the free world could afford no more losses to the communist world, that the battlefield was global, and that any loss would decrease American credibility and security. Moreover, unlike Indian officials, they saw communism as monolithic and incompatible with nationalism, and believed Beijing to be just an affiliate of Moscow. The administration also saw decolonization, which Nehru welcomed, as creating vulnerabilities that the communists could exploit. Furthermore, there was disapproval of neutral countries, which muddied the waters and created rifts in the free world that the communist world would manipulate.3
In most of Eisenhower’s first term, which this chapter covers, these differences contributed to or manifested themselves in persistent US-India disagreement on China. The two countries’ different attitudes and approaches toward that country were evident in the final stages and the aftermath of the Korean War, as well as in their debates over Indochina, American prisoners in China, and the Taiwan Strait crisis. And these developments took place as India’s partnership with China and the Soviet Union—and that of the US with Pakistan—evolved. Delhi’s and Washington’s differences on China had adverse consequences for the relationship—they deepened the rift between the US and India or, at the very least, prevented them from bridging the gap. This chapter examines those differences and their impact on the relationship. In a final section, it also considers why those disagreements did not lead to disengagement.
Interacting in the East (1953–1954)
In the early years of the Eisenhower administration, American and Indian officials engaged on East Asian and Southeast Asian issues. They frequently found themselves at odds, often over means more than ends.
Korea: Mediating Once More (1953–1954)
The Korean War was the most urgent problem facing Eisenhower when he came to office.4 The president and Dulles wanted to end the war that was consuming American resources and concerning US allies. At the start of the administration, to bring Beijing to the negotiating table on US terms, they increased the pressure on China and North Korea. Policymakers even considered the use of nuclear weapons to end the war. Then, suddenly, in the aftermath of Stalin’s death in March 1953, China offered to exchange sick and wounded prisoners—as Delhi had proposed in 1952 and Washington had suggested the month before—and to move toward a settlement.
Eisenhower and Dulles debated whether the offer was a genuine attempt toward peace or a stalling tactic,5 but Nehru believed the new Soviet leadership wanted to ease global tension.6 While he often demurred from assessing the extent of Soviet sway over Chinese decisionmaking7 and sometimes even rejected that Moscow had any influence, Nehru believed that the Chinese offer had to have had Soviet approval.8 He did not know the precise reasons behind the change in Beijing’s and Moscow’s attitudes, but he welcomed it. He also appreciated Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace speech in April. Nehru thought it was “a great improvement” from the first few months of the administration, when escalation seemed to be the chosen US approach in East Asia—an approach he had publicly criticized. But he feared that continuing American suspicion of the communist countries would prevent a settlement.9 And, as he told Dulles that May in Delhi, the likely alternative was war on a “much wider and more intensive scale”—as the secretary of state had himself indicated.10
While Nehru thought the US was too suspicious, the administration thought he was not suspicious enough of China and the Soviet Union. This shaped its attitude on aid for India. Dulles told Congress that the Indian prime minister was “quite naïve” and not “fully grounded as to facts” on certain matters.11 It was worth supporting India to ensure it did not lose the China-India race, but only on a limited basis—and not to the extent of $200 million, as the Truman administration had recommended for FY1954.12 Still, Cold War logic meant a $110 million request, of which $90 million was authorized amid grumbling in Congress that India was not on the US side and Nehru had not been “playing fair with [the US] all along.”13
Nehru’s attitude also contributed to the Eisenhower administration’s doubts about India’s involvement as an intermediary between China and the US. Washington used India as a channel to China—Dulles, for example, sought to warn Beijing through Delhi that, if necessary, the US would “extend the area of conflict.”14 But, more often than not, the administration tried to eliminate or limit Indian involvement as a mediator—during the Korean crisis and after. Most of these efforts failed, however, and American attempts to exclude India only exacerbated the strain between the two countries.
In the waning stages of the Korean War, as settlement proposals flew back and forth, the US unsuccessfully tried to prevent India from being chosen as the neutral state in charge of postwar prisoner of war (POW) repatriation. U. Alexis Johnson, in the State Department Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (FEA), outlined the reason: India seemed to be “‘more neutral’ toward the Chinese Communists than toward the UN.”15 For General Mark Clark, commander of the UN forces, India’s neutrality was not “as well defined” as that of some other candidates.16 Dulles thought India would be acceptable, if necessary, as long as the operating guidelines were set out firmly.17 On Capitol Hill, Senator Knowland expressed opposition since, on Korea, India had “perhaps 80 percent of the time voted with the Chinese Communists.”18 FEA chief Walter Robertson then suggested that if the communists insisted on India as a neutral, the US could insist that it play that role with Switzerland or Sweden. But General J. Lawton Collins, US Army chief of staff, said a two-nation commission was impractical, and he favored India as a neutral, capable Asian state.19
The US soon found its hands tied. A communist proposal on May 7 envisioned a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) with Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as India as the chair. Despite pressure from South Korean leader Syngman Rhee to exclude India and Clark’s concerns about it having the swing vote, Robertson realized the US had been put in a spot—the communists would use any US exclusion of India for propaganda purposes. Along with pressure from NATO allies, especially Britain, this left the administration with little choice but to accept Indian chairmanship of the commission.20
In a twist, the US then backed India for a crucial role that Delhi was reluctant to play. A May 13 UN Command proposal envisioned only India—and not every commission member—as having troops on the ground to supervise the POW repatriation process. For Nehru, the UN Command proposal was “most unhelpful.” Zhou told Indian ambassador to China N. Raghavan it was unacceptable, being too much of a departure from the Chinese proposal.21 Nehru did not want India to take on any responsibility that did not also have Beijing’s buy-in.22 The UNC revised its proposal, but, resisting a Chinese demand, still insisted that India have sole military supervisory authority.23 Nehru did not think China would agree. Its eventual acquiescence led the prime minister to praise Beijing’s “very statesmanlike attitude.”24 He noted publicly that China could now return to nation-building, which had been disrupted by a war in which it had been reluctantly “brought … in” by the fear of US attack.25
Nehru’s tendency to give China credit and the benefit of the doubt created resentment among American officials. But he was not above giving the US the benefit of the doubt at times. When Rhee released North Korean prisoners instead of turning them over to the NNRC—a move that threatened to torpedo the Korean settlement—Nehru told Raghavan that the Eisenhower administration had not incited the move.26 With Zhou accusing the US of being “undependable,” Nehru suggested that Washington take steps to assure Beijing that it could control the situation. Simultaneously, he urged the Chinese premier not to back out of armistice talks.27 In order to prevent this and strengthen Eisenhower’s hand, Nehru pushed for the reconvening of the UN General Assembly as soon as possible. This interjection, however, annoyed Dulles, who believed that bringing more parties into the discussions would only complicate the matter.28
