and ye openly declare that the games have been desecrated” (Har. resp. 25). A second example is found in Cicero’s charge that the prodigy is a warning that the gods are angry over the neglect of sacrificial rites. He quotes the soothsayers’ report in this regard: “Ancient and secret sacrifices have been performed with laxity, and have been desecrated” (Har. resp. 37). His comment on this is in the form of a rhetorical question which links this statement to testimony from the gods themselves: “Is it the soothsayers who utter these words, or the gods of our ancestors and of our households?” (Har. resp. 37). He then goes on to associate Clodius with this matter. In this same section, Cicero claims that Clodius is deranged, and that this is so due to the punishment of the gods.191
Finally, in the conclusion of this speech, Cicero calls for Clodius to be punished, reiterating his position that the noise was a warning from the gods (Har. resp. 61). He reinforces this by asking another rhetorical question: “And if other manifestations, less impressive, perhaps, though more widely bruited, have not failed to move us, shall not the feelings of all of us be stirred by the actual voice of the immortal gods? (Har. resp. 62; emphasis mine). Cicero then makes reference to an earthquake, which occurred in a nearby town at approximately the same time. This, too, he deems a “portent,” which is “as a voice, nay, an eloquent appeal, of the immortal gods that this must be viewed, when the world with its seas and lands shudders with a weird motion, and by a sound beyond experience and beyond belief conveys to us tidings of the future” (Har. resp. 62–63).192
A final example from Cicero comes from De legibus, his treatise on the law. Here Cicero is arguing for the divine origin of Rome’s laws. In an argument quite similar to the one already seen above in his defense of Milo, Cicero argues that the people must understand that “the gods are the lords and rulers of all things, and that what is done, is done by their will and authority; that they are likewise great benefactors of man” (Leg. 2.7.15). He goes on to say that the observation of nature should motivate humanity to thank the gods for their goodness and that nature gives evidence of a greater reason which governs it (Leg. 2.7.16). Finally, this same reason is the basis for Rome’s legal system. Cicero concludes this section by stating:
Who will deny that such beliefs are useful when he remembers how often oaths are used to confirm agreements, how important to our well-being is the sanctity of treaties, how many persons are deterred from crime by the fear of divine punishment, and how sacred an association of citizens becomes when the immortal gods are made members of it, either as judges or as witnesses [quamque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos diis immortalibus interpositis tum iudicibus, tum testibus]. (Leg. 2.7.15)
Thus Cicero associates the goodness of Rome’s laws with the gods who are active participants in the legal system through their testimony and judgment.
The examples above demonstrate that the topos of divine testimony was used abundantly as proof or evidence in ancient speeches and philosophical treatises. The examples also show the breadth of situations in which ancient rhetors were able to apply the topos in forensic and deliberative cases involving law, politics, and even in philosophical works. The method of the present study, as explained in chapter one, is to consider how the topos of divine testimony would have been heard and understood by an ancient audience, especially in the case of Luke-Acts. Therefore, it is appropriate at this time to consider, albeit briefly, the question of the persuasiveness of this particular topos in the ancient world. It is to this question I now turn.
The Persuasiveness of the topos of Divine Testimony
First, it is important to remember that the primary goal of ancient rhetoric was to persuade one’s audience of the validity of one’s case.193 For example, Cicero in De inventione says, “The function of eloquence seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience, the end is to persuade by speech [finis persuadere dictione]” (Inv. 1.5.6).194 Similarly, in De oratore, he maintains that “the duty of an orator is to speak in a style fitted to convince” (De or. 1.31.138). Quintilian also expresses this idea; in considering the different definitions of rhetoric, among the diversity of opinions he finds this one area of agreement: “They almost all believe that the function of oratory lies in persuading or in speaking in a way adapted to persuade.” He then concludes, “So the commonest definition is that ‘rhetoric is the power of persuading’” (Inst. 2.15.3, 5). Given this emphasis on the results of rhetoric,195 namely to persuade an audience and to adapt one’s presentation to the audience in order to do so,196 one can argue that simply the fact that the topos of divine testimony appears in these speeches and treatises noted above is evidence of their persuasiveness in the context in which they were written and/or spoken.197 If the rhetorician indeed desired to persuade the audience, then these arguments must have been considered to be convincing.
The emphasis on the orator’s consideration of the audience is even more significant when one considers other ancient writings in which authors describe their individual attitudes towards the gods and divination. One example is from Cicero himself. In the first half of De divinatione, Cicero, through the character Quintus, Cicero’s younger brother, espouses the contemporary Stoic worldview concerning divination and augury,198 one in which these aspects of religion were acceptable and beneficial to the people.199 The second half of the treatise is spoken through the character of Marcus Cicero himself, and consists of a complete refutation of what Quintus has put forward as a defense of divination and augury.200 The negative attitude toward divination and augury described by Marcus Cicero in this treatise has caused scholars to question where Cicero himself actually stood on this issue.201 For my purposes in this study, however, I would argue that the question of the “historical” Cicero’s opinion of divination is insignificant, and it is insignificant for two reasons.
First, I have already discussed the significance for the rhetorician of persuasion and adapting one’s case to the audience. Thus, the important question for the rhetor is not, “What do I believe?” Rather, the more significant question is, “What proofs and evidence will convince my audience?”202 Thus, Cicero can write,
Now nothing in oratory, Catulus, is more important than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgement or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute [quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus]. (De or. 2.42.178)
For the present discussion, it is important to note that Cicero places a higher value on convincing his audience by emotional appeal than “reality” (veritas).203 Quintilian makes a similar statement; in the context of the appeal to emotions within a speech, he says, “But where force has to be brought to bear on the judges’ feelings and their minds distracted from the truth, there the orator’s true work begins” (Inst. 6.2.5). Therefore, given this emphasis on conviction at all costs, Cicero’s personal views concerning augury and divination are not significant.204 What is significant is the judge’s (or audience’s) opinion of the evidence, and it is this second point noted above that I now address.
In the first chapter of this study I explained in the section describing the proposed methodology that I would focus on the implied audience of Luke-Acts
