Hohmann argues that in Cicero, dialectic becomes a tool which supports rhetoric. For example, in Cicero’s Top. 6, dialectic is used to evaluate the various arguments available to the orator. For Hohmann, therefore, Top. is a rhetorical work (rather than dialectical), in which the emphasis falls on application of loci and the practicality of using them within a speech. Hohmann, “Rhetoric and Dialectic,” 41–51.
130. This same distinction will be found in Theon’s Progymnasmata as well. Pernot, in his study of topos and commonplace, concludes that topoi represented a system of examining a plethora of cases with a limited number of patterns or examples, while through a commonplace a rhetor could treat a specific issue as a general question. See Pernot, “Lieu et lieu commun,” 253–84.
131. Leff’s comments are apposite and should be cited in full (see Leff, “Common-places and Argumentation,” 448):
Obviously, the commonplace is an argument elaborated more carefully and fully than other types of argument. But the distinction between loci and loci communes should not be understood as a distinction between two kinds of argument, since, for Cicero, the loci are not arguments, but resources used in discovering materials for arguments; they provide individual pieces—the timbers and planks as it were—which enter into the construction of arguments. The loci communes are finished products that integrate logical argument, emotional appeal, and style into a single structure. They are “minor forms” that contribute to the general development of a discourse but can be detached and appreciated as independent units.
132. Conclusions (epilogoi) are found “in the Direct Opening, after the Statement of Facts, after the strongest argument, and in the Conclusion of the Speech” (Rhet. Her. 2.30.47).
133. “For neither the Prooemium nor the Narrative has any function except to prepare the judge for the Proof . . . Lastly of the five parts into which we divided the forensic speech, any one of the other four may sometimes be unnecessary for the Cause; but there is no dispute which does not need proof” (Inst. 5.pr.).
134. Quintilian indeed cites Aristotle at this point; cf. Inst. 5.1.1.
135. See Thom, “Defining the topos,” 555–73, who makes a similar point as the one I am making here.
136. As noted above, the Greek here reads Τόπος; the Greek text is from Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 106.6.
137. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 93.6.
138. Ibid., 93.8.
139. Notice that in Kennedy’s translation, he chooses the word “topics” rather than topoi as in the section on the preliminary exercise of commonplace. This same distinction is seen in Theon’s exercises concerning encomion and invective (Theon, Progymnasmata 111 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 51]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 111.11), prosopopoeia (Theon, Progymnasmata 117–18 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 49]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 118.1), and thesis (Theon, Progymnasmata 121 [Kennedy, ed. and trans., 56]; cf. Patillion and Bolognesi, Théon, 121.14–15, 24).
140. Kennedy bases this estimate on the sources that appear in the document; see Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, xiii.
141. The author lists the following as examples of non-artistic proofs (which are generally defined as originating “from material at hand”: “witnesses, decrees, contracts, oracles.” These are summarized as being “such things, as many are written down” (Anonymous Seguerianus, Art of Political Speech 145, in Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises). The author does, however, qualify the use of these inartistic proofs through the following statement: “Overall, invention in the case of these proofs is non-artistic, but the use is artistic” (ibid., 145).
142. Kennedy notes that the treatise, in the form in which we now have it, shows evidence of having been edited by a later editor/redactor; see Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, xvii.
143. Kennedy argues that θεώρημα in this section refers to “a topic from which an idea or argument can be drawn,” and notes that later in the treatise the term τόπος will be employed in referring to a similar concept (Dilts and Kennedy, eds., Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises, 77 n. 5). For Kennedy, this is evidence that the original treatise has been edited (cf. ibid., xvii).
144. Several headings are discussed, including what is legal [περὶ νόμου], customary [περὶ ἔθου], just [περὶ δικαίου], advantageous [περὶ συμφερόντος], possible [περὶ δυνατοῦ], and honorable [περὶ ἐνδόξου].
145. “The narration and the demonstration (apodeixis) are grouped under the pragmatic, the prooemium and the epilogue under the pathetical. How then, since we have said that the epilogue belongs to the pathetical aspect, do we say that reminder, being a topic of it, is part of the pragmatic? [τὴν ἀνάμνησιν τόπον οὖσαν αὐτοῦ μέρος πραγματικῆς εἶναί φάμεν;]” (Art of Rhetoric 10.2). And on pity, the author writes: “Whenever we are going to arouse pity (eleos), we shall prepare the judges ahead of time so this will be useful for us; for one ought not to enter on this topic suddenly, but after some preparation [οὐ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιχειρεῖν δεῖ τούτῳ τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ μετὰ παρασκευῆς]” (Art of Rhetoric 10.15).
146. Although Quintilian does not specifically label these types of arguments as loci, he discusses them within a context of proofs used in a speech. Thus, his concept of inartificial proofs parallels that of Cicero, for whom the inartificial proofs are loci.
147. Cicero at this point adds the following comment: “[L]et us say a few words about these topics from without, although they bear no relation to your discussions of the law [etsi ea nihil omnino ad vestras disputationes pertinent]” (Top. 4.72). Cicero’s comment is not meant to infer that these loci are unnecessary for arguing forensic cases; rather, he is implying that Trebatius, a jurist, would normally be his own authority and would not normally require an outside authority to lend credibility to his case. See Reinhardt, Topica, 342.
Here I am confining the discussion to authoritative witnesses being invoked for the purpose of persuasion. There is, however, a second, very significant aspect to the concept of authority, namely the authority of the one speaking. For an interesting treatment of this topic, in which Cicero’s use of authority in his speech Pro Sulla is analyzed, see Goodwin, “Cicero’s Authority,” 38–60. Goodwin likens Cicero’s use of authority in
