take power for themselves. As a result, the leader cannot easily preempt his or her internal rivals from conspiring with the foreign power to stage a coup.
To orchestrate a successful coup, the foreign power and the leader’s rivals require the cooperation of two pivotal players. First, the target state’s military must be convinced either to acquiesce to or lead the coup. Otherwise, the targeted leader could simply use the military to preempt or overturn the coup. Second, the foreign power must also convince at least some of the leader’s supporters to abandon the leader. Without their support, the rival may not be able to acquire a sufficiently strong political base to seize power.
To obtain the cooperation of these two groups, the foreign power often attempts to drive a wedge between them and the leader. Although the primary interest of most leaders is to retain power, the supporters and military are more interested in retaining the goods the leader provides them.9 The state seeking regime change can often weaken the leader’s ability to provide these goods by using economic sanctions, covert political action, propaganda, and displays of force.10 Though the military and supporters of the targeted leader might remain loyal under the status quo, if these measures damage their interests sufficiently, both parties may conclude that they are better off abandoning the leader. In some cases, the leader’s supporters may not even be aware their defection will facilitate a foreign-backed coup. In Chile, for example, US President Richard Nixon tried to undermine popular support for the democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, by using sanctions to “make the economy scream.”11 Although these measures failed to secure Nixon’s immediate goal—to prevent Allende’s inauguration—the administration continued its economic pressure, combining it with covert political action to divide Allende’s supporters and organize his opposition.12 These efforts helped generate resentment toward his regime, which encouraged his opponents in the military to move against him.13
Once a critical number of the leader’s supporters become willing to accept the foreign power’s demands, hypothetically, the leader could reshape his or her coalition, abandoning supporters that oppose the foreign power and picking up ones who do not. The leader might then be able to appease the foreign power without suffering domestic political punishment. However, the foreign power may not accept the leader’s concessions, because once it withdraws its threat, the leader could cease cooperation, reverting back to the status quo ante or, at the very least, offering incomplete compliance. The Soviet Union encountered this problem during its 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moscow had launched the invasion anticipating that it would prompt pro-Moscow Czechs to oust the reform-minded Czech leader Alexander Dubček. But when it became apparent that hardliners lacked the following to do this, the Soviets arrested Dubček and his fellow reformers, brought them to Moscow, and pressured them to accept Soviet demands for “normalization.”14 Although Dubček was returned to power and gradually began overturning the reforms, his pace was too slow for Moscow. When an anti-Soviet riot erupted six months later, Moscow insisted on regime change. It used the threat of another invasion to demand Gustav Husák be installed. Husák had been among the reformers brought to Moscow and had since adopted the view that conceding to Moscow’s demands was an unfortunate necessity. Once in power, he became a loyal ally to Moscow, purging the party of its reformers and completing the process of “normalization.”15
Convincing a member of the internal opposition to construct a new coalition closer to the foreign power’s policy position, however, may not be enough to make regime change worthwhile for the foreign power. Just like the former leader, these new leaders could also face political pressure to abandon their new coalition and revert to the status quo ante. They are less likely to reverse course, however, when they transform the state’s political institutions. By rewriting the rules governing access to power, new leaders can diminish the political influence of the former regime’s supporters and guarantee that of their new coalition. Accordingly, they become more likely to comply with the foreign power’s policy preferences over the long term because their ability to maintain power now depends on satisfying constituents who support those policies. As a result, foreign powers that use partial regime change typically choose internal rivals who can and will implement institutional change. Husák, for example, completely abandoned his reformist ideas and reinstituted authoritarian rule in Czechoslovakia. In Chile, General Augusto Pinochet established a dictatorship, brutally cracking down on Allende supporters. In Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi transformed Iran’s political system twice. He first agreed to rule as a constitutional monarch following his father’s ouster in 1941; twelve years later, he consolidated authoritarian control after the CIA coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.
In some instances, internal opponents, once in power, cannot transform the political system without undermining their own political interests. When this is the case, regime change may ultimately do little to alter the target state’s policies. In Panama, for example, George H. W. Bush had initially considered orchestrating a military coup against Noriega, but Colin Powell, chair of the JCS, advised against it, noting that a new military leader would likely rule much as Noriega had.16 President Bush agreed that an invasion would be necessary to overhaul the current regime and democratize Panama. Whether the foreign power encounters a leader who is willing to transform the target state’s institutions, or whose interests lie in preserving them, depends on several variables. These can include the nature of the foreign power’s demands, its offer of assistance to the new leader, and the domestic political strength of groups hostile to the foreign power. These contingencies can affect the likelihood of producing a stable, reliable regime when working with the external opposition too. However, the difference remains that the leader’s external opposition has a much stronger incentive to overhaul the existing political order. As a result, though the internal opposition may be easier to install, the foreign power prefers to partner with the external opposition when possible as it is more likely to accommodate the foreign power’s interests.
LEADER RESIGNATIONS
Internal coups are not always feasible. Ethnic, religious, racial, or class loyalties may prevent supporters from abandoning the head of state, who can deliberately play upon societal divisions to ensure supporters and the military remain loyal.17 Leaders may also be able to shield supporters and the military from foreign pressure.18 Under such circumstances, foreign powers may still attempt partial regime change, but instead they may directly pressure the leader into stepping down. By coercing or inducing the head of state to resign, regime change can occur without a military confrontation.
The leader’s resignation, however, can be a costly and risky option for at least three reasons. First, such deals are often unappealing to the leader. Once the leader resigns, the domestic opposition could seek retribution or the foreign power could renege on its promises of amnesty. In fact, even if domestic amnesties could be made credible, the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not guarantee they will be respected.19 Further, resignation deals tend to be pursued when the foreign power is reluctant and the external opposition, though popularly supported, lacks sufficient military force. The leader is, therefore, in a relatively strong position and knows that the costs for resisting the deal will be low. Given the risks of conceding power, leaders have little incentive to accept such deals unless the foreign power can demonstrate that forced removal is the leader’s only other option. In Haiti, for example, the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations tried but failed to convince the military junta to step down by using sanctions. It was not until President Clinton mobilized forces for an invasion that the junta agreed to return power to deposed president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.20 States may, therefore, have to bear the costs of signaling their willingness to depose a targeted leader militarily before they can succeed in convincing that leader to step down.
A second reason resignation is often the foreign power’s option of last resort is that it leaves the leader’s coalition of supporters intact but with little incentive to accept the new regime. In contrast to an internal coup, in which at least some of the leader’s supporters are first induced or coerced to accept it, the leader’s resignation does not require their consent. Although the foreign power can
