it was to have a soul during the latter part of their lives; yet, sir, these men adorned society. Why possession of his faculties, mental and corporeal? Who writes a keener epigram? Who reasons more wittily? Who – but stay! I have his agreement in my pocket-book.”
Thus saying, he produced a red leather wallet, and took from it a number of papers. Upon some of these Bon-Bon caught a glimpse of the letters Machi – Maza – Robesp – with the words Caligula, George, Elizabeth. His Majesty selected a narrow slip of parchment, and from it read aloud the following words:
“In consideration of certain mental endowments which it is unnecessary to specify, and in further consideration of one thousand louis d’or, I being aged one year and one month, do hereby make over to the bearer of this agreement all my right, title, and appurtenance in the shadow called my soul. (Signed) A…”[38] (Here His Majesty repeated a name which I did not feel justified in indicating more unequivocally.)
“A clever fellow that,” resumed he; “but like you, Monsieur Bon-Bon, he was mistaken about the soul. The soul a shadow, truly! The soul a shadow; Ha! ha! ha! – he! he! he! – hu! hu! hu! Only think of a fricasséed shadow!”
“Only think – hiccup! – of a fricasséed shadow!” exclaimed our hero, whose faculties were becoming much illuminated by the profundity of his Majesty’s discourse.
“Only think of a – hiccup! – fricasséed shadow!! Now, damme! – hiccup! – humph! If I would have been such a – hiccup! – nincompoop! My soul, Mr. – humph!”
“Your soul, Monsieur Bon-Bon?”
“Yes, sir – hiccup! – my soul is —”
“What, sir?”
“No shadow, damme!”
“Did you mean to say —”
“Yes, sir, my soul is – hiccup! – humph! – yes, sir.”
“Did you not intend to assert —”
“My soul is – hiccup! – peculiarly qualified for – hiccup! – a —”
“What, sir?”
“Stew.”
“Ha!”
“Souflée.”
“Eh!”
“Fricassée.”
“Indeed!”
“Ragout and fricandeau – and see here, my good fellow! I’ll let you have it – hiccup! – a bargain.” Here the philosopher slapped his Majesty upon the back.
“Couldn’t think of such a thing[39],” said the latter calmly, at the same time rising from his seat. The metaphysician stared.
“Am supplied at present,” said his Majesty.
“Hiccup – e-h?” said the philosopher.
“Have no funds on hand.”
“What?”
“Besides, very unhandsome in me —”
“Sir!”
“To take advantage of —”
“Hiccup!”
“Your present disgusting and ungentlemanly situation.”
Here the visitor bowed and withdrew – in what manner could not precisely be ascertained – but in a well-concerted effort to discharge a bottle at “the villain,” the slender chain was severed that depended from the ceiling, and the metaphysician prostrated by the downfall of the lamp.
Morella
Αυτό χατ ‘αυτά μετ’ αύτοϋ μονοειδές α’ιεί φν
April 1835
With a feeling of deep but most singular affection I regarded my friend Morella. Thrown by accident into her society many years ago, my soul, from our first meeting, burned with fires it had never known – but the fires were not of Eros – and bitter and tormenting to my eager spirit was the gradual conviction that I could in no manner define their unusual meaning, or regulate their vague intensity. Yet we met: and Fate bound us together at the altar: and I never spoke of love, or thought of passion. She, however, shunned society, and, attaching herself to me alone, rendered me happy. It is a happiness to wonder. It is a happiness to dream.
Morella’s erudition was profound. As I hope to live, her talents were of no common order – her powers of mind were gigantic. I felt this, and in many matters became her pupil. I soon, however, found that Morella, perhaps on account of her Presburg education, laid before me a number of those mystical writings which are usually considered the mere dross of the early German literature. These, for what reasons I could not imagine, were her favorite and constant study: and that in process of time they became my own, should be attributed to the simple but effectual influence of habit and example.
In all this, if I err not[41], my reason had little to do. My convictions, or I forget myself, were in no manner acted upon by my imagination, nor was any tincture of the mysticism which I read, to be discovered, unless I am greatly mistaken, either in my deeds or in my thoughts. Feeling deeply persuaded of this I abandoned myself more implicitly to the guidance of my wife, and entered with a bolder spirit into the intricacy of her studies. And then – then, when poring over forbidden pages I felt the spirit kindle within me, would Morella place her cold hand upon my own, and rake up from the ashes of a dead philosophy some low singular words, whose strange meaning burnt themselves in upon my memory: and then hour after hour would I linger by her side, and dwell upon the music of her thrilling voice, until at length its melody was tinged with terror and fell like a shadow upon my soul, and I grew pale, and shuddered inwardly at those too unearthly tones – and thus Joy suddenly faded into Horror, and the most beautiful became the most hideous, as Hinnon became Ge-Henna.
It is unnecessary to state the exact character of these disquisitions, which, growing out of the volumes I have mentioned, formed, for so long a time, almost the sole conversation of Morella and myself. By the learned in what might be termed theological morality they will be readily conceived, and by the unlearned they would, at all events, be little understood. The will Pantheism of Fitche[42] – the modified παλιyyεδιl[43] of the Pythagoreans – and, above all, the doctrines of Identity as urged by Schelling were generally the points of discussion presenting the most of beauty to the imaginative Morella. That Identity which is not improperly called Personal, I think Mr. Locke[44] truly defines to consist in the sameness of a rational being. And since by person we understand an intelligent essence having reason, and since there is a consciousness which always accompanies thinking, it is this which makes us all to be that which we call ourselves – thereby distinguishing us from other beings that think, and giving us our personal identity. But the Principium Individuationis – the notion
Quere-Arouet (
Couldn’t think of such a thing – (
Αυτό χατ ‘αυτά μετ’ αύτοϋ μονοειδές α’ιεί φν. Plato. Sympos – (
if I err not – (
Fitche – Иоганн Готлиб Фихте (1762–1814), немецкий философ, представитель немецкого классического идеализма
παλιyyεδιl – (
Locke – Джон Локк (1632–1704), английский философ, создатель идейно-политической доктрины либерализма
