help the leader manage the external opposition, when foreign powers make demands that will weaken those institutions, the external opposition stands to benefit. Dictators that comply with demands to limit repression or implement reforms could risk losing power. Panama’s Manuel Noriega, for example, could not comply with the Reagan administration’s demands for free and fair elections without giving up his power and influence.17 Likewise, leaders who are forced by a foreign power to grant influential bureaucratic appointments or legislative seats to the opposition could increase their risk of a coup. Once the external opposition holds influence within the system, it can use its proximity to the leader or new-found political power to mount an internal challenge.18 Communists, for example, were able to seize power in Poland after World War II with the help of Moscow, which pushed for the creation of a communist-dominated government. Despite the communists’ initial lack of popular support, once they attained political influence, they were able to rig elections and persecute their enemies to consolidate power and assure communist rule.19
How resolved a targeted leader will be in resisting a foreign power’s demands depends on the strength of the opposition the leader already faces. The stronger the opposition is, the better it can exploit the opportunity provided by the leader’s concessions to challenge the leader. Autocratic leaders might be able to comply with foreign demands to hold elections when their external opposition is too weak to win, but when the opposition is strong, such concessions could imperil the leader’s survival. Similarly, leaders who already have broad popular support might be able to trade on their popularity and concede to unpopular policy changes. Leaders without such support, however, could face a coup or rebellion when making similar concessions. The stronger the opposition is relative to the leader, the greater the risk to the leader of accepting demands that will further strengthen the opposition; as a result, the more determined the leader will be to resist the stronger state’s demands.
Targeted leaders often have good reason to prioritize their domestic enemies over their foreign ones, despite the foreign power’s greater military capabilities.20 First, a foreign enemy might put only a moderate value on the issue at hand, whereas domestic enemies are often highly resolved to attain power, especially if their survival depends on it. Second, when domestic opposition groups seize power, they are more likely to kill or imprison the deposed leader to prevent that leader from returning to power.21 Third, domestic opponents are closer in proximity than foreign ones. If they operate within the government, they may be able to overthrow the leader without having to wage war. But even when they operate outside the government, they can seize resources, cities, and infrastructure, without having to launch a foreign invasion first. Finally, foreign enemies eventually leave, while domestic ones can be an indefinite menace. Because domestic opponents can pose more severe and longer-lasting threats, leaders may be willing to risk war with a foreign power to protect themselves from homegrown perils. When the United Kingdom’s Lord Lytton pressured Afghanistan to accept the stationing of British officers there in 1878, the emir’s representative, fearing a domestic rebellion, pleaded, “You must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear.”22 The emir subsequently refused Lytton’s demands. After invading and installing a new Afghan ruler, the British found themselves facing the rebellion the emir’s representative had predicted.
Leaders facing little opposition will not necessarily yield to all of the foreign power’s demands. Their willingness to concede depends not only on their political vulnerability but also on their military and economic weakness. Leaders with the resources to resist a foreign power’s pressure may refuse concessions even though the political costs of conceding are low. Politically strong leaders may also avoid concessions they fear could create opposition. These leaders can often afford to take a firmer bargaining position because they know that the foreign power has no credible threat to replace them. Nevertheless, when compared to leaders who have similar resources, but face staunch domestic threats, leaders without domestic opposition should be more willing to make concessions. The threat to their political survival is much lower. Domestically weak leaders, in contrast, will require greater incentive to accept settlement terms that increase their political vulnerability. For scholars, then, the issue becomes determining the conditions under which the foreign power will give a politically weak leader sufficient incentive to accept an agreement.
The Foreign Power’s Costs of a Settlement
To attain a favorable settlement, first the stronger state must convince the targeted leader to accept its terms; second, it must convince the leader to uphold them. The first task requires the stronger state to incur coercion costs, while the second entails enforcement costs. In this section, I detail both sets of costs, showing how each is influenced by the domestic threat the targeted leader faces.
THE COSTS OF COERCION
To convince a targeted leader facing domestic opposition to accept a settlement that could be politically costly, the foreign power must first demonstrate that it poses a greater threat than the leader’s domestic threat.23 Simply possessing greater military capabilities is not enough. The foreign power must also convince the target it will follow through on its threats. This could be difficult to do, especially if the foreign power has interests that span the globe. If the issue at stake is outside its core security interests, its target might well doubt the foreign power’s willingness to sacrifice significant resources in a less important arena.24 In the rationalist literature on war, such doubts drive what is known as the incomplete-information problem.25 When actors cannot judge their opponents’ capabilities or resolve, they often resist at the bargaining table, believing they can do so with impunity. Although each side could theoretically communicate its resolve and capabilities, neither has reason to trust the other since each has incentive to bluff. Targeted leaders that believe their domestic enemies are more resolved to challenge them than their foreign ones may, therefore, resist a foreign power’s demands to protect their political positions.
One way to overcome an incomplete-information problem is with a costly signal, which entails actions a less committed actor would avoid.26 Whereas a bluffer might make a verbal threat to go to war, only truly resolved ones will bear the costs of actually preparing for it. Costly signals can also include verbal threats for which policymakers would incur political costs if they failed to follow through. But preparing for war has an additional benefit that verbal threats do not: war preparation measures increase the chances of military victory.27 A state that mobilizes a large invasion force, for example, is far more likely to achieve a military victory than one that does not. Likewise, states that form military alliances or attempt to weaken their targets with military or economic pressure are more likely to prove victorious than ones that simply threaten war. Thus, the size and scope of the foreign power’s war-preparation measures, more so than mere verbal threats, can convince a targeted leader of the foreign power’s resolve to fight. Consequently, they can also influence which enemy—the foreign or domestic one—the targeted leader sees as more dangerous.
Mobilizing for war may not be enough to convince some leaders to concede. They might be facing such deadly domestic threats that they would rather risk a fight with the foreign power. They may hope to hold out in a protracted conflict or, like Reza Shah discussed earlier, settle for terms that allow them to save face. Though such targets may be difficult to intimidate, agreements are often still possible. The state demanding concessions can use limited force to weaken the target’s defenses, resolve, or both. Bombing or economic blockades can be used to deny the target the means to hold out or to weaken its resolve.28 The foreign power can also target the leader’s supporters, imperiling their interests to ensure they see compliance as necessary.29 The stronger state can also use positive incentives, such as offers of aid or security guarantees, to make compliance more appealing, or it can soften its terms to attain its core aims. It can also use scorched-earth tactics to make resistance very costly for the target or defeat the target militarily, leaving it no choice but to accept a settlement.30 Of course, some targets may possess such powerful military capabilities or resolve that they cannot be defeated. But if the foreign power can defeat the target and impose regime change, then it
