views.200 American officials thought he was not objective about the Chinese—a concern that Indian officials like Bajpai and Pandit shared.201 Yet others, including Truman, believed that China was trying to influence a vote pending at the UN, and that the messages were either just Chinese propaganda or “a bald attempt to blackmail the UN.” Moreover, MacArthur had assured the president that China was unlikely to intervene.202
Allies, as well as some in American military and political circles, worried about potential Chinese escalation if the 38th parallel was crossed. But Truman was even more concerned about global and domestic credibility, and military demands.203 Thus, despite India’s and others’ warnings, he did not rescind his approval to cross the parallel. On October 7, US forces crossed the parallel. Twelve days later, Chinese troops started moving into Korea.
Expectations in Washington that the Chinese entry into the war would lead India to see the light assumed that Delhi would share Washington’s interpretation of Chinese actions. Instead, it increased Nehru’s frustration with the US rather than with China. Indian officials believed MacArthur’s move had provoked China into retaliation. This heightened the prospect of a larger war, which Nehru—dreading that India would be dragged into war at a time when it needed peace—had been trying to prevent.204 To avert even further escalation, India sponsored a UN resolution in January 1951, backed by Britain, that called for a ceasefire and negotiations. The US grudgingly supported the resolution, with Acheson hoping that China would reject it.205
Beijing did exactly that, leading to criticism in Indian newspapers and disappointment in the government.206 An Indian diplomat in Moscow reported back that Chinese “intransigence” was following “the Soviet line,” and Delhi should thus curtail hopes of an “Asiatic Tito” (i.e., a Mao willing to buck that line).207 But, publicly, the Indian government asserted that the Chinese reply was not an “outright rejection.”208
Parallel American efforts toward a General Assembly resolution blaming China as the aggressor proved to be another source of tension between the US and India. Nehru vociferously criticized it as another example of the US not facing facts. He argued that rather than Chinese aggression being responsible, “All the troubles in the Far East arise from the failure of the rest of the world to adjust itself to the changes which have taken place in Asia.”209 For Nehru, the US had erred in crossing the 38th parallel despite Chinese (and Indian) warnings, and “further complications ensued.”210 With the resolution, it was only shutting the door to negotiations and compounding its mistakes.211
Truman disagreed, and bluntly and publicly said, “I believe in calling an aggressor an aggressor.”212 American commentators dismissed Nehru’s assertion that the isolation of China, rather than Chinese aggression, had led to the situation in Korea. Worse, he was playing into Chinese hands by “sowing confusion and mistrust.”213 Beijing did not want a settlement, as Delhi and London believed. Rather, Chinese actions were designed to divide the noncommunist countries.214
Once again, the different lessons learned from the Second World War played a role in shaping US and Indian views of the best approach. Henderson told Bajpai that collective failure to combat aggression would only lead to more belligerence, eventually resulting in a larger war.215 A frustrated Acheson could not understand “what means India would propose [to] use to check aggression” instead.216 Bajpai contended that the means would “depend upon form and character of aggression and upon effect which such means might have upon world peace.”217
The differences over means, including the right balance between the use of force and diplomacy, were broader. NSC-68 and subsequent American policy reflected the belief that the need to counter an existential threat did not just make “all interests vital”; it also made “all means affordable, all methods justifiable.” But for Nehru, as the Australian high commissioner to India put it, “the end rarely justified the means.” In the US, moreover, the Korean War had only strengthened the view expressed in NSC-68 that active military resistance was more appropriate than passively waiting for the emergence of nationalist resistance—as Nehru seemed to prefer. These different views of the best means were perhaps partly influenced by the two countries’ capabilities. While there was a sense in the Truman administration that rather than divide the resource pie, one could expand it to justify larger defense spending, Indian policymakers, including Nehru, did not believe that was feasible for them given their limited resources.218
Henderson hoped that differences over tactics would not overpower a common interest in peace and security.219 But for Acheson, “it was not [Nehru’s] objectives so much as [the] way in which he said and did things which had caused us lots of trouble.”220 Nehru, too, subsequently acknowledged that the main difference between the US and India was “in the method of approach.”221 For US policymakers “frustrating the Kremlin design” had become a goal in itself.222 For Nehru, this blurring of means and ends—and the American emphasis on military instruments—made it harder to achieve the objective of peace.
The consequence of these differences, especially as the situation in Korea deteriorated after the Chinese intervention, was strain in the US-India relationship. Pandit expressed concern to Bajpai about the “considerable hostility” toward India in US government circles as a result of various China-related disagreements. Lamenting “the universality of the change in tone,” Bajpai felt as a consequence, “for the time being, at any rate, we are isolated, and that over Kashmir and other issues, Pakistan and our enemies will exploit our isolation to the full.”223
Beyond disillusionment, a more visible impact of the China-related friction was the reaction to India’s first major request for bilateral assistance from the US in December 1950. Delhi had asked for food aid. There was debate within the Truman administration—not so much on the desirability of aiding India economically, but on the feasibility given the cost and congressional attitude. While there were a number of US-India disagreements, Acheson told the Indian ambassador frankly that Congress would basically watch India’s approach on two matters: (1) Kashmir and (2) Korea, especially India’s response to greater Chinese involvement.224
India’s attitude toward the Korean War, where the US was directly involved, evoked a greater reaction in Congress than the subject of Kashmir. When Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee reached out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Tom Connally (D-TX) to facilitate passage of an aid bill in January 1951, the senator bluntly noted that sentiments toward India, greatly affected by its China policy, would make the task difficult.225 He refused to move quickly on Indian food assistance, referring the question to a subcommittee.226 There, McGhee tried to argue that the grant would have a “strong conditioning effect” on Nehru’s policies and Indians’ sentiments. If, however, the US did nothing despite its resources and large numbers of people died, the Indian people “will know at that time that Mr. Nehru and we were on the outs over the question of Communist China, and an inference will be very strong to them that we denied this request because we did not like the political attitude Mr. Nehru expressed.”
But Connally retorted, “Nehru is out giving us hell at the time, working against us and voting against us” and was unlikely to change his approach. Senator Guy Gillette (D-IA) said he did not want to do anything to stabilize Nehru’s position. And Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AK) said that India should pay for the food. He added that he did not like what appeared to be blackmail, with India arguing, “Give it to us or we will go Communist.” McGhee argued that the US had already lost China and could not afford to lose India too, but when Fulbright asked if India, especially given its attitude, was “more important than the Ruhr and Japan,” the assistant secretary had to admit “strategically, no.”227
US officials told their Indian counterparts that their statements and actions, which were seen as defending
