constitute any bar to growing friendship and cooperation” between the US and India. There was a great amount of “common ground on which we can work out mutual problems and minimize differences.” Nehru agreed, saying differences in approach were “natural,” but “should not be allowed to come in the way.”148 Good intentions, however, were not enough to overcome the tensions generated by differences over their methods.
A key source of that tension—Indian engagement with China—continued, with a year of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) culminating in China’s coming-out party at the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955. Publicly, Dulles said the conference was of no direct concern to the US. Privately, however, Allen, now the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African affairs, told the Indian ambassador that the inclusion of China at the conference would not be “well received.”149 But Nehru had dismissed these objections and US pressure on the other organizers, insisting that China needed to be invited.150 For him, as John Garver has observed, the conference was part of “creating political constraints” on China.151 And at Bandung, Nehru found Zhou to be “accommodating” and countries like Pakistan and Turkey—spurred, he believed, by Washington—to be obstructive.152
The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955)
Having had to deal with the first Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954, the Eisenhower administration would not have described the Chinese leadership as accommodating. In September, China started shelling Taiwan-held offshore islands. Eisenhower and Dulles had been concerned that Jiang would try to force their hand with an attempt to make a move onto the mainland. But for reasons of credibility, as well as domestic politics, the Eisenhower administration felt it could not jettison the GMD leader. Thus, following intensifying Chinese shelling, it expanded the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. It also sped up discussions between Taiwan and the US on a mutual defense treaty (MDT), which they saw as “a way to simultaneously support and control” Jiang. It was eventually signed in December 1954 despite concerns on the part of some, including Dulles. In a related exchange of letters, the US also got Taipei to commit not to unilaterally attack China.153
While the US had been considering the MDT, the State Department’s Near Eastern and South Asia bureau had expressed concern that it would drive India “closer” to China.154 India would see the MDT as provocative and indicative of the lack of desire on the part of the US to reach a settlement with China.155 An intelligence assessment had added that India would see it as “further evidence of US imperialistic interference in Asian affairs.”156
But Nehru’s reaction was more nuanced.157 He believed that earlier in his administration, Eisenhower had altered Truman’s stance of restraining Taiwan from attacking China. This had heightened Chinese insecurities and destabilized the situation. Nehru told the British high commissioner that, if an MDT indicated that the US would restrain Taiwan from attacking the mainland, it would be “commend[able]” and “useful” in the long term even if Beijing was not immediately convinced of US sincerity.158
On his visit to Beijing, as the crisis continued, Nehru stressed the importance of diplomacy to his Chinese interlocutors. He emphasized that negotiations were the best method to solve issues related to Taiwan and Southeast Asia, “instead of using armed force as [China did] now.” Nehru emphasized that a diplomatic approach would pave the way toward easing China’s isolation. That was important because Beijing’s lack of engagement meant it did not really understand countries outside the communist bloc.159
As the Taiwan Strait crisis escalated, toward the end of January 1955, Eisenhower sought and received congressional authorization to use force to protect Taiwan. The president and Dulles saw this action as brinkmanship to deter China; Nehru saw it as provocative. The prime minister thought it would prove ineffective and counterproductive to Eisenhower and Dulles’s stated goal of stabilizing the region.160 Believing that China was “[l]ogically entitled” to take possession of the offshore islands,161 he saw Dulles’s subsequent speech on providing a shield for the offshore islands as just making things worse.162
Nehru told his daughter the situation was “dangerous,” with “two great countries with high ideas of their own prestige and ‘face’ and with a good deal of passion [being] at logger-heads.”163 He instructed his ambassador in the Soviet Union to urge Moscow to find a way to reduce the tension.164 Nehru did not want to make any public statements that would add to the problem.165 Otherwise quick to participate in multilateral efforts, he declined the Burmese premier’s suggestion of a multilateral declaration.166 When U Nu then suggested that China, India, the Soviet Union, and the UK meet to discuss Taiwan, Nehru agreed with British foreign secretary Anthony Eden that such a meeting was impractical.167 Furthermore, as even Krishna Menon noted, it was “unrealistic” to “ignore American sentiment.”168
Nehru did not hold only the US responsible for the situation; he also disapproved of Mao’s means of tackling it. Through his ambassador in Beijing, Nehru urged China to be constructive or show some inclination to discuss the crisis. He was disappointed with the negative Chinese response. India, in theory, recognized the mainland’s claims to Taiwan, but Nehru noted that “however justified it might be, it is not practical politics at present to ask [the] US to withdraw completely.” What China could aim for, and India could help with, was direct or indirect negotiations on the offshore islands, prevention of deepening US-Taiwan relations, and recognition of the Beijing regime.169
The Indian prime minister knew by this point that the US had not given Jiang assurances on the offshore islands but worried that Washington’s stance remained ambiguous.170 Indeed, it was intended that way to keep China guessing.171 Nehru told the Commonwealth prime ministers that the situation called for an American assurance that it would not use Taiwan as a base to attack the mainland. China would then not resort to war to take over the island.172
American policymakers did not want war, but they were not as optimistic about Chinese intentions, and they could not let Taiwan fall. In March, Eisenhower, Vice President Richard Nixon, and Dulles publicly implied that the US would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in the event of war in the Strait—not just as a message to Beijing, but also to Moscow and perhaps to prepare the ground domestically in case of war.173 These public statements did not help their cause with Nehru. Indian officials were aware of US concerns about credibility.174 And the prime minister was not entirely unsympathetic to Eisenhower’s difficulties related to dealing with Jiang.175 But he continued to believe that Washington’s China policy was “basically wrong”—and the longer it stood, the harder it would be to change.176
By mid-April, Nehru felt that the American attitude on the offshore islands had “toned down a little.” He disapproved of Dulles’s indication that the issue should be brought up at the UN, seeing it—correctly—as an American attempt to tie its allies’ hands. He did believe, however, that the US was restraining Jiang from attacking the mainland and would itself not attack.177 Little did he know that this was when Eisenhower and Dulles were proposing Taiwanese withdrawal from the offshore islands—in exchange for a US blockade and mining of the Strait and placement of nuclear weapons in Taiwan.178 Before those US-Taiwanese discussions bore any result, however, Zhou made a surprising move.
At Bandung, the Chinese premier refused to renounce the use of force to reclaim Taiwan but indicated a willingness to talk directly to American officials.179 Nehru had been frustrated with Beijing’s “good deal of stubbornness,”180 but this changed to approval after Zhou’s overture. The Indian embassy in Beijing believed the offer was the effect of the Bandung conference—and validation of the Indian approach.181 Dulles, on the other hand, claimed
