Congress, Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ)—usually a moderate on India—worried that Delhi would try to force the US to make concessions to China in order to enhance Nehru’s image and influence in Asia.264 In discussions with Panikkar and Krishna Menon, American officials felt there was a lack of clarity about whether they were hearing those officials’ personal views or Chinese ones, or Indian preferences rather than Chinese ones.265 There were only more doubts when Chinese actions did not reflect Beijing’s apparent attitudes as assessed by Panikkar.266
These doubts about India as an intermediary led Washington to try to limit its role at times, which Indian officials resented. While Zhou indicated that China wanted India to be included in some negotiations, the US showed little desire to include India in groups like the Good Offices Committee (India, on its part, showed little desire to serve on the latter).267 And despite British urging, the US resisted consulting India on a sixteen-nation statement on Korea.268 The US also opposed Indian involvement in any Korean armistice conference, despite British and Canadian recommendations.269 In the case of prisoner repatriation, the US turned to the Indian channel because there were few, if any, alternatives.270 But, even in this case, US officials continued to pursue other viable alternate channels.271 They also tried to work around the Indian diplomats they neither liked nor trusted (Krishna Menon, Panikkar) and work with the ones they did (Narayanan Raghavan [N. R.] Pillai and Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit).272 These efforts to restrict India’s role and influence would continue after the Truman administration.
What Have They Done for US Lately? (1951–1952)
In 1949, K. P. S. Menon had expressed the hope that “the differences in our approach to Communist China would not lead to mutual embarrassment.”273 A couple of years later, it was clear that his hopes had been misplaced. There were consequences beyond a reluctance to give India a seat at the table. India’s China policy, for example, was a key reason for the limited appetite in Congress for aiding India. While many members of Congress publicly attacked foreign assistance broadly, India continued to present a particularly ripe target, especially for members of the China bloc.
Focused on aiding allies, particularly militarily, in their FY1952 aid request, Truman and Acheson halved the amount of aid an interagency assessment suggested for South Asia. Congress subsequently authorized only $54 million of the $65 million requested for India.274 The subsequent Indian refusal to sign the Japan Peace Treaty—primarily, the administration believed, on the grounds that China and the Soviet Union had not been part of the negotiations—did not win it any friends in Washington.275 John Foster Dulles, the US negotiator for the treaty, pointed to Nehru’s belief in the communist propaganda line of “Asia for Asians” as the reason for Indian opposition.276 Even though Nehru publicly rejected this concept, the impression stuck.277 In 1952, Bowles’s push for an expanded $250 million FY1953 aid package for India faltered, in large part because the White House did not think it could get it through Congress.
Bowles unsuccessfully tried to convince administration officials and members of Congress that Nehru had lost any illusions about China and supported the US position on prisoner repatriation in Korea “100 percent.”278 He argued that losing India to communism would be worse than the loss of China, with global, regional, and political consequences.279 He had some support for his advocacy from junior officials on the Near East and South Asia bureau, as well as liberal legislators like Representative John F. Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator Humphrey on the grounds that aid could ensure that India remained noncommunist and secure. But in Congress there was continued criticism that India was not being helpful in Korea. Of the $115 million of assistance the administration requested for India, Congress approved only $45 million—a proportionally greater cut than to the overall aid request.
The apathy toward India was widespread in Congress—where India had not developed a major constituency—and among the public, as well as within much of the administration.280 In some sections, there was downright antipathy. Truman and Acheson understood the potential threat of the lack of economic development in India, but given the administration’s other priorities (Korea, Europe), the lack of an imminent threat (of communists taking over in India) or opportunity (of winning India over), they had no stomach to take on the apathy or antipathy.
Thus Acheson and Mutual Security Agency director Averell Harriman also turned down Bowles’s request in summer 1952 for a special appropriation for India. Given congressional views on India, they were concerned that such a request could adversely affect foreign assistance more broadly. The deputy director of the Mutual Security Agency furthermore asked, “Is it in our best interests to spend large sums to build strength in a neutral India which is thereby able to assume the leadership of the Asian countries?”281
Concerns about communism spreading in India, an NSC-68 reappraisal, and cooperation with India at the UN eventually led the outgoing administration to suggest an increased FY1954 aid package for India to the incoming Eisenhower administration. But the proposal came in the lame duck period of the Truman presidency, and the chances of it getting through unscathed seemed slim.282
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Why So Wary? (1953–1956)
We did not come to an agreement about anything. I don’t mean to say we disagreed about everything. We didn’t try to come to an agreement.
—John Foster Dulles, US secretary of state, on his meeting with Jawaharlal Nehru in May 19531
It was obvious that we did not feel in the same way as the American Government about communism and the way to combat it … We felt that [the] American reaction to the communist countries was not only exaggerated and dangerous but actually was likely to produce the very opposite results than those aimed at, more especially in Asia.… American policy has led the United States to side with colonial and reactionary elements in Asia, and as a result of that, had almost presented to the communist countries an ideal opportunity to pose as liberating agencies. Mere force and threats of war might frighten people for a while, but would never succeed in convincing people.
—Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, to George Allen, April 24, 19542
During his 1949 visit to the United States, Nehru had received an honorary doctorate from Columbia University. In 1953, the man who had handed him that degree, former university president and retired general Dwight D. Eisenhower, became president of the United States. Despite their different backgrounds, Nehru and Eisenhower shared some views, including the need for balance between defense and development when thinking about national security. The Indian prime minister agreed with Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s view that military strength alone was not important; economic stability was essential as well. Furthermore, Eisenhower—like Nehru—believed that thinking in terms of unlimited means was not helpful; the resources to secure the country’s interests were limited, rather than expandable.
Between 1953 and 1956, however, shared concepts did not mean similar visions of how they should be put into practice. Nehru’s idea of containment-on-the-cheap, for example, envisioned engagement and negotiations. Eisenhower, on his part, believed that limited means necessitated burden sharing through alliances, and the use of more cost-effective instruments, such as nuclear weapons and covert action. Furthermore, while Eisenhower approved of the idea of negotiations, he left the details to Dulles, who saw negotiations as desirable only from a position of strength. In addition, Eisenhower and Dulles saw saber rattling—even of the nuclear kind—as acceptable instruments to demonstrate strength and deter adversaries. Nehru, however, thought it was provocative and counterproductive.
There
