“[Oratory] seems to me, Gorgias, not to be an artistic practice [εἶναι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὖ], but that of a soul taking aim, courageous, and naturally clever in associating with men. Its total effect I call flattery” (Aristides, In Defense of Oratory 22).
162. Aristides emphasizes his use of evidence in this section; he states, “Then my argument will be made not from lack of taste, but for proof [ἔπειτ’ οὐ τοῦ φορτικοῦ χάριν εἰρήσεται, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως], which we claim is lacking in these [i.e., Plato’s] arguments” (In Defense of Oratory 27–28).
163. “Men go to Delphi and inquire about constitutions. And then they legislate according to the voice which comes from the Pythian priestess, beginning with Lycurgus, who came after many others, but must be called first for the sake of argument” (In Defense of Oratory 38).
164. “[A]nd [Plato] says that then he must act, ‘if the Pythian priestess assents,’ but before that he does not dare” (In Defense of Oratory 41; cf. Plato, Resp. 540c).
165. Aristides summarizes this section with the statement, “So be it! Here is the evidence for our argument, from Delphi and Pythian Apollo [αὓτη μὲν ἐκ Δελφῶν ἡ μαρτυρία τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παρὰ Ἀπόλλωνος (τοῦ) Πυθίου]” (In Defense of Oratory 42).
166. This is basically an argument from the greater to the lesser, the greater being the “artless” testimony of the gods through oracles. Aristides summarizes: “Therefore, evidence and support has come . . . from all the gods [οὐκοῦν παρὰ . . . τῶν θεῶν μαρτυρία ψῆφος ἐπῆκται], that such an argument is worthless, which either seeks art or belittles whatever does not have it” (In Defense of Oratory 45).
167. Cicero will cite the gods as the source of madness as well; the context, however, is quite different. See comments below in connection with his speech against Clodius, De haruspicum responso.
168. Other examples could be cited; Demosthenes cites the law, and then quotes oracles in his case against Meidias, thus providing evidence for the illegality of Meidias’s actions (striking Demosthenes) and for his impiety (see Mid. 47–55).
169. The author of the declamation references an attack made by Alexander against Athens.
170. See, e.g., Cicero, who quotes a verse from Ennius’s Annales and then states, “Our poet seems to have obtained these words, so brief and true, from an oracle” (Resp. 5.1). See also Aeschines (Ctes. 135–36), who quotes Hesiod and then states, “If you disregard the poet’s meter and examine only his thought, I think this will seem to you to be, not a poem of Hesiod, but an oracle directed against the politics of Demosthenes [ἀλλὰ χρησμὸν εἰς τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν]” (Ctes. 136); Lycurgus (Against Leocrates 92), who prefaces a quotation of poetry by stating, “For the first step taken by the gods in the case of wicked men is to unhinge their reason; and personally I value as the utterance of an oracle these lines, composed by ancient poets and handed down to posterity [καὶ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀρχαίων τινὲς ποιητῶν ὧσπερ χρησμοὺς γράψαντες τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις τάδε τὰ ἰαμβεῖα καταλιπεῖν].” Here, however, one must exert caution, as the various terms translated “oracle” can carry a wide range of meanings, not unlike the term topos.
171. See Quintilian, Inst. 5.12.42. The other examples that Quintilian cites in this passage are discussed below.
172. The significance of this is that this speech is therefore technically not a species of forensic rhetoric in that it is not a formal accusation of Catiline. It is, rather, Cicero’s report to the people of what has taken place, and in places sounds much like a self-encomium (cf. Dio Cassius’s statement: “[Cicero] was the greatest boaster alive and regarded no one as equal to himself” (Hist. Rom. 38.12.7; see also Plutarch, Comp. Dem. Cic. 2.1: “[W]hereas Cicero’s immoderate boasting of himself in his speeches proves that he had an intemperate desire for fame”). Heibges argues that while this speech is deliberative in nature, the citation of the direction of the gods is nonetheless employed by Cicero in order to persuade his audience more effectively that he has taken the correct course of action; see Heibges, “Religion and Rhetoric,” 833–49.
173. Cicero employs the same strategy in a forensic speech, through which he defends Sulla against the accusation that he was a part of this same conspiracy. In that speech, Cicero states: “Thwarted on this charge, Torquatus returns to the attack and makes another accusation against me. He says that I falsified the entry in the public records of what was said. Immortal gods!—for I grant you your due and cannot with honesty claim for myself the sole credit for distinguishing unaided the number, variety and speed of the dangers in that storm which burst so furiously upon the State—it was surely you who then kindled in my mind the desire to preserve my country, you who turned me from all other considerations to the single thought of delivering the Republic, you in short who amid the deep shadow of uncertainty and ignorance illumined my thoughts with the brightness of your light” (Sull. 40).
174. Pliny the Elder also records a lightning strike which he interprets to be an omen with respect to Catiline; see Nat. 2.52.137.
Cicero’s statement recorded here is an excellent example of the rhetorical figure of speech known as paralipsis (occultatio), as described in Rhet. Her. 4.27.37: “Paralipsis [occultatio] occurs when we say that we are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying.”
175. “You remember, of course, that in the consulship of Cotta and Torquatus a large number of objects on the Capitol were struck by lightning, images of the gods were overthrown and statues of men of old overturned and the bronze tablets of our laws melted; even the statue of Romulus, the founder of Rome, was struck . . . On that occasion the soothsayers assembled from the whole of Etruria and said that murder and arson, the end of the rule of law, rebellion and civil war, the destruction of the whole city and of our empire were upon us, unless the immortal gods were placated by every means and used their power virtually to alter the path of destiny” (Cat. 3.19).
176. “Who here can be so blind to the truth, so impetuous, so deranged in his mind as to deny that, more than any other city in the whole world that we see about us, Rome is governed by the will and the power of the immortal gods?” (Cat. 3.21) Heibges expresses some doubt as to the timing concerning the erection of the statue and the coup being averted. She intimates that this confluence of events may have been manipulated in order to bring about the desired results; see Heibges, “Religion and Rhetoric,” 844.
