American Political Writing During the Founding Era: 1760–1805. Группа авторов
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The great Mr. Lock placed it in suspension of the mind, (i.e.) as I suppose, a being duly disposed to determine as evidence should appear. Suspension implies impartiality, and a freedom from byas and prejudice; but it does not solve the difficulty of motive; so that none have receiv’d any real information from [10] it. But it appears that the author himself was not satisfy’d of the existence of Liberty; for in a letter to his friend Molineux, he owns that he could not conceive of Liberty being compatible to the omniscience of the Deity. This no doubt was from a notion of something absolute being necessary to the idea of Liberty; the universal mistake of all the writers in the controversy, on one side as well as on the other, while the thing is so far otherwise, that the mind is evidently passive in every thing it gives attention to, at least it is so in a state of vigilance, since the spirit here strictly observes the laws of its union with the body, though it may be otherwise in sleep. And probably from this effect of the laws of union, the Necessitarians have been induced to rest their cause on the power of motive, and latterly have persuaded themselves that this alone is an effectual bar to liberty.
If, say they, we do nothing without a motive, we cannot by any means have liberty. And they add, that a moral determination no more admits of freedom, than a natural or physical one; in which they plainly make no distinction between the sensitive, and the rational nature. Nor do they better, when they would confirm their doctrine of Fatality, by the sophistical whim of motive depending on motive, in infinitum, (i. e.) that there is no first [11] mover. A notion too puerile to admit of a grave answer, were it not that many sober writers have adopted it, as if it was really to their purpose. But so it is, that in attempting a system of absurdities, one must give an answer to such stuff as this as well as the rest; therefore quo ineptia trahunt, retrahuntque sequamur.
This notion of a boundless series of motives, must have been the offspring of contracted views, as well as the impossibility of tracing them back to a first mover, viz. the external senses in their first affecting the mind; before this, it is to be observed there could be no motive. What chiefly gave occasion to the whim, seems to have been the impossibility of tracing them back to their source. The case is such, that long before we are capable of looking back, our first perceptions in childhood have escaped us. The memory of childhood is not retentive. In infancy the perceptions are seldom retain’d to the next day; tho’ in a short time they may remain two or three risings and settings of the sun; but were it otherwise, in the course of a few years our faculties pass through such a variety of action, associations, improvements, and interweavements of ideas; and too often such actual depravities of our moral powers, that the hundredth part of these may be well thought more than enough to prevent our pursuing the thread of motive back to its original.
[12] But there is yet a way by which we may satisfy ourselves; and that is, by beginning at the first perceptions of the human mind: What these are, we may be assured by considering our frame; the order of our ideas; and what must, in the nature of things, have been our first perceptions: And indeed the impossibility of their having been any other than what originated in external sense. The first of these senses in use, are feeling and tasting; we feel first, then taste, loath, or else suffer hunger. Our use of the other senses appear to follow, but no mental ones are perceptible, till the bodily ones have been exercised. Anger is the first of the passions, and grief known by shedding tears, (i. e. weeping); for in the first days, the child cries without tears. After some experience, imagination begins; and in length of time reason, and the moral sense unfolds. All these, in their uses supply a vast number of images, ideas, and correspondent motives, forming a wilderness effectually preventive of any other way of inquiry; while in this it will evidently appear, that our first motives originated in external sense. For we have no innate ideas; nor have we the least appearance of mental powers, before perception by our senses. We must have perception before we can have motive; and sensation before we can have perception: So that here is the beginning of all motive. Motive then is not such an infinite [13] thing as the Necessitarians would have us believe; they make it like space, unbounded; for which this was once deify’d: As for the same reason, according to them, motive might be too.
By the way, I have taken for granted that others have the same idea of motive that I have, (i. e.) any perception exciting to action; or determining the judgments we make of things. It may be considered of two kinds, natural and moral; the former immediately from our various senses; the latter the offspring of our understandings, in reasoning; on which account I take the liberty of distinguishing them by the terms primary and secondary.
At the first view, man appears constituted of two natures, the animal and the intellectual. Motive necessitates all mere animals without a remedy; and it does the same by every human creature; as far as he is governed by his animal affections, so far he is necessitated. But experience shows he can controul these. Socrates and others in all ages have done so, by considering things, and their circumstances; and further by disciplines and use, facilitating the capacity, and improving the habit of reflection. We can consider the bodily claims, and submit to, or reject them.
In considering the power of Motive, I readily grant the Necessitarians all the facts they build upon; but not the assumed principles, [14] and hypothesis. I own we are in all things determined by Motive; that we never act without and never contrary to the present one. These concessions no ways interfere with our Liberties. What this consists in, is a particular prior to secondary Motives. Our Liberty consists in the procuring this sort of Motive. By consideration we determine concerning the propriety of our Motives, and confirm or reject them, in lieu of such as we approve: (i. e.) We reject the primary ones occasionally, and adopt others, which I call secondary, as more eligible: In the same manner as a servant who has leave for it, upon consideration of two persons, chuses which shall be his master.
In fact, we find our Motives do often change, and why? but by seeing things in different lights. It is true that they frequently change, as it were, by chance; but this is far from being always the case. New Ideas, and of consequence, new Motives arise in a way of reasoning and reflection; and this difference of origination alters the quality of the Motives, with respect to Liberty; in the latter case, we are active in their production: It is in this way we controul our inferior affections, according to the natural order, that the nobler powers should rule the ignobler. The thing is, that upon examination, finding the reasons intended action, conduct, judgment or opinion faulty, a [15] change of Motive naturally ensues, for other, or contrary ones. Any one may recollect that he has often done so, and satisfy himself that he can on like occasions, do the same again; viz. as reasons occur in reflection.
Here the Necessitarians may probably ask, Where shall we find the Motives for consideration? since they hold it not at our command.
The question indeed is proper to the occasion; but in putting it, they virtually own a fault they have always been reprehensible for, viz. a negligence in their enquiries into the frame of the human mind, and the operations of it; or they might have answer’d this question by themselves.
We freely grant that we have no immediate power of commanding consideration: But we have an equivalent, for all human purposes, implanted in the mind; a naturally strong disposition to it, which nothing but culpable self neglects, and rejections of its use, destroy: So that we have only to submit to our native promptings, to its use, on all occasions; and we shall sufficiently consider. Where there is reason, consideration and reflection constantly and readily offer. A much wiser provision for us, than any absolute power of commanding it; we can let the disposition take place; or we can shut the eyes of the mind against it; we can use or refute it as free creatures.
[16] We may with an agreeable propriety, call consideration the eye of the mind; since we make discoveries by it. And in comparing it with the bodily organ of sight, we may find we have a like power over both. The bodily eye is automatically, and naturally kept open by a proper