the Grecian Philosophers, by their blind way of inquiry, overlook’d and deny’d it: [24] However it was several ages before the doctrine of Necessity spread farther than themselves, even to the days of Epicurus. Epicurus erected an academy, and taught it to his disciples, and these propagated it: But what manner of reasoners he and they were, may be seen in Lucretius, who handed down his imaginations to posterity. After Epicurus, Liberty became more disputed; but was still believ’d by all that were not more or less taught to disbelieve their senses. Our modern Fatalists would reduce us to this, by confusing our minds with their abstract reasonings, which if they prove any thing, imply a great deal too much; particularly by the lengths they carry their power of motive. If we would have liberty, in their way of talk, we must be void of passions, appetites, desires and aversions; and be capable of willing differently, all circumstances the same. Unless our liberty be absolute, they will not allow it to be liberty. So that according to them, if a man’s property is limited, it is no property; if he is confin’d to his own house, or parcel of land, he has no liberty within his own walls; if he has not the strength of a giant, he has no strength at all: But besides this, their notion ends in ridiculous nonsense; as that only inanimate things can have liberty: A stone then, a stock, or the posts in the streets have it. A man certainly cannot, unless he is fast asleep, and does not so much as dream. [25] But enough of this; the particulars here intended follow.
The faculty of reason strongly implies Liberty. In the foregoing part, it was considered as the faculty in which it inher’d, as it was evidenced in the article of consideration. Here I take it in a different light, as a proof of its reality.
Reason in man is in lieu of instinctive direction. Man has but few instincts; and these only such as are for purposes prior to, or rather out of the province of reason; while more had been superfluous for a creature furnished with rational powers. Our frame is contriv’d, as every thing through universal nature is, with nothing wanting, nothing redundant. And our being endow’d with reason and understanding, instead of more instinctive powers, shows that we were ordain’d for self-direction, in conducting by the former: And in fact, we find that we determine frequently on action and conduct by consideration and reflection, without any instinctive impulse, further than self-love, which without the other, is blind in the human species.
Man is plainly form’d not only to provide as the sensitive hoarding species do, the necessaries of life, but to procure both them and the conveniences of life, to look beyond what sense and instinct can direct him, for this and other purposes; to take in by his understanding [26] large prospects; consider the effects and events of prosecuting excursions into them; and determining on the suitable conduct for his intentions. His understanding is accordingly analagous to a prospective glass, which furnishes views beyond what the eye unassisted could afford him; and which he is upon innumerable occasions, in wisdom and prudence oblig’d to make use of, or suffer for the neglect. This glass we may use, or refuse in supplying the mind with materials for conduct so peculiarly needful in the system of man, and no other ways provided for him: It is the mean, as before observed, by which he can occasionally change his mere animal motives, and whereby he is denominated free. Upon this occasion, I may be allowed to repeat, That our being naturally oblig’d to act in conformity to the judgments we procure by consideration, is no objection to our liberty; since this arises only in the consideration itself, which is prior to the judgment. The essence of our liberty consisting in that use of reason whereby we can occasionally turn our present determination into another channel.
In the next place the moral sense, or conscience, so universally found in our species, is a strong presumptive proof of liberty.
Every human creature has a sense of right and wrong, ought and ought not, which are evidently intended to remind him of duty and [27] obligation; and without which he could have no idea of it. It is as really a natural sense, as the external ones of sight, feeling, tasteing &c. As constitutional as the other internal ones of honor, harmony, benevolence, &c. All which where any of them are wanting, no industry or discipline can give the subject any idea of their objects, whatever the Fatalists or Moralists pretend to the contrary. It is well known that these gentlemen assert it to be generated by the occasions, although by these it is only excited into action, upon the appearance of its objects: It unfolds when the person is arrived to the use of reason, and this being its nature, it evidently implies moral laws with a capacity of obeying and refusing. Here then it is to be observ’d, that such a sense could be to no pertinent purpose, if we had not liberty. The faculty would otherwise shew great unkindness in the construction of the mind. Is it possible to believe that an infinitely wise and good Being, would have plac’d such a severe chastiser in our frame, were we really necessitated; but rather that he would have form’d us so as not wrongfully and injuriously to afflict ourselves. We should rather believe that he would have impressed mankind with an effectual bias to right conduct, or else with proper instincts for every laudable purpose. vid. Divine moral government next to be considered.
[28] The appearances of a divine moral government are presumptive of liberty.
In the general course of common providence a scheme of moral government appears. We find that right action and conduct tend to happy enjoyments; as the contrary naturally to evil effects; and this by an establishment in the nature of things. So that we are beforehand apprised of the respective general consequences, in which we find ourselves interested, and naturally accountable: Common providence having thus the nature of law and government.
As to any special providence, the Materialists would have us believe there is no such thing; but that every event is the effect of general laws without any interpositions. They are no ways concerned that observation and facts are against them, as well as the universal sense of the first ages. We find the ancients firmly persuaded of a particular and special providence, and frequently observing that good morals and religious observances, engage a kind and indulgent providence on their side. That where these and religious observances have been duly attended to, especially by their rulers, a people have been divinely smiled upon by providence; and not only so, but many times honoured with riches, power and grandeur; together with the prolonging their duration as a people; and contrariwise. This was matter of [29] their observation, an evidence of what the universal Father of his creatures expects in the moral world, viz. That all mankind, of whatever condition, or however circumstanced, should use their intelligent powers in the best manner they were capable of; by improving and disciplining themselves into virtuous, and approvable conduct; and with the use of the best religious observances they are furnished with, or can obtain. A confirmation of which we have in the beginning of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.
What shall we then think of the present doctrine of our sectaries, That materially good deeds are hateful to the Deity, unless in a state of grace; and that by every act of obedience, although performed with an honest intention to amend our lives, we render ourselves more abominable in the sight of God, and are further remov’d from his grace and favour, than by a course of licencious living, and total disregard of every thing praise-worthy. Do not these teachings tend to render the divine word, dispensations and grace, inconsistent and contradictory to one another, and to the harmony of the divine attributes; as well as abhorrent to any idea we can form of the divine wisdom and rectitude? But I return.
By careful examination it might evidently appear, that events are not always effects of general laws, but that at least some of them [30] are really expressive of a divine, and special administration. Cursory observers may not be sensible of this; so few of the instances being explicit enough to satisfy such persons. And yet in this very particular, they are most agreeable to that divine wisdom which would not too much interrupt our liberty. Which observations bring me to the following question;
By what rules the divine disposer governs the moral world?
And the general answer to this may be, That he does it in a manner suitable to the moral nature of mankind. Has he given man moral powers? Then surely he rules him in a moral manner, so far as those powers reach. To suppose any thing different from this, would be to charge unerring rectitude with impropriety. The most evident appearances are, that he
