with that natural freedom, to which all have an equal claim, is founded in compact, or agreement between the parties;—between Rulers and their Subjects, and can be no [14] otherwise. Because Rulers, receiving their authority originally and solely from the people, can be rightfully possessed of no more, than these have consented to, and conveyed to them.
And the fundamental laws, which are the basis of government, and form the political constitution of the state,—which mark out, and fix the chief lines and boundaries between the authority of Rulers, and the liberties and privileges of the people, are, and can be no other, in a free state, than what are mutually agreed upon and consented to. Whatever authority therefore the supreme power has, to make laws, to appoint officers, etc. for the regulation and government of the state, being an authority derived from the community, and granted by them, can be justly exercised, only within certain limits, and to a certain extent, according to agreement.
To suppose otherwise, and that without a delegated power and constitutional right, Rulers may make laws, and appoint [15] officers for their execution, and force them to effect, i.e. according to their own arbitrary will and pleasure, is to defeat the great design of civil government, and utterly to abolish it. It is to make Rulers absolutely despotic, and to subject the people to a state of slavery; because it will then be in the power of Rulers, by virtue of new laws and regulations, they shall please to make, to subvert and annihilate the present constitution, and to strip the subject of every kind of privilege.
This may be briefly evidenced by a single instance.
It is essential to a free state, for without this it cannot be free, that no man shall have his property taken from him, but by his own consent, given by himself or by others deputed to act for him. Let it be supposed then, that Rulers assume a power to act contrary to this fundamental principle, what must be the consequence? If by such usurped authority, they can demand and take a [16] penny, by the same authority they may a pound, and even the whole substance of the subject, so as to make him wholly dependent on their pleasure, having nothing that he can call his own; and what is he then but a perfect slave.*
This, at first view, is manifestly inconsistent with all just conception of freedom; and is the very essence of arbitrary and tyrannical power.
Now, all Rulers in a state, and all power and authority with which they are vested;—the very being, and form of government, with all its constitutional laws, being thus from the people, hence civil government, is called, and with great propriety, the ordinance of man,—an human institution.
[17] This is the case, as to the British government in particular, under which we have the happiness to live. Its constitutional laws are comprized in Magna-Charta, or the great charter of the nation. This contains, in general, the liberties and privileges of the people, and is, virtually, a compact between the King and them; the reigning Prince, explicitly engaging, by solemn oath, to govern according to these laws:—Beyond the extent of these then, or contrary to them, he can have no rightful authority at all.
If the preceding positions, and the reasonings from them are just, the following things may be noticed, as deducible therefrom, or closely connected therewith,—That it is highly requisite, for the good of the state, that both Rulers and people be well acquainted with, and keep in mind the constitutional laws of government—Rulers, that they may be directed and guided thereby, and not depart from, or counteract the design of their institution, to the injury, or disquietude [18] of the people.—And people, that knowing the bounds of submission, and the extent of their privileges, they may be guarded against transgression, and yield a ready and full obedience.
Equally requisite it must be likewise, for the same end, that there be no mysteries in the governing plan:—That all laws and rules of government, be as plain as possible, and easy to be understood, to prevent contentious disputes between Rulers and their subjects;—to preclude the former, from tyrannical oppression, under colour of lawful authority, and the latter from rebellious disobedience, under pretence of privilege.
For, it follows from what has been said, that as all disobedience in subjects, to constitutional authority, is rebellion against government, and merits punishment adequate to the crime, so all assumed power in Rulers, not granted them by the constitution, is without just authority, and so far forth, can claim no submission. [19] “As usurpation,” says the great and judicious Mr. Locke, “is the exercise of power which another hath a right to, so Tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to.” And again, “Where-ever law ends, Tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm. And whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by law, and makes use of the force, he has under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate: And acting without authority, may be opposed as any other man who by force invades the right of another.”
And tho’ it may not always be prudent and best, to resist such power, and submission may be yielded, yet that the people have a right to resist, is undeniable; otherwise the absurd and exploded doctrines of passive obedience, and non-resistance, must be admitted in their utmost extent, and their consequences patiently borne. And it must be granted finally, that the people as well as their [20] Rulers, are proper judges of the civil constitution they are under, and of their own rights and privileges; else, how shall they know when these are invaded;—when submission is due to authoritative requisitions, and when not?
But we are now to consider
Secondly, the great design of Civil Government, and the end for which Rulers are appointed; and that is the good of the community, or political body—Whether it be to the King, as supreme; or unto Governors, as unto them who are sent by him, for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well.
Rulers are not appointed, indeed, for the happiness of the people, exclusive of their own, as if these things were unconnected. But, as it would be unreasonable, that some should be advanced above their brethren,—be cloathed with authority, and honorably supported meerly for the sake of their own ease, [21] dignity and grandeur, so it would be equally unreasonable, that Rulers should be slaves to the people, and watch and labour for their welfare, without sharing in it.
But the happiness of rulers and of their Subjects, are not thus exclusive of each other, but perfectly coincident. They are both parts of the same body,—their true interests are interwoven, and their happiness inseparable. Rulers, acting agreeable to their institution, and attending on that very thing, are justly entitled to esteem and reverence, and an honorable support from the people, though these are not the things they ought to have chiefly in view.
They are to consider themselves as raised above their brethren, and invested with authority, for more noble and generous purposes;—for the peace and wellfare of the Community, committed to their care: Hence it is said, of the civil Ruler, he is the minister of God to thee for good.†
[22] Nor can any other end be imagined, worthy of reasonable beings, why men should put themselves out of a state of natural freedom, and subject themselves to the authority and rule of others, but for their greater good;—for the securing, more effectually, their just rights, liberties and privileges.
This is the great end of their forming into society;—of their establishing certain laws, as the general measures of right and wrong, and giving power to some, to govern the whole community by such laws.
This being the design of civil government, good Rulers are justly considered as benefactors to the people. They are placed as watchmen and guardians over the state, whose special business it is, both in their legislative and executive capacity, to consult and promote its wellfare. To curb and restrain the unrighteous and factious, from acts of fraud, rapine and violence, and to protect others in the peaceable enjoyment of their rights. [23] To punish transgressors;—to relieve the oppressed, dispensing,
