A WELL-WISHER TO MANKIND
Theory of Agency: Or, An Essay on the Nature, Source and Extent of Moral Freedom
Perkins was a physician of Lynn, Massachusetts, who authored a number of pamphlets on earthquakes, comets, and other natural phenomena. This present essay is the only instance where he is known to have taken on political matters in print. Americans during the founding era frequently had a deeper philosophical or theological basis for their understanding of concepts like freedom and equality than is apparent from their political writing. Such theoretical assumptions and underpinnings were frequently taken for granted. Perkins here lays out the basis for consent—a concept central to American politics but rarely analyzed philosophically.
PREFACE
The consideration of the subject of Liberty has been, not only an agreeable amusement to the Author, but really interesting; he having formerly been carried away by the metaphysical, and very specious reasonings of the Necessitarians, into a favourable opinion of their notion.
What gave him lately an occasion of considering the matter, was, the reading an Essay entitled PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY, written as it seems, to establish the doctrine of Fatalism. In that piece, the author represents the strong sense, or feeling, as he calls it, of Liberty, so universal in mankind, as a deceitful idea. That in want of power to confer liberty, the Divinity was oblig’d to impress our minds with this fallacious perception, to dispose us to perform the part assigned us. This was too striking to pass without attention: It had the effect; and but for this, the Author of the following pages had probably remain’d quiet, and secure, in the Necessitarian tenets. In examining the matter, he put down his thoughts in writing, as they occurr’d [4] not indeed as any answer to that piece, but for his own information, and in the most impartial manner he was capable of; if possible to find on which side of the question the truth lay. In this way he became assured of the reality of Liberty, particularly by a discovery of what it consisted in, and how it originated in the operations of the mind. This is what he has in the following pages endeavour’d to explain. Upon the whole, he thinks a Theory of Liberty practicable, and accordingly leaves the consideration of it, together with the materials he has collected, to the candor of the publick: Not without a pleasing hope that some better hand may undertake and perfect the idea.
[5] THEORY OF AGENCY, &c.
Considering the design’d brevity of the following Essay, any particular examination of what others have written upon the subject, may not be expected: neither that much notice should be taken of the terms they have used, to express their meanings and explain the thing. A few words concerning absolute liberty, and moral freedom, may suffice to introduce the Author’s private way of thinking.
By absolute liberty, a person has been supposed capable of determining differently, all circumstances remaining the same. Coactive necessity is its reverse; and both equally destructive of true liberty: One being absolute will, without any reason for action; the other being acted from without, as a mere machine.
On both sides of the question, it has been firmly believed, that some degree of a self-determining power was necessary to the existence of liberty; on neither side, however, has any one been able to find it; and probably many may have become Fatalists for no other [6] reason, than because they could not conceive of Liberty without it.
By Moral Freedom, has been meant a power of determining according to apprehended good and evil; opposed to a state of moral necessity, either natural, or induced by long custom, habit, passion, or some special depravity; which may be further taken notice of in the sequel: For the present, we may observe, that the question of Liberty turns upon this, viz.
Whether there be any moral power or faculty in the mind, whereby it can occasionally change a prior determination? Wherein this consists? and by what operation of the mind effected?
Preparatory to a solution of this question, we may consider some of the differences between the rational and the sensitive world; together with the nature of what is called the will.
The powers of all creatures are suited to their wants and intentions; and their liberty is of the same nature, and proper to their powers. The brute, with only sensitive powers, and what are called instincts, acts according to these, and without constraint; or as he lists; but cannot have moral freedom; this being the exclusive property of the rational nature. Man has the inherent power of controuling the animal affections, which is denominated moral. So that he is not, as may by [7] and by appear, in all things necessitated. I say in all, because in many things he is so; thus by the constitution of his nature, as a corporeal being; in what life consists; and in some appetites, desires and aversions; but wholly so, till arrived to the use of reason, as in childhood, and at any time of life when reason fails; or the subject criminally neglects the proper use of it.
All appearances evidence that man was form’d for self-direction; since by his intellectual powers he can govern the sensitive clues in the use of proper means; rectify errors in judgment; disengage himself from prejudices; foresee events, and conduct accordingly: All which, by consideration; not by any thing of an absolute intention; the appearances of which are deceitful. The same may be said of the choice of two exactly similar objects, wherein there is no preference. I mention this, because the pitching upon one, instead of the other, has been objected as a proof of free-will: Tho’ the person takes one instead of the other, only to get rid of the difficulty, which is all the motive he has in the case.
But suppose a person could chuse without a motive, (i.e.) with absolute liberty, what would be the wisdom of such a power? To what purpose an unmeaning determination more likely to produce ill than good effects? It is [8] time enough for willing and determination, when some cause, some reason for it appears.
The notion of absolute liberty leads us to enquire into the nature of what is call’d the Will: A thing which, as it seems, has not been rightly understood by the writers in morals. Much has been said of it in the affair of liberty; some have imagined it the first mover in the mind; and long use has associated a notion of something arbitrary in the mental economy, which has occasioned great confusion and obscurity.
The common expression is, that man has a Will; his faults are charg’d on the Will; and his Liberty called Freedom of the Will. Now in these expressions, we have strong intimations of some certain subsistence, faculty, or distinct power in the mind, by which it chuses and refuses, wills and nills, as the terms have been, and which have, as it were, given a sanction to the notion, and prejudiced people against an examination of the thing; whereas by a little observation of what passes in their own minds, almost any one might perceive the mistake.
By looking inwards with respect to will, nothing appears but desire and aversion; and by these, we constantly observe the mind determined; and by no other means. By these, we pursue apprehended good, and avoid evil; our determination wills, or choices, which are [9]* synonimous, are as our desires and aversions; and these, as our perceptions, and the ideas we have of things; or as our external and internal senses are affected. By all which it is evident, that will is no other than the mind determined by motive.
These affections of the mind, determining to action and conduct, are what have been invariably express’d by the term will. And indeed a proper name was necessary, as well as convenient,
