as Nehru’s biographer put it, felt they were in a “thankless position” with “both sides accusing India of partisanship.”29 American observers charged that India accepted Chinese and North Korean allegations that Taiwan was instigating anticommunist prisoners to riot, while ignoring US allegations about the communists doing the same.30 Senate majority leader Knowland accused India of giving in to all Chinese demands; in response, Dulles indicated the administration’s displeasure with some of the NNRC’s functioning.31 China, on the other hand, criticized India for not using force to coerce Chinese and North Korean POWs to return to their home countries.32 It then vociferously condemned the Indian chair’s announcement that the NNRC would return unrepatriated POWs to their captors by January 22, 1954.33 Even some in the US who wanted India to release all unrepatriated POWs complained about that step.34 Delhi was not pleased when the US subsequently released them.
The Eisenhower administration’s move to exclude India from the postarmistice political conference also did not win it any friends there. Nehru had expected that India would be asked to participate.35 But, despite Australian, British, and Canadian support, the US refused to endorse Indian participation, largely because of the objections of South Korea, which accused India of “trafficking with the Communists.”36 India critic Knowland told Robertson that India’s “dubious” record should take it out of contention.37 The US subsequently announced that it would vote against extending India an invitation.38 China, on the other hand, supported Indian participation and even suggested Delhi as a possible venue for the conference—thereby scoring propaganda points with India.39
To save face and the conference, Nehru withdrew India from consideration. He stated that the US step was one more example of the West excluding Asians from decisionmaking that affected Asia. Asian countries, he asserted, would no longer be “ignored or bypassed, certainly not sat upon.”40 It was around this time that Indian policymakers also started publicly indicating a desire to play a leadership role in Asia.41 Citing how crucial it was to keep India “out of the communist orbit,” Dulles’s deputy for the political conference had warned about Korea-related anti-India opinion damaging US-India relations.42 And he had been proved correct.
In Washington in the aftermath of the Korean War, there was an effort to downplay any Asian leadership role for India and Nehru—a role many in the US had earlier advocated. Knowland, criticizing India for “yielding” to China, dismissed Nehru as the spokesman for all of Asia.43 Dulles told Eisenhower that the US should avoid actions that would “establish Nehru as the leader of all South and Southeast Asia.”44 And American diplomats reported with satisfaction when differences between Nehru and other South Asian leaders on communism were apparent.45
Even beyond Washington, the Korean War and Delhi’s mediatory role between China and the US took its toll on American public opinion of India. In January 1951, a quarter of those polled had said India could not be counted on to cooperate with the US; by April 1954 this number had climbed to 42 percent. In January 1952, 57 percent of those polled believed that India was neither on the American nor the Russian side; in April 1954, only 28 percent thought India was neutral, with 7 percent believing the Indian government was communist and 26 percent considering it to be pro-communist.46
Indochina: Dueling Approaches (1953–1954)
Korea was not the only Asian conflict that caused US-India strain; there was also the situation in Indochina, where Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh was taking on US ally France. US and Indian objectives in Southeast Asia were not entirely disparate. Eisenhower and Dulles believed that after the loss of China to the communist world, a loss in Vietnam—to the China-backed Vietminh—would be crippling. Even with an upswing in Sino-Indian relations, however, India had no interest in greater Chinese influence in the region.47 And American officials acknowledged that Delhi desired neither a return to colonialism nor a turn to communism in the region nor “a further consolidation of external communist power.”48
But, while their goals in Southeast Asia might have been similar, once again, India and the US had different ideas about the right approach. Nehru was critical of Washington’s “purely military approach in aid of a colonial power.” Communists were no doubt taking advantage of the situation, but, he believed, at its root this was about nationalism. He understood American motivations—anti-communism and the desire not to abandon ally France—but he thought its approach was counterproductive, creating the opportunity for communists in Indochina.49
The differences were evident in spring 1954 as a settlement conference was being discussed. Dulles gave what came to be called his massive retaliation speech, and also made clear American reluctance to participate in a conference. Furthermore, he publicly dismissed criticism of the US nonrecognition of the Chinese communist regime. Dulles insisted this policy was “soberly rational” given Beijing’s “consistently and viciously hostile” behavior toward the US. He argued that communist promises were unreliable and outlined the administration’s preferred alternative of united action against the Chinese threat.50
Nehru found it “rather odd” and unhelpful that, ahead of the conference planned in Geneva, Dulles had given a speech emphasizing the need for collective action against the communist threat in East Asia.51 He worried that the secretary of state would play spoiler at the talks so that a collective security organization would come into being as an alternative. The US, he felt, only seemed to be able to “think in terms of war or threat of war and massive retaliation,” which rendered a solution impossible.52
But Dulles’s move was deliberate—he thought it would serve as a warning to China. Given the imminent fall of Dien Bien Phu, it could also help the weak French negotiating position at the conference. Eisenhower had been skeptical of the British and French belief in the value of negotiations with the communists—and disapproved of the influence India seemed to have with British policymakers on this question. Nonetheless, the president did not want to break with allies who hoped to reach a settlement at Geneva. So he agreed to send US representatives to the conference, even as Dulles hoped that the negotiations would “acrimoniously collapse.”53
India’s fallen stock as an honest broker shaped the American attitude toward its involvement in the Geneva conference that April. Dulles’s initial reluctance about such a summit was indeed partly due to any related elevation of India to a leading role in Asia.54 The US eventually succeeded in officially excluding India from the conference. Nonetheless, as the Indian embassy in Beijing noted, India “was more than present”—the result of Nehru sending Krishna Menon to Geneva.55
The conference did not alleviate Nehru’s doubts about the US approach. Unlike Dulles, the prime minister did not think the participating Chinese premier was “uncompromising” or merely following Moscow’s lead at the conference. He believed that any rigidity on Zhou’s part stemmed from American behavior—a sense exacerbated by Zhou’s assertion to Nehru that the US attitude basically was “to obstruct any settlement in the Conference.”56
Nehru thought the options in Southeast Asia were clear: (1) a settlement that accepted and stabilized the status quo and essentially prevented Chinese expansion, or (2) a lack of agreement, which meant continuation of military activity that would benefit China and the Vietminh. He was concerned that US policy was leading to the latter, which, in turn, would eventually lead to war.57 Seeking a settlement, Nehru proposed a peace plan in conjunction with other Asian leaders and sought British support for it. Furthermore, egged on by British foreign secretary Anthony Eden, Nehru urged Zhou to cease large-scale attacks in Indochina, even getting the Chinese premier’s public endorsement in principle of noninterference in Southeast Asia.58
Nehru had not expected much to come from the Geneva conference but
