Fateful Triangle. Tanvi Madan

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a settlement. India subsequently agreed to chair the International Control Commission, created to supervise ceasefires in Indochina. The US, on the other hand, refused to sign the agreement. It had been pleased neither with the settlement nor with Krishna Menon’s shuttling.

      The US-India differences on Indochina only added to negative American perceptions of India’s role in Asia. An unnamed US policymaker lamented publicly that “the Chinese Communists in a sense hold a veto over India.”60 During congressional hearings on the foreign assistance program, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee questioned India’s attitude. Representative John Martin Vorys (R-OH) asserted that India was a “neutral that isn’t even neutral.” Representatives Ralph E. Church (R-IL) and Walter Judd (R-MN) commented that continued assistance to an unsupportive India adversely affected the US position with supportive partners in Asia. Representative Donald Jackson (R-CA) pointed out that India had actively put up “stumbling blocks” for the US.61

      One of those obstacles was Nehru’s reiteration that foreign forces en route to Indochina would not be permitted to fly over India. Representative Frances P. Bolton (R-OH) wondered if Indian policymakers realized that their attitude on Indochina was going “to bring communism right to their own doors.”62 Appropriations Committee chairman Senator Styles Bridges and others said the US should keep in mind Nehru’s refusal when considering aid to India. Senator Homer Ferguson (R-MI) added that India’s action “gave aid and comfort to the communist world.”63

      Congressional criticism had an impact in India—but not the kind intended. Nehru said that while “it would be grossly unfair … to judge the United States by the speeches of some Senators … inevitably there are reactions in India to speeches and writings in the press.”64 Reports indicated that even Indian friends of the US and critics of Nehru were disappointed by the outburst against India in Congress.65 The prime minister also expressed doubts to his ambassador in Washington about accepting American aid since the two countries were at such loggerheads.66

      There would be further doubts, as the US turned to a different approach to contain communism in Asia: collective security. US ambassador to India George V. Allen told Congress this was the source of the “biggest difference” between the US and India.67 And when the administration subsequently announced the consideration of a collective security organization in Asia—the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—this only further exacerbated US-India tensions.68

      Problematic Partnerships (1953–1955)

      Like Acheson before him, Dulles noted that the US and India did not necessarily have differences on ultimate interests or objectives. The real crux of the problem was India’s method of achieving those goals.69 One key example of its different approach was the Indian engagement of China. India, too, saw Eisenhower’s chosen means as increasing India’s difficulties. This was particularly true of collective security, which made Pakistan part of the solution from Washington’s perspective, rather than part of the problem as Delhi saw it.

      US-Pakistan: Collective Security or Creating Insecurity? (1953–1954)

      The US would have liked to see India as part of its evolving collective security plans. Dulles was even willing to consider including nonaggression principles—of the Sino-Indian Panchsheel sort (discussed later in the chapter) that some were arguing for—if it would bring India and Burma into SEATO.70 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their part, wanted to exclude India and focus on the Pacific.71 But the State Department considered, with Eisenhower’s approval, the idea of organizing a smaller group on military matters and another on economic development that could attract states like India.72 Defense Secretary Charles Wilson thought Britain and India should take the initiative for any Southeast Asian consortium.73 Wilson and National Security Adviser Robert Cutler favored an Asian economic grouping more than a US-sponsored military one, but Dulles thought the US had come too far to jettison the latter.74 The US eventually dropped the idea of a dual-track group since neither Japan nor India were joining, and nonaligned countries were unlikely to participate in an economic grouping associated with the military treaty.75

      Nehru’s general belief that pacts “brought insecurity” meant he had no interest in SEATO.76 He told parliament that the motivation for its creation—to ease the fears of countries in the region—might be good, but the approach was wrong.77 It could only be seen as anti-China, he said at the Bogor conference that preceded the Bandung summit.78 Nehru disagreed with the American view that China posed a clear and present danger in Southeast Asia. In another instance of mirror imaging, he told American ambassador George Allen that China did not have aggression on its mind; rather, like India, China wanted peace so that it could focus internally. Moreover, he disagreed with the Eisenhower administration’s military approach, arguing that it increased rather than alleviated insecurity. He stated that the US should accept Chinese assurances that they would not indulge in aggression and, in turn, assure Beijing that it would not try to invade China or overthrow the communist regime. In what had become a familiar retort, however, Allen argued that, given its apparent expansionist tendencies in Korea and Indochina, China needed to reassure the US first.79

      While India had no interest in SEATO, its neighbor Pakistan did. News of Pakistani negotiations with the US for military aid, which began in spring 1953, had become public in November 1953. Subsequently, in February 1954, the US had confirmed it would provide military aid. A few months later, Pakistan offered to join SEATO, and US policymakers reluctantly accepted.80

      There was an outcry in India against the inclusion of Pakistan in the US strategic script.81 Nehru called it an “intrusion of a new and dangerous element in the politics of Asia,” one that required an Indian policy rethink.82 Nehru told the home minister that the US would likely play a restraining role on Pakistan vis-à-vis India because “such a conflict would upset their larger plans in Asia.” But he was extremely anxious about Pakistan’s increased access to military equipment and the implications for Indian defense expenditures.83

      Had India’s China policy affected the US decision to ally with Pakistan? Robert J. McMahon has argued that “American disillusionment with and devaluation of India” was definitely “a necessary precondition” for it.84 That devaluation had partly stemmed from India’s lack of willingness to play the role vis-à-vis China that Washington had hoped it would. The role it had played had not been helpful. The disillusionment, too, partly flowed from what US policymakers saw as India’s lack of understanding of the China threat and the American approach toward China. Beyond Delhi’s willingness, questions about India’s ability to stand up to China also contributed to the decision to go the collective security route. The idea of alliances and partnerships in the region itself partly stemmed from the belief that while India and Japan were potentially considerably strong, at that point, as the NSC statement of policy on China noted, they lacked the ability to resist the communists effectively. Thus noncommunist Asia needed “protection against Communist attack.”85

      Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai: Peaceful Coexistence or Naïve Nurturing? (1953–1955)

      Most Indian policymakers disagreed that India needed such protection and objected even more vociferously to the way the Eisenhower administration envisioned protecting Asia. Indeed, in mid-1953, US intelligence analysts had noted that the American anticommunist efforts that made India the most apprehensive were those directed against China.86

      The approach Eisenhower and Dulles took focused on pressuring China. They had concluded that there were few near-term feasible options to get rid of the communist government in Beijing. Pressure, on the other hand, could facilitate internal instability. Isolating

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