and psychological warfare, as well as refusing to recognize Mao’s regime or support its bid to take the Chinese seat at the UN.87
Nehru told Indian heads of mission that this American approach to China was “unrealistic and fallacious.”88 He remained frustrated about the US reluctance to recognize the regime in Beijing.89 Washington was leaving a “major factor out of reckoning. It is bound to upset the cart.”90 Nehru also worried about the consequences of the “obviously wrong” American effort to keep Taipei in and Beijing out of the UN Security Council, noting, “a whole castle is sought to be built on an artificial foundation; and then, if something goes wrong afterwards, complaint is made.”91 Furthermore, isolating rather than engaging Beijing only kept it more connected to Moscow.92
Asked during a congressional hearing in 1953 if he and Nehru agreed at all on China, Dulles had said no.93 He had told the South Korean president that their key difference was on tactics—India believed “the methods of appeasement rather than strength would weaken the communist world.”94 There was little expectation that Delhi would change its approach. Nehru had told Dulles what he had told Truman: that India had to deal with China for reasons of geography and pragmatism—their countries shared a 2,000-mile boundary. And he did not want “trouble for the indefinite future,” especially since the Indian leadership needed peace for nation-building.95
In the post-Stalin era, American analysts saw Beijing’s willingness to come to the table for talks on Korea as only reinforcing Indian views that China did not intend to behave aggressively.96 US policymakers knew that India wanted to establish a modus vivendi with the regime in Beijing. For that reason, an NSC assessment had predicted in early 1954, “India will go to great lengths to win Red China’s friendship.”97 Indeed, India was doing just that at the time, with negotiations that would culminate in the signing of a Sino-Indian agreement that included the five principles of peaceful coexistence (or Panchsheel).
Did US military aid to Pakistan cause Delhi to seek a peace agreement with Beijing? Allen believed it did.98 And Indian foreign secretary R. K. Nehru did argue for “nonaggression pacts with the Soviet and Chinese” governments as one of the ways to maintain the balance with Pakistan.99 However, while the announcement of American aid to Pakistan might have contributed, India’s desire to deepen its relations with China had preceded it. In March 1953, Burmese prime minister U Nu had first suggested that Burma, China, and India sign a fifty-year friendship and nonaggression agreement. Nehru had been unsure of the Chinese reaction given Beijing’s adverse response to the Indian resolution on Korea at the UN in late 1952 and the resultant “coolness” toward India. Nonetheless, Nehru had welcomed the idea, but only if it was not “anti” any country. He also thought the duration too long, recommending instead a decade-long agreement with the possibility of renewal. He had suggested that rather than a trilateral agreement, the countries aim for bilateral ones. Nehru had wanted to be careful, telling the Indian ambassador in Beijing that any such agreements would have a powerful impact, especially on the US. Moreover, Beijing should not think Delhi wanted this more—China “did not respect those who show weakness,” so India should be “both friendly and firm.”100
From Nehru’s perspective, continuing global and regional tension in fall 1953, despite Stalin’s death and the end of the Korean War, had made it even more important for India to seek peace with China. But, thanks to India’s NNRC role, Sino-Indian relations were not “not quite happy,” as the Indian embassy in Beijing put it.101 Therefore, Nehru had sought to avoid steps that China would see as unfriendly.102 Subsequently, he had moved to settle issues that could cause tension between the two countries, announcing in September 1953 that his government had reached out to Beijing seeking talks.103
China and India began discussing the status of Tibet at the end of December 1953. In March 1954, Pillai told Allen to expect “some kind of statement of mutual desire … to maintain peace between [the] two countries” if the negotiations were successful.104 What emerged was the Sino-Indian agreement, signed in April 1954, through which India implicitly recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Explicitly, it laid out rights for trade and pilgrimages between India and Tibet, as well as Indian promises to withdraw its military missions and reduce its overall footprint in Tibet. Finally, it contained the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panchsheel, including clauses on mutual respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs.
An NSC assessment saw the Indian desire for an accommodation with China through a cultural prism and thought it stemmed from “legendary bonds of friendship and culture” and “psychological ties arising from the fact that the Chinese as a colored race and as Asians have asserted themselves against the West.”105 But, for Nehru, there was a more important reason. While he did not think there was any “immediate likelihood,” it was not inconceivable that India’s relations with China would deteriorate. He told senior foreign ministry officials that there could be a new phase of Chinese expansionism in the future, and the only feasible solution for India was to “fashion our policy to prevent [China] coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.” The agreement might not be “a permanent guarantee,” but it was a useful insurance policy at that stage.106 Beijing could change its mind, he acknowledged to Burmese leader U Nu, but he wanted to take advantage of that moment when it sought Delhi’s friendship.107 This approach was especially desirable for a leadership that did not want to enter an alliance to ensure the country’s security. Moreover, Nehru believed that India’s importance increased because of its “intimate relations” with China since Delhi could “say things [to Beijing] which many other nations could not.”108
The Sino-Indian agreement did not help India’s cause in the US. The New York Times declared, “Peiping Gets Indian Gift.”109 On Capitol Hill, Representative Bolton called the agreement the “first step toward the communization of India.”110 Allen tried to explain that the “favorable Indian attitude toward China is not because China is Communist, but in spite of the fact that it is Communist.” He acknowledged that the agreement might not be a good deal but said Indian policymakers accepted it as “the best deal they could get.”111
Nehru traced the criticism to lack of awareness of the bigger picture—that the agreement was an effort to “encircle and contain China in a ring of pledges,” as one scholar put it.112 Indians generally approved of it, but there were voices of dissent from China critics in the Praja Socialist Party on the left and the Hindu Mahasabha on the right, and even from some in the Congress Party.113 But for the prime minister, an alternate approach was neither feasible nor desirable. What India lost—rights in Tibet—it could not have held on to; moreover, what India gained outweighed any loss: “a friendly frontier and an implicit acceptance of that frontier.”114 India did not have the ability to act within Tibet. It could merely tolerate, without encouraging, the Tibetan movement in India—which he assumed the US was supporting—if it was “peaceful and unobtrusive.”115 Finally, Nehru contended that “assum[ing] an aggressive role” would only lead to trouble.116
After the treaty was signed, Zhou Enlai suddenly accepted a pending invitation to visit India, pleasantly surprising Nehru.117 In the US, a New York Times editorial reflected American disapproval, noting with chagrin that Zhou’s visit was taking place on the fourth anniversary of the Chinese-“aided and abetted” North Korean invasion of South Korea.118 In India, Zhou was well received. Nehru and the premier did not discuss potentially contentious issues like the Sino-Indian border—Nehru indeed thought that the very act of bringing the subject up might suggest doubt about India’s frontiers, which he asserted were settled.119 Sarvepalli (S.) Radhakrishnan, the Indian vice president, told Allen that Zhou was reasonable about every subject, except one—the US.120
US policy toward
