therefore his position) rather than insult his dignity by disagreeing with him.
148. The statement “everything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to win conviction [Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quo dab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem]” (Top. 4.73) certainly allows for other forms of evidence than simply testimony of witnesses. Cicero, however, chooses to focus his treatment on witnesses, both human and divine.
149. Cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.58.148: “We are told that during the wars with the Cimbri a noise of clanging armour and the sounding of a trumpet were heard from the sky, and that the same thing has happened frequently both before then and later.”
150. Seneca writes: “Hear what I think about those fires which the atmosphere drives across the sky.” In the same context he continues, “Also, we have more than once seen a flaming light in the shape of a huge ball which was then dissipated in mid-flight. We saw a similar prodigy about the time of the death of the deified Augustus” (Nat. 1.pref. 17.2–3). See also Nat. 1.15.5: “Among these you may also include a phenomenon which we read about frequently in history: the sky seems to be on fire.” He then goes on to give an example which occurred during the reign of Tiberius Caesar. Cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 2.58.148: “It has often been seen, and is not at all surprising, that the sky itself catches fire when the clouds have been set on fire by an exceptionally large flame.” Here, however, Pliny does not connect this to a specific event. He does, however, associate “a burning shield scattering sparks” which “ran across the sky at sunset from west to east” to the time of Lucius Valerius and Gaius Marius, albeit not to a particular incident during their rule (Nat. 2.34.100). Here one must include lightning, which is, according to the ancients, a form of fire in the heavens. See Seneca, Nat. 2.12.2; in his discussion of lightning (both “flashes” and “bolts”) and thunder, he writes: “It is further agreed that both lightning flashes and lightning bolts are either fiery or have the appearance of fire.” Later, he continues: “It is generally agreed that a lightning bolt is fire and so is a lightning flash, which is merely fire that would have become a lightning bolt if it had acquired more force” (Nat. 2.21.1). Seneca also argues that lightning, when rightly interpreted, foretells future events; see Nat. 2.32.1–51.1 for his discussion of interpreting lightning as well as other forms of augury. Especially pertinent to this study are his remarks concerning Jupiter and lightning (Nat. 2.41.1–46.1). Seneca first states the position of the Etruscans, namely that Jupiter sends lightning for three reasons: to warn; to do good (but this can also do damage); and for destruction. Seneca himself disagrees. He promotes his Stoic viewpoint by stating that “lightning bolts are not sent by Jupiter but all things are so arranged that even those things which are not done by him none the less do not happen without a plan, and the plan is his. For, although Jupiter does not do these things now, it is Jupiter who brought it about that they happen. He is not present at every event for every person but he gives the signal, the force, the cause, to all” (Nat. 2.46.1). For Pliny the Elder’s discussion of this topic, see Nat. 2.52.137–54.141.
151. Cicero states this despite the claims of Euhemerus, who, appealing to intellectual elites, had argued (early in the third century BCE) that most of those recognized as gods had originally been mortal human beings, who were then deified after their deaths. See the discussion in Seznec, Survival of the Pagan Gods, 11–13.
152. Topica is not the only work of Cicero in which he mentions divine testimony. In Part. or. 2.6, the following dialog between the elder Cicero and his son appears after the elder Cicero states that what brings conviction in a speech are “[A]rguments, which are derived from topics that are either contained in the facts of the case itself or are obtained from outside” (Part. or. 2.5):
“Son: How then do you distinguish between the two kinds of arguments you speak of?
Father: Arguments thought of without using a system I term arguments from outside, for instance the evidence of witnesses. . . .
[At this point there is a question and answer concerning internal arguments.]
Son: What kinds of evidence are there?
Father: Divine and human. Divine evidence is for instance oracles, auspices, prophecies, the answers of priests and augurs and diviners; human evidence is what is viewed in the light of authority and inclination and things said either freely or under compulsion—the evidence that includes written documents, pledges, promises, statements made on oath or under examination” (Part. or. 2.6).
153. Cf. the discussion above concerning Aristotle and the use of authority as an inartificial proof.
154. Quintilian then gives several examples of Cicero’s use of divine testimony in treatises and speeches, some of which will be examined below.
155. In his section on θέσις, Theon also references the topos of authority as a way of providing proofs for one’s thesis; he does not, however, mention the gods. He writes: “A more advanced student should include in each of the topics just mentioned the evidence of famous men, poets and statesmen and philosophers . . . and one should not make mention of these things randomly or by chance, but amplifying the examples, first from what has been done by an individual, private man, then by those in authority or a king” (Theon, Progymnasmata 122 [Kennedy]).
156. “And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight [ἀξιόχρεων]. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness . . . Well once [Chaerephon] went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; . . . he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser.” Note here that Plato connects the oracle itself with divine speech, a theme to which I will return.
157. Cicero also references this oracle in Amic. 2.7, 10; Sen. 21.78; and Acad. 1.4.16. See also Valerius Maximus, who also references this oracle in his Memorable Doings and Sayings (3.4.ext. 1). In this particular section, Valerius discusses those who despite lowly origins rose to positions of prominence. As a non-Roman example, Valerius names Socrates, using the oracle as proof of his intellectual and virtuous stature.
158. Cicero makes use of this oracle in a second argument for the immortality of the soul (Tusc. 1.22.52). Here, Cicero claims that a body is simply a container for the soul; one’s existence is therefore defined by the soul, not the physical body. The Delphic inscription, which he attributes to Apollo, is therefore the god’s command to know one’s soul, not one’s physical body. Cf. also Dio Chrysostom, 10.22; 67.3; Plato Charm. 164b-65b; [Alc. maj.] 1.124a-b. Aristides also references this oracle in his In Defense of Oratory 78–83; see the analysis of this passage below.
159. Specifically, Leocrates fled Athens and went to Megara when Philip won a victory over the Athenians at Chaeronea.
160. At this point, Dio Chrysostom quotes the oracle in full:
“Wait
