“For the more shamefully an honourable and worthy profession was abused by the folly and audacity of dull-witted and unprincipled men with the direst consequences to the state, the more earnestly should the better citizens have put up a resistance to them and taken thought for the welfare of the republic” (Inv. 1.3.5).
115. He does define what he means by “common topics”; see below.
116. In this rhetorical treatise, Cicero argues that the following are the parts of a well-organized speech: exordium (1.14.19–18.26), narrative (1.19.27–21.30), partition (1.22.31–23.33), confirmation (1.24.34–41.77), refutation (1.42.78–51.97), and peroration (1.52.98–56.109).
117. The complete list also includes “habit, feeling, interests, purposes, achievements, accidents, speeches made” (1.24.34).
118. Grimaldi also recognizes that the loci in Cicero are focused on the content of the arguments rather than on the form of the argument. He goes so far as to state that Cicero misunderstood Aristotle’s method; see Grimaldi, “The Aristotelian Topics,” 176–93, esp. 178. Emrich, in questioning Curtius’s definition of a topos as a cliché, argues that the term locus is a metaphor which helps to explain the concept as seen in the Latin rhetoricians (primarily Cicero and Quintilian). Emrich notes that in these writers, a locus is a place at which arguments can be found (“der Sitz des Beweises”), but can also be the argument or proof in itself. See Emrich, “Topik und Topoi,” 90–120, esp. 102–20.
119. Kennedy argues that it was written in 55 BCE and published in the year following its composition. He also claims that De or. “is one of [Cicero’s] most admired works and stands beside or only slightly behind Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Quintilian’s De institutione oratoria as a rhetorical classic”; see Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric, 205 n. 84.
120. Antonius goes on to say that “the mind must needs return to those headings and those commonplaces [locos] which I have often mentioned as such already, from which every device for every speech whatever is derived” (2.34.146).
121. Cicero differentiates the task of an orator from dialectic as practiced by philosophers through Antonius’s statement: “For we notice the overflowing copiousness of the diction of the philosophers who, I think . . . prescribe no rules for speaking, but none the less undertake to discuss with overflowing copiousness, whatever subject is laid before them” (2.35.151). The context is one of oratory vs. philosophy; therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that when Cicero mentions Aristotle’s work, one which concerns the discovery of arguments, Aristotle’s Top. is in view.
122. According to Schütrumpf (“Non-Logical Means of Persuasion,” 95–110), another significant difference between Aristotle and Cicero is that Aristotle differentiates between those elements in the argument for which the orator is responsible (ἔντεχνος; earlier these were called the “artificial” means of persuasion) and those for which the orator is not directly responsible (ἄτεχνος; the “inartificial”). Those arguments that fall under the heading of ἔντεχνος include arguments from ethos, pathos, and logical arguments. In Cicero’s De or., however, what he considers ἄτεχνος actually falls under the heading of logical proof. Schütrumpf concludes: “In Cicero, therefore, the ‘non-technical evidence’ does not constitute a means of persuasion in its own right, as in Aristotle; rather it is classified as subordinate to one of the three means of persuasion which for Cicero are the only means of persuasion” (ibid., 105).
123. An excellent overview of the content of Top. can be found in Gaines, “Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae and Topica,” 469–70.
124. Or perhaps he does not. Gaines argues that the phrase in question should be rendered “I began to write a Topica in the manner of Aristotle” (Gaines, “Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae and Topica,” 469); see also Stump, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, 21–22.
125. Bornscheuer (Topik, 63) notes that Aristotle did not consider the topos as a source of arguments; rather, he saw topoi as being elements of an argument; see also McAdon, “Probabilities,” 226. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 2.2.13: “Let us now speak of the elements of enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I mean the same thing).” As seen in the citation from Rhet. 1.2.21 above, Aristotle conceived of topoi as being elements of syllogisms and enthymemes. Stump notes that Cicero’s concept of loci is much different from that described in Aristotle’s Topics. In Top., Aristotle presents an organization of topoi useful for dialectical argumentation. Aristotle emphasizes the process of developing an argument, rather than the rote memorization of possible arguments. Stump contrasts this with Cicero, who, she argues, is developing a system for forming arguments for legal cases. Thus, for Cicero, the significance of the loci is found in their use within oratory and rhetoric, which make use of dialectic for the purposes of arguing legal cases. Here, one notes an emphasis on the practical nature of the loci in Cicero. See Stump, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, 18–23. Leff also points out the practical nature of loci in the Latin rhetoricians. He, however, compares the descriptions of loci in Cicero and Quintilian to the later Boethius in forming this conclusion. See Leff, “Up from Theory,” 203–11. On this see also the work of Van Ophuijsen (“Where Have the Topics Gone?,” 131–73), who notes that Critolaus makes a statement in which he rejects rhetoric. Van Ophuijsen maintains that “far from being directed at Aristotle’s more rarefied conception of the subject, this is likely to have been an assertion of its [the peripatetic school at Lyceum] claims in the face of an unphilosophical rhetoric encouraged by the new demand for unadorned and intellectually unambitious but practically effective legal speeches created by the extension of Roman jurisdiction” (ibid., 133).
126. Kemper notes that this is a shift in emphasis from that in Rhet. Her. (see below) and Inv. In these two works, loci are predominantly meant to be the arguments themselves. See Kemper, “Topik,” 27.
127. Cicero also provides an example for each one; each example is derived from a forensic issue.
128. In comparing Cicero’s idea of locus to Aristotle’s presentation of topoi, Bornscheuer persuasively argues that the main difference is one of means and ends. For Aristotle, according to Bornscheuer, it was important for the orator to know the means of persuasion for every eventuality. Bornscheuer contrasts this with Cicero, who, he argues, is much more practical and therefore sees an intimate connection between the speech and the situation in which the speech is offered. Cicero ultimately makes this connection through the selection of loci. Bornscheuer also notes that the emphasis on the practicality of oratory in Cicero is a direct result of his involvement in Roman politics, so that his system of rhetoric is governed by political and public ends. See Bornscheuer, Topik, 71–90. Reinhardt somewhat similarly argues that Cicero developed his concept of locus as a result of the Roman legal system becoming more formalized. Around the second century BCE, trials in Rome became more structured, which led to an increased emphasis on the arguments being made, rather than the reputation of the one making the arguments. This occurred along with an increase in legal literature, which included the classification of cases.
