the administration had noted, “There is little hope that Nehru will dramatically announce that he has seen the light.”66 Henderson had noted that a survey of elite Indian opinion on China had shown that the majority of the leadership shared the prime minister’s views.67 Furthermore, reports from American diplomats in Delhi and Nanking had made evident that American and Indian attitudes toward the Chinese communists did not fully overlap.68
Nehru’s visit, with public hints that Delhi was close to recognizing the communist regime in China,69 made clear to the American public what had been apparent to some observers within the administration: the US might have assigned India a role in its strategic script, but India was not willing to play that role in the way the US wanted.70 As the British ambassador in Washington noted, the visit “made abundantly clear to the American public that they could not look to India as a ready-made replacement for China [in] the cold war against Communism.”71 Speaking to the US Congress, Nehru had asserted, “Where freedom is menaced … or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral.”72 But as the New York Times lamented, Nehru “declined to encourage the slightest hope” that the US would have an ally in India.73 The “fall” of China had created a constituency for India in Washington among the public and Congress; Nehru’s visit limited its hopes and size.
Within the administration, the visit cemented the view that India was not necessarily the answer to its China problem—certainly not one that would justify half a billion dollars of aid at a time when resources were limited, congressional support was uncertain, and the Truman administration’s focus and the public’s attention remained on Europe.74 There was also a developing change in emphasis in US policy from economic to military assistance. Thus, in the week after Nehru’s visit, Henderson’s proposal for a large aid package to India was set aside.75
Overall, Nehru’s visit limited the US view of India’s importance. The shift in the administration’s attitude was evident in the National Security Council staff’s December 1949 draft position paper on Asia policy (NSC 48/1). It stressed that since communism was global, rather than regional or local, the solution was not necessarily regional or local. Thus it would be “unwise” for the US to look toward India as a bulwark against communism in Asia.76 At a meeting of US chiefs of mission in East Asia, officials also expressed doubts about the desirability and feasibility of building up Japan or India as dominant powers to counter China and the Soviet Union. India had not shown “constructive leadership,” and it was preoccupied with internal matters. Moreover, any such assigned leadership would stir up countries like Pakistan or Sri Lanka.77
The evolving American strategic framework did, nonetheless, have a place for South Asia more broadly. This affected US policy in two ways that led to disagreements with Delhi. First, American policymakers put an even higher premium on stability in South Asia. While Indian policymakers would not have argued with this objective, the American assessment that the Kashmir dispute was one of the key threats to that stability—and required greater US involvement—came to be a major source of tension between the US and India.78 Second, even though India was the bigger prize in most American policymakers’ eyes, as NSC 48 outlined, it also became important to prevent Pakistan from falling to communism. And, in spring 1950, Pakistani prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan made clear that, while India might resist playing a role in the American script for Asia, his country was ready for a role.79
There was one area of US-India agreement on China, but it did not lead to convergence because of differences over means. The New York Times reported that one aspect of Nehru’s prescription—pursuing a wedge strategy—had impressed the State Department.80 Even before his visit, China watchers at State had argued against assuming Soviet control of the Chinese communists and stressed that Mao could act independently. Like Nehru, the American embassy in Moscow thought that US recognition of the communist Chinese government could help create a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Acheson, in turn, believed that attempting to detach China from the Soviet Union would not constitute appeasement.
By the end of 1949, NSC 48/2 endorsed the idea of exploiting “rifts” between the communist giants.81 But, while this US objective was defined, the means to achieve it were not as clear. Kennan recommended a hands-off American policy. Truman and Acheson, on the other hand, contemplated cautiously detaching Beijing from Moscow, but not until the Chinese communists stopped “active abuse of us.”82
This question of whether China or the US should take the first step would become a continuing point of difference with India. Furthermore, the Truman administration publicly continued to treat and condemn international communism as a monolith. To Nehru, as he had told the American leadership, this approach was counterproductive to the objective of facilitating a Sino-Soviet split.
To Recognize or Not to Recognize
Nehru was willing to take the first step with China by offering to recognize the People’s Republic in late December 1949. Through most of that year, the Indian prime minister had been in “no hurry” to recognize communist China.83 He had wanted to “wait and watch developments” in China before India took such a step.84 Nehru had also not wanted “too abrupt a break” with Jiang.85 The communist Chinese had not been friendly, and throughout that year, their news outlets had continued to condemn his government as being a “lackey” of Western “imperialists.”86 He also wanted to communicate and coordinate with other countries like Britain and the US, though Indian representative in China K. M. Panikkar advised against this.87 Finally, there was no consensus in India about recognition.
There had been a lively debate in India among the press and politicians of all stripes about whether to recognize communist China. Some supported recognition on idealistic or pragmatic bases; some opposed it as disloyal to Jiang or on the grounds that it would divide the US and India. Yet others called for conditional recognition, seeking guarantees from China in return. Within the government, Panikkar, foreign secretary Kumara Padma Sivasankara (K. P. S.) Menon (former Indian agent general in China), and high commissioner in London Krishna Menon argued in favor of recognition. Others such as Governor-General Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, Deputy Prime Minister Patel, and some diplomats advocated a “go slow” approach.88 Some, like the political officer in Sikkim, suggested that India should state that any recognition was “without prejudice” to India’s rights and commitments vis-à-vis Tibet. Bajpai, who did not believe India could help Tibet militarily, similarly argued for using the recognition negotiations to protect India’s rights there.89
Washington followed this debate closely. Other countries, including American allies like Britain, had made clear that they would soon recognize the communist Chinese government. But US policymakers and legislators watched India’s decision closely because Nehru was thought to have broader influence, especially among other developing countries and with the Commonwealth.90 Chairman Tom Connally’s first question to Acheson at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing ahead of the Indian prime minister’s visit to Washington had been whether India was favoring recognition.91
Administration officials were aware that Nehru’s government was leaning toward recognition. In May 1949, the US ambassador to China had conveyed rumors that India would recognize the communist government “fairly promptly after [a] ‘decent interval.’”92 American officials had subsequently sought assurances from the Indian government that it would coordinate or at least consult with the US or Commonwealth states on the matter of recognition.93 By September, it had been evident that it was just a matter of time before India recognized Mao’s regime.94 In Delhi, the Indian foreign secretary had remarked to the US chargé that, while there was “no reason for haste,” recognition was “inevitable.”95
Nehru had not decided on the how and when
