least marginally closer than the leader to the foreign power’s policy preferences, the foreign power will expend fewer resources coaxing the opposition to cooperate than it would the leader. In many instances, the external opposition already shares some of the foreign power’s policy preferences. But even when the external opposition is more opposed to the foreign power than the leader, or too weak to fight, the foreign power can often coerce or induce the leader’s internal rivals into trading policy concessions for help in attaining power. In the next chapter, I explain in more detail when the foreign power is likely to find willing collaborators among the external and/or internal opposition. I also explain how the relative strength of these two groups affects the type of regime change the foreign power imposes.
In all, as long as a foreign power can locate strong and marginally sympathetic opposition groups, it is more likely to estimate the costs of regime change as low. That the very element causing a leader to appear susceptible to overthrow—domestic opposition—is also the very element causing the leader to resist is what tempts foreign powers to use regime change to resolve disputes with recalcitrant foreign leaders. Domestic opposition makes the leader appear more costly to coerce but also cheaper to overthrow. Leaders without opposition will not necessarily be more conciliatory. Though their domestic compliance costs are lower, their concessions will still depend on how vulnerable they are to military and economic pressure. But when compared to leaders with similar resources, domestically strong leaders will make greater concessions than their domestically vulnerable counterparts.56 Among leaders facing domestic opposition, greater military vulnerability should also increase the likelihood of FIRC. Although states have been known to attempt regime change in their peer competitors, large disparities of military power should lower the expected costs of FIRC, making its use more likely. All told, my argument suggests the following three hypotheses:
H1a1: When states’ interests diverge, the stronger one side’s internal or external opposition is, the greater the probability that the opposing side will pursue FIRC.
H1a2: The greater the military vulnerability of one state in a dispute, the more likely it is that the stronger state will attempt regime change when the weaker state’s leader faces domestic opposition.
H1b1: All else equal, targeted leaders without domestic opposition will make more concessions than those with opposition.
The Effect of Major Events and Crises
Major events and crises can serve as catalysts for regime change. They can affect the timing of the foreign power’s policy decision to impose regime change by prompting policymakers to reassess their policy options and change course. They can also influence how policymakers estimate the costs of using military force. A crisis involving a military confrontation with the target’s forces, for example, could lower the domestic political costs of using one’s own military by increasing popular or elite support for the use of force against the target. If the target appears to be the aggressor, a crisis might also lower the reputational and diplomatic costs of using force. Nevertheless, though the foreign power’s expected costs of using military force may drop, this will not necessarily lead to a decision to impose regime change. In the absence of domestic opposition, a major event or crisis might prompt policymakers to use greater military force, but that force will be in pursuit of a settlement, not regime change.
The death of a US service member in Panama, which precipitated the 1989 US invasion there, illustrates the role crises can play in the decision to pursue regime change. Prior to the invasion, the Bush administration had steadily increased pressure on Noriega to democratize but had stopped short of threatening direct military force to remove him. The Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) warned that a military confrontation might lead to another Vietnam-style quagmire.57 The Bush administration’s policy abruptly changed, however, when a US service member died after a run-in with Panamanian soldiers on December 16, 1989. The service member’s death not only offered a casus belli but also helped convince the Defense Department and the JCS that the military costs of removing Noriega would be low compared to the cost of leaving him in power. As Colin Powell, chairman of the JCS at the time, explained to the president, “There will be a few dozen casualties if we go…. If we don’t go, there will be a few dozen casualties over the next few weeks, and we’ll still have Noriega.”58 Yet, though the service member’s death influenced the timing of regime change and the manner in which it was imposed, it was not the primary cause. Had Noriega enjoyed strong domestic support, he would have been far more costly to remove and also possibly less combative. Under these circumstances, the service member’s death would have been far less likely to trigger an invasion aimed at regime change.
The events and crises that give rise to regime change are often a consequence of the targeted leader’s domestic political weakness. Targeted leaders, in the course of resisting the foreign power’s demands, may adopt confrontational behavior that sets the stage for a crisis. Noriega, for example, had responded to US pressure by delivering fiery speeches, increasing harassment of US citizens, and declaring war on the United States.59 His nationalist rhetoric and attempts to play upon anti-US sentiments were measures designed to boost his popularity and weaken his domestic opposition. But his posturing also heightened tensions with the United States and ultimately led to the crisis that prompted the Bush administration to invade.
Not all events or crises stem from the target’s domestic political vulnerability. In some instances, exogenous events or crises elsewhere in the world can prompt policymakers to undertake regime change in the target state. For example, the failure of the US congress to ratify the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty (SALT II) in 1979 influenced the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan by convincing Soviet leaders that détente was crumbling. The Soviet leadership concluded that there was no need to worry about how an invasion would affect relations with the United States since those relations were already deteriorating.60 Regime change can also occur without a previous crisis or confrontation with the targeted leader. A foreign power may decide to remove a seemingly conciliatory leader because the foreign power anticipates this leader will renege on cooperation. France, for example, overturned the 1964 coup that ousted Gabonese leader Léon M’ba, despite the new government’s assurances that it would maintain a pro-French policy. French President Charles de Gaulle anticipated this new government would be less accommodating than M’ba had been in satisfying French demand for uranium.61
In sum, when a foreign power confronts a domestically weak target, a major event or crisis can play a role in the ultimate decision to impose regime change. The event or crisis not only prompts policymakers to reassess their policy options, but it can also lower the expected costs of using military force. Events or crises may arise from the target’s defiant behavior or they may be unrelated to it. Either way, although crises and events may hasten a regime-change decision, they do not cause it. That decision still depends on the targeted leader’s domestic opposition and the effect that opposition has on the foreign power’s expected costs of bargaining and regime change. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H1a3: When a foreign power confronts a domestically weak leader, a major event or crisis can serve as a catalyst for the decision to impose regime change.
Responses to the Threat of Regime Change
Targeted leaders may be able to anticipate when their resistance to a stronger power’s demands will lead that state to use their domestic enemies against them. How they respond in these instances depends on the immediacy of the foreign power’s threat to impose regime change. When the foreign power plans to use direct military force and mobilizes for an invasion, the threat of regime change is more immediate and thus more credible. A targeted leader might then offer partial or temporary compliance to defuse a crisis and forestall an attack. The target’s cooperation can also increase the diplomatic and domestics costs of regime change for the more powerful state by making the target appear conciliatory and the aggression against it unwarranted.
When
