yet we have a voluntary power of shutting it by another prepar’d for that office. The power of consideration is as really and as much under our command, in its design’d use, as the bodily eye is to view, or not, any external object. And we are in the general as much promted to the use of it, with this advantage, besides others, that the new motives obtain’d by the use of it, are our own property; redound to our praise and benefit; as the neglect of it does to our guilt and injury.
But the Necessitarians object, that desires and aversions are not in our power, and therefore we have no Liberty.
The reader will easily perceive the sameness of these and Motive, in so many respects, that the same answer might have served for both: But as particular expressions and sounds have very great influence on some minds; and considering that a separate discussion may give occasion to the mentioning some things which more or less affect the argument, I was determined to give it a place by itself.
[17] It is then readily own’d, that desires and aversions are not immediately at our command, as has been observ’d of Motive; but we have a remote power of obtaining new ones; or altering them, which is sufficient for our purpose. Experience teaches that we can procure very different, and even contrary ones, by industry and application of mind.
The body and the mind are both improveable, and by improving their faculties, likings and dislikings, are generated: Custom and use have great influence in altering our likings and dislikings; so applications of mind in the use of the understandings, as in arts and sciences, we become delighted with them in proportion as we increase in understanding them: The mind is like the palate, to which many things by use become agreeable which before were irksome, as oyl, olives, tobacco, &c.
Observation and attention make some things agreeable, by giving us right notions of them; thus we see the rustic, who at first despis’d the gentle manner and obliging behavior of the well-bred and polite, esteeming them incompatible with a manly fortitude and resolution, upon further acquaintance, becoming delighted with them.
Would we rectify our tastes concerning buildings, sculpture, paintings, &c. we may do it by frequent observations on them; and thus alter our erroneous likings and aversions. And [18] it is the same with our moral likings and aversions which we rectify, or change, by obtaining better notions of the things themselves, with their tendencies and benefits.
By consideration we become reconciled to various disagreeable self-denials; as with respect to the means for recovery from sickness; for the preservation of life and health: For these we deny ourselves many, otherwise desireable gratifications; the contrary becoming desirable by reflection.
Here I cannot pass some notice of what happened in the hot weather, while I was revising these pages for the press; particularly the death of divers by drinking freely cold water, or other cold small liquors, to quench thirst, when they were overheated by the sun, or exercise; now although accounts of such accidents are well known to every one, yet they are not attended to for want of consideration, and a resolution to consider and to take their drink leisurely, and by mouthfuls, at intervals, swallowing it slowly, ’till cool enough to make free with it. One would think the past and striking instances of mortality, by indulging in such circumstances, should render every one attentive and considerate; whereas we see them soon forgot; and why? but because no astonishing sound like thunder attends them. Altho’ for one that dies by lightnight, there are many that die by such inconsideration. The least [19] thought might prevent many of these accidents. If no more than this remark is remembered, of this essay, I shall think all the rest, which gave occasion to it, well rewarded; and have the satisfaction of having been useful to the world.
But to proceed,—
I have observed elsewhere, that we can consider, or we can reject consideration; and that in both these we have liberty; altho’ by the latter, in the use of liberty, we act against the continuance of it, so as gradually to lose the capacity for it, by depravities which always take place in the neglect of it. Both the learned, and the unlearned, are faulty in consideration. In their inquiries, they have too many resting places; they are too apt to take up with the first appearances of truth, by which they frequently come short of it. On a cursory view, we should be at a loss to say which of these classes of men are most faulty. We have therefore to consider, that among the learned, as among the vulgar, there are the knowing, and the unknowing. That man, alone, is knowing, who has not only acquired a proper stock of ideas, but well digested his notions of things. Not the mere scholars, that have scamper’d through the fields of science for the vanity of a title, and university diploma, without any becoming improvement of mind, or substantial principles of knowledge; these are generally more disposed to avoid consideration, [20] than the illiterate; those they despise under the term of the prophanum vulgus. They have more important and injurious prejudices, with an additional obstinacy, and arrogant assurance, from the pride of vain and imaginary knowledge. The plain, the simple, and honestly well-meaning, are, if I may be allowed the expression, infinitely more free, than those whose self-affections are exalted by a mere formal education. Practical knowledge only is valuable; literature is but a mean for obtaining it, but often falls short of the end. Right knowledge is a moral principle, which, besides other things, qualifies for self-government, and so the enlargement of moral liberty; as literature without it tends to its destruction: We see the pride of literature and contempt of the sense of mankind in a Bolingbroke, Morgan, Coventry, Hume, Wolston, and others; who have made the most violent attacks upon all religion, both natural and revealed: These however suit only the grosser palates, who can swallow absurdity without any seasoning, besides a little elegance of language to recommend it; they are therefore much less dangerous to religion than another sort of writers who are little suspected; and of which there is a great number: These in a covert and insinuating way, with the specious cloak of moral principles, and refined notions of things, are unsuspectedly poisoning the minds of the people. Nothing [21] shows the depravity of mankind more than the zeal with which these writers endeavour to root out of the minds of their readers, those principles which have the best tendency for the happiness of mankind. They are prejudiced, and voluntarily continue so: They avoid a manly reflection and consideration, being apprehensive it would prove an interruption to their love of licence: Their fondness for this, has an effect upon them similar to that of the serpent’s enchantment of small animals, which is said to be done by a bewitching appearance round the serpent’s head, when his eyes are fixed on the creature; drawing it, by admiration, to still nearer views of the thing, till it is brought within his reach, so weaken’d that he becomes an easy prey.
It is not pretended that the most considerate can in all things find truth; but then they will be generally cautious of misleading others: And yet a strong ruling passion may without a steady watch, betray them into gross enormities. Thus ambition and an over-fondness for honor, as by high offices in church or state, or the being esteemed as persons of superiour talents, knowledge and abilities: Such persons if not sufficiently attach’d, and zealous for a particular party, will be apt to list on the side of a controversy where their most flattering hopes of distinction attract them. In this class [22] perhaps, we might place the Author of an Essay on the Principles of Morality. An Author, who had he written in favor of Liberty, with the same genius and capacity he has done against it, would have done himself honor; and sav’d one, unus’d to the pen, from attempting such an abstruse subject.
[23] PART II
Containing a few presumptive Proofs of Liberty.
The Author imagined it might not be amiss to subjoin to the foregoing theoretic thoughts, some moral probabilities of the reality of our freedom; which perhaps may prove more agreeable to some readers than the other more philosophic treatment. To these may be premised a few words concerning the ancient Fatalists, and the general belief of Liberty in the first ages.
It is acknowledged that universal consent is no infallible criterion of the truth. And yet it seems worth observing, that in all ages mankind have been invariable persuaded of the reality of Liberty;
