opposition group that favors popular rule would face fewer costs when complying with such demands. Indeed, instituting these reforms may be their goal. Though Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega could not hold free and fair elections without risking his political power, his popularly supported opposition was seeking to institute democratic rule and, therefore, could embrace such elections.
Just as it is more costly for dictators to comply with demands to liberalize than it is for their popularly supported opponents, so too is it more costly for popular rulers to accommodate foreign demands for unpopular policies.3 King Charles Albert of Piedmont-Sardinia, who attempted to fashion himself as a popular monarch by instituting representative government, discovered the difficulty of trying to maintain domestic popularity while placating the regional hegemon. In 1848, he went to war against Austria-Hungary to win independence, but after suffering defeat on the battlefield, he accepted an armistice. In the months following the defeat, Charles Albert found himself under domestic political pressure from leftist revolutionaries agitating for a return to war. He relented to their pressure and reneged on the armistice, only to be defeated again by the Austrians. This time, he was forced to abdicate. Learning from his father’s experience, his son suppressed the leftists and restored the monarchy’s power.4
Targeted leaders cannot prevent regime change simply by persuading their supporters that placating the foreign power is an unfortunate necessity. Although the leader could submit to the foreign power’s demands once assured domestic political support, the leader’s supporters will only accept the need for concessions when convinced that resistance is pointless. To convince them of this, the foreign power must threaten to make resistance more costly than compliance. Threats of an invasion accompanied by war preparation measures, for example, might persuade the leader’s supporters that concessions are necessary. But if the foreign power wants to avoid the various costs of those actions, it may never undertake them. Instead, it may avoid the costs of using direct force altogether by using covert or indirect measures to oust the leader. Without a visible or even verbal threat from the foreign power, the leader’s supporters will continue to see capitulation as unnecessary and will punish the leader for conceding. Hence, unlike the external opposition, the leader cannot accommodate the foreign power and dissuade it from pursuing regime change without incurring political costs.
Though partnering with a targeted leader’s external opposition can have its advantages, a foreign power may at times be forced to look elsewhere for help in overthrowing a leader. First, in some instances, the external opposition’s policy preferences may be more opposed to those of the foreign power than to those of the current leader. Such groups may still threaten the leader, prompting the leader to resist the foreign power, but they will be of little help to the foreign power in overthrowing the leader. Second, the external opposition can also be costly to install in power. Even when external opposition groups share the foreign power’s preferences, as political outsiders, they cannot engineer coups from within the political system. The only exceptions are when the leader has already tried to co-opt them by bringing them into the government or when they partner with the internal opposition, which leads the coup. More typically, the external opposition must rely on military force to overthrow the standing regime. This means that outside powers may have to fund an insurgency, support a popular rebellion, or conduct a military invasion to effect full regime change. Due to these potentially high costs, the foreign power’s preference for full regime change depends on the external opposition’s strength. The stronger it is, the more likely the foreign power will pursue full regime change, as long as the external opposition remains marginally more willing than the leader to comply. Otherwise, foreign powers may look for less costly ways to overthrow the targeted leader.
My argument thus far suggests the following testable hypothesis:
H1a4: When a state seeks to effect regime change in another state, it is more likely to pursue full regime change when the external opposition to the targeted leader is strong relative to the targeted leader.
Partial Regime Change
When external opposition to the targeted leader is too weak to make full regime change feasible, the foreign power may instead settle for partial regime change—the removal of the targeted leader. Partial regime change can be carried out in one of two ways. Foreign powers can either conspire with the leader’s internal opposition to remove the leader or pressure the leader directly to step down from power. I address each in turn in the next sections.
COUPS
States can pursue partial regime change by urging internal rivals of the targeted leader to undertake a coup. The leader’s internal opposition is composed of political rivals who compete for power based on the established rules governing the existing political system.5 They may work directly alongside the leader as members of a ruling coalition, party, or junta, or they may head opposition parties that compete for power in accordance with the established rules. To carry out a coup, a rival must convince both the military and at least some of the leader’s supporters to abandon the leader.
Orchestrating a coup can be a relatively cheap way for a foreign power to bring about regime change. Because the internal opposition can use its power and influence within the existing political system, it may not need outside military aid to spearhead a popular revolt or insurgency, as the external opposition would.6 The leader’s internal rivals could, for example, seize power by using their bureaucratic privileges to conduct purges and isolate the leader. Or, they could use their proximity to the leader to kill or imprison him or her. If members of the military, they could also use their weapons to forcibly take control. All told, the internal opposition’s ability to seize power from within means the foreign power can use less costly covert or indirect force to facilitate regime change.
Figure 3. Policy Positions of the External Opposition, Internal Opposition, Leader, and Foreign Power
The disadvantage to installing the leader’s internal rivals in power is that they may share some of the deposed leader’s policy preferences. The leader’s internal rivals compete with the leader for the same set of supporters and so will tend to promote policies that will satisfy those supporters. For partial regime change to be worthwhile for the foreign power, the foreign power must convince the leader’s rivals not only to overthrow the leader but also to abandon some of their traditional supporters and move closer to the foreign power’s policy position. Figure 3 shows the conditions under which the foreign power may see advantage in partnering with the internal opposition. In this scenario, the external opposition (EO) is too weak to help the foreign power (FP) impose full regime change. The leader (L) maintains power by appealing to a critical number of supporters (S) whose policy preferences lie between SLeft and SModerate (e.g., within range 1).7 Members of the leader’s internal opposition (IO) compete with the leader for power by attempting to lure some of the leader’s supporters into a new coalition, for example, within range 2. Because this coalition also includes new supporters with preferences closer to the foreign power, the rival can make concessions to the foreign power that the leader would refuse (i.e., policies lying within the portion of range 2 that does not overlap with range 1).
The foreign power can often convince the leader’s rivals to undertake a coup by exploiting their desire for power. Much like the external opposition, the rivals may only need the promise of material support to move against the leader. In some cases, rivals from within might already be willing to oust the leader, and they seek only the foreign power’s tacit support. Generals in South Vietnam, for example, had attempted to oust President Ngo Dinh Diem several times before seeking American support in August 1963. President John F. Kennedy and his administration needed only to consent to the plot and withdraw US support for Diem to facilitate the coup against him.8 Although a targeted leader can attempt to buy off his or her rivals by offering them greater political power or perquisites,
