This could make India “less neutral and more realistic about Communism,” facilitating better US-India relations.178 But, despite indicating that it would participate,179 India demurred after receiving the more conciliatory note from Beijing and interpreting other Chinese steps as friendlier (e.g., release of some American prisoners of war in North Korea).180 Bajpai was “suspicious and cynical” about the note, but he agreed that a UN debate would not be helpful at that time.181 It would jeopardize simultaneous Indian efforts for a ceasefire in Korea.182 Patel’s death in December 1950 only made Nehru’s voice more dominant on Tibet. By January 1951, Bajpai was telling Henderson that with Tibet likely beyond saving and other issues intervening, India was “giving little thought to Tibet.”183
Henderson, who had previously detected little Indian interest in the State Department idea of joint US-UK-India action to stall China in Tibet,184 urged UN action that could highlight China’s “aggressive attitude.” But he found Indian assessments to be “wishfully warped” to fit their “inclination to do nothing which might offend China.”185 While some US officials argued that such joint support would buoy Tibetan spirits, Indian officials made clear their belief that the Tibetans were merely trying to postpone—rather than resist—a Chinese takeover.
Indian officials were not disinterested, but they had different moves in mind. They were, in fact, chagrined about the idea of China taking over Tibetan border defense.186 Bajpai acknowledged that the Sino-Tibetan agreement signed in May 1951 would affect India’s position vis-à-vis Bhutan, Burma, Nepal, and even Korea. Delhi had already taken some steps to protect its interests. It had devised its own version of what came to be called pactomania in the Eisenhower administration in the US. It signed treaties with neighbors Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950), and Sikkim (1950, making it a protectorate) that gave Delhi a crucial say in their foreign and security policies.
There was also an effort to strengthen and integrate India’s northeast. After China’s initial invasion of Tibet, a defense committee assessed the impact of losing the buffer state. It recommended strengthening border posts and infrastructure for transport and communications as well as alleviating the neglect of the area and its residents. But there were limits, Bajpai stressed to Henderson, to what India could do militarily.187 Therefore, to key decisionmakers in Delhi, the missing buffer made it more necessary to keep China in good humor.188
The American embassy in Delhi remained concerned that Tibet would be “lost by default,” and that China could “constantly menace” India from there.189 The chargé argued that the US should convince India that the Sino-Tibetan treaty was not in its interests and that Delhi should encourage the Dalai Lama to reject it and flee to India.190
But, while Washington was willing to encourage Tibet’s leaders and its autonomy in spirit, it was unwilling to act alone to provide military or financial assistance or appoint official representatives to Tibet. Acheson maintained that India had the primary responsibility to help Tibet.191 In addition, the US had no desire to upset Jiang by announcing support for Tibetan sovereignty.192 Furthermore, like Britain and India, the US was concerned about any spillover impact on the Korean situation—the reason why it would not promise a specific response to a potential Tibetan appeal to the UN.193 Finally, any unilateral American action in Tibet would only serve to push India toward China; instead there was hope that Indian resentment would grow as the Chinese consolidated their hold over Tibet.194
By the fall of 1951, the Truman administration accepted that Tibetan officials were unlikely to reject the Sino-Tibetan agreement. The Far East Asia desk at the State Department advocated using “Tibet as a weapon for alerting GOI to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist Govt and, specifically, for maneuvering GOI into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.”195 There were still some attempts to get India to assure the Dalai Lama that he would be given asylum. But with Delhi unwilling to take the initiative and a new US ambassador in Delhi—Chester Bowles—who was less enthusiastic about pressuring India on this issue, such efforts faded. So did hope that India would change its China policy.
Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: The Blame Game (1950–1951)
In the fall of 1950, Acheson had told members of Congress that the Chinese going into Tibet made Delhi realize that the “force that is loose in China is a pretty difficult one to handle.”196 The American hope that India would recognize Mao’s aggressive intentions in Asia only escalated when the Chinese subsequently intervened in the Korean War.
Even though its efforts in summer and early fall 1950 had met with little success, the Indian role as intermediary between China and the US had continued. Washington usually considered India’s nonalignment and its relations with China a liability, but, along with Panikkar’s access to Chinese officials, these were seen as assets when the US needed a channel to China. Britain also had a presence in Beijing. But American officials thought Nehru and India had more credibility in Asia and the nonaligned world, and India had been willing to take on this role. From the start of the war, Indian officials had briefed American officials on the messages they received from Panikkar.197 In turn, India had passed on American messages to China, including warnings intended to deter Beijing.198 But some US policymakers doubted India’s role as an honest broker. India was not an ally, and it followed an independent China policy that they believed was primarily designed to avoid provoking Beijing. This added to the strain in the US-India relationship.
American doubts about the messenger were partly responsible for skepticism about Chinese signals via Delhi in September and October that it would intervene directly in the war if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel dividing North and South Korea.199
