or covert force, however, its threats to impose regime change are more remote. The foreign power’s regime-change operations may not only take longer to succeed, but they may also be less likely to succeed, because of the foreign power’s reluctance to use direct force. Given this longer time horizon and lower odds of success, the targeted leader (if he or she suspects the foreign power has plans for regime change) is likely to adopt defensive measures to increase the costs of regime change and force the foreign power to negotiate. Targeted leaders, for example, may crack down on their domestic opposition to eliminate any alternative to their own rule. Other defensive measures include attempts to align with an adversary of the foreign power, as Cuba did during the Cold War, or to acquire nuclear weapons, as North Korea ultimately did.62 These measures will not only shore up the target’s defenses against FIRC, they may also enhance its ability to resist the foreign power’s coercive pressure.
The defensive policies of Albanian chief of state Enver Hoxha demonstrate how indirect or covert threats of regime change can end up exacerbating a targeted leader’s defiance. Yugoslavia attempted to topple Hoxha after he refused to join a Yugoslav-dominated union in 1946. Hoxha responded by exploiting the rivalry between Stalin and Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito to secure Soviet protection.63 Stalin ordered the construction of a military base in Albania and also sanctioned Hoxha’s elimination of his internal rivals.64 After Stalin’s death, Hoxha came under pressure from Moscow to mend relations with Belgrade. He managed to survive subsequent Yugoslav and Soviet covert attempts to oust him by preemptively purging his opponents. By the 1960s, he was able to exploit another rivalry—this time between the Soviet Union and China—to gain Chinese assistance.65 In all, Hoxha succeeded in making regime change infeasible for his foreign enemies. By threatening it, Belgrade and Moscow had inadvertently made Hoxha more difficult to control. Indeed, he was the only leader of a Warsaw Pact state to successfully withdraw from the treaty during the Cold War.
In short, threats to impose regime change can be self-defeating when they lack immediacy or credibility. Insincere regime-change threats, whether made to please a domestic audience or to coax the target to the bargaining table, may only encourage that target to take defensive action. Even when committed to the target’s overthrow, if the foreign power relies on covert or indirect military action, the target is likely to respond by acquiring arms, aligning with a rival power, or cracking down on domestic opponents. These measures can make the targeted leader more difficult not only to overthrow, but also to coerce if they reduce the target’s vulnerability to foreign military and economic pressure. In sum, my argument implies the following hypothesis:
H1b2: A targeted leader is more likely to adopt defensive actions when the foreign power threatens regime change but does not signal the intention to use direct force.
Additional Explanations
The theories that offer the most complete explanation for FIRC can explain not only why states would want to remove a foreign government but also why they would bear the costs of doing so. Not all theories do. Many arguments in the literature on regime change and foreign intervention focus on the policy objectives states seek to attain when they intervene in the domestic politics of other states. These objectives can include ideological and normative goals, security and economic interests, or domestic political gains.66 Such objectives may very well motivate states to take action, but they do not explain why that action takes the form of regime change. Presumably, states could achieve these objectives by using coercion and/or inducement to pressure the targeted leader into making concessions. This would allow them to avoid the costs of installing a new regime. Moreover, targeted leaders should also have reason to make concessions to deny the foreign power reason for regime change. Actors who are ideologically committed to their positions might set aside their beliefs and negotiate to avoid the costs of either suffering or imposing regime change. Arguments focusing on ideological, normative, security, economic, or domestic political motivations may tell us why states enter into disputes, but they cannot necessarily tell us why states use regime change to resolve those disputes.
Two theoretical approaches stand out for their ability to explain why states would eschew bargaining and pursue regime change, despite its potentially high costs. The first suggests that actors either ignore or underestimate the costs of replacing foreign regimes. Theories along these lines suggest that either psychological biases or bureaucratic actors and lobbyists mislead policymakers, causing them to underestimate the costs of regime change. The second comes from the rational choice literature, which assumes states are rational unitary actors but face conditions that make bargains impossible to attain. The dominant arguments in this vein stress the problems of credible commitment and incomplete information.
PSYCHOLOGICAL-BIAS ARGUMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC-POLITICS OR INTEREST-GROUP ARGUMENTS
Scholars in the field of international relations have developed a rich body of research aimed at explaining why states end up in costly wars they come to regret. Very few of these arguments focus on regime change per se, but they can be used to explain why FIRC occurs despite its costs to both sides. One prominent strain focuses on the psychological biases that can influence actors’ decision-making. These biases can help us understand why actors might refuse to set aside their beliefs to negotiate with a foreign leader. In his influential writings on misperception, Robert Jervis explains that the desire for “cognitive consistency” can lead actors to disregard information incompatible with their preexisting beliefs.67 Once convinced a target is hostile, policymakers may overlook evidence to the contrary and consider that nation’s concessions to be insincere or unacceptable. They then pursue policies that antagonize the target and make cooperation impossible. Decision makers are especially likely to cling to their beliefs when they are already highly confident in them and face ambiguous situations in which their beliefs cannot be easily refuted.68 Cognitive consistency can also lead actors to hold firm to policies once they have made a decision. After deciding to pursue regime change, for example, policymakers may ignore new evidence that challenges their reasoning or initial cost estimates.69
Psychological bias may also lead policymakers to see regime change as the only effective way to deal with an adversary. When interpreting the source of another person’s actions, human beings have an inherent tendency to attribute any resistance or hostility to the personality, beliefs, or character of that person. In doing so, they tend to overlook the external conditions that could be causing that person’s resistance or hostility, including their own provocations.70 As a result, policymakers may be quick to conclude that the opposing side in a conflict is inherently problematic and that installing a friendly regime is the only effective way to neutralize the threat.71 In short, psychological bias can cloud actors’ judgments, causing those actors to dismiss other policy options and conclude that regime change is the only feasible course of action.
Another alternative explanation for why states end up in costly wars aimed at regime change focuses on the role of influential domestic political actors. Theories of international relations commonly assume that states function as rational unitary actors whose policy is set by a single decision maker. But leaders rely on the counsel of others to arrive at decisions—others who may attempt to steer policy along a course that benefits them personally. In his work on bureaucratic politics, Graham Allison notes that the advice presidents receive may reflect the bureaucratic incentives of their cabinet officials.72 Whether attempting to justify their budgets or enhance their own influence, bureaucrats may be inclined toward solutions that give the departments they represent an advantage. The professional training of these advisers, as well as the culture of their professional organizations, can also shape how they perceive the world and the policies they recommend.73 Military and defense officials, for example, may be more apt to see military force as effective and, thus, advocate regime change, whereas officials schooled in diplomacy may push for negotiations.
Interest groups might also convince leaders to pursue regime change. Lobbyists representing large and politically influential groups can use the threat of political punishment to pressure policymakers into pursuing regime change. When
