continue until the end of the war in Europe.
It was not until June 1940 that the Mediterranean became a major problem for Britain, caused by two seismic shifts in the war: the entry of Italy into the war followed only days later by the collapse of France. At once Britain had lost an ally and gained an enemy, the impact of which was most keenly felt in the Mediterranean. The Italian Navy (Regia Marina), under the command of Admiral Angelo Iachino, presented a formidable opponent; modern, well designed and generally faster than its older Royal Navy (RN) counterparts; it also had the advantage of being able to focus solely on the war in the Mediterranean while Britain and the Allies had to stretch resources to cover the Atlantic and later the Pacific. It had been designed principally to provide home defence against the French Navy, a role it was clearly not required to fulfil, and preferred to remain ‘a fleet in being’, reluctant to engage in battle, save for the protection of the occasional convoy, while continuing to pose a sizeable threat to its opponents.1 The apparent reluctance of the Regia Marina to engage in battle was in part due to its limited supply of fuel.2 When it did venture out it suffered other significant deficiencies, notably the lack of organic (sea-launched) aircraft, the absence of radar and the centralised land-based command of the Italian Naval Headquarters (Supermarina), which denied Italian commanders the freedom of action enjoyed by their British counterparts. All these factors were to weigh against the Regia Marina when it met the RN at Cape Matapan.
By comparison, the British Mediterranean Fleet, which included the Australian light cruiser HMAS Perth and the destroyer HMAS Stuart, under the command of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham (know as ABC) began the war smaller3 and older. All three battleships engaged at Matapan, HMS Warspite, Valiant and Barham had been present at the Battle of Jutland, 25 years earlier. Crucially, each but Barham, together with other more modern British ships, was fitted with radar. The RN also enjoyed the presence of an aircraft carrier, although by the time the two fleets met at Matapan it had already been necessary to replace one carrier, the damaged HMS Illustrious, with Formidable. The ensuing battle would be ‘the first time that carrier- borne aircraft played a vital and indispensable role in a main fleet action’.4 A further advantage would also present itself at Matapan; the legacy of pre-war night-fighting training. Indeed Cunningham could claim to be ‘arguably the most expert ‘night-fighter’ in the Royal Navy’, while the Italians neither expected nor prepared for action after dark.5
Initial engagements between the two fleets had been largely inconclusive, the Regia Marina preferring a safe escape to open battle. However, there could be no escape when, assisted by long-range American built photo-reconnaissance aircraft, the British targeted the Italian naval base at Taranto on the evening of 11 November 1940, with the aim of reducing the Italian threat to essential convoys from Malta to troops in North Africa. The attack, conducted by Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers from HMS Illustrious, severely damaged two battleships and sank a third; arguably the psychological impact was as devastating as the material one on the Italian fleet. The RN now enjoyed superiority in capital ships; however, it remained outnumbered in lesser classes; ‘command of the sea’ was still far from secured.6
Ashore, Mussolini was attempting to assert Italian military might. Using the previously invaded and occupied Albania as a springboard, Italian forces invaded Greece on 28 October 1940. Unfortunately for the Italian dictator, his adventure rapidly and vividly highlighted the fallacy of his ambition to reclaim the glory of the Roman Empire; not until the intervention of German forces did Greece eventually fall. The invasion of Greece also provoked Britain to become involved, the government deciding to send an expeditionary force of Commonwealth troops from North Africa to the new front in Greece. This was a commitment the British could ill afford and was arguably intended as much to demonstrate, particularly to the still neutral USA, their resolve to continue to fight the Axis powers.7 The safe passage of men and material from Alexandria to Greece would place further responsibility on Cunningham’s fleet which, since Germany’s increased presence in-theatre, was also required to deal with the threat posed by the German bombers of Fliegerkorps X, recently arrived from Norway.
It was against this background that the characteristically cautious Supermarina would order Admiral Iachino to take his fleet to sea. The reasons for this decision were summarised by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, Admiral Campioni as: “(i) the volume of shipping between Egypt and Greece; (ii) the need to allow the Navy to go into action; and (iii) the pressure from the Germans”.8 Of all these imperatives it is the latter which appeared decisive; as Iachino himself is quoted in the Battle Summary, the German instance on offensive cruises in the Eastern Mediterranean “was in the final analysis the determining cause of our operation at the end of March”.9
The Supermarina’s plan was to intercept British convoys to the north and south of the island of Crete, thus disrupting their route for resupply from North Africa to Greece. This would involve a formidable fleet of one battleship, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and 13 destroyers. The battleship Vittorio Veneto, in which Iachino flew his flag, was so new that it had avoided destruction at Taranto and boasted nine 15-in guns and a top speed of 30 knots. The only omission was of air cover and reconnaissance; this was promised by the Luftwaffe although in reality it failed to materialise properly. The fleet left Naples on 26 March, encouraged by German intelligence reports that the British could muster just one battleship and no operational aircraft carrier, since Illustrious had been bombed by German planes in Malta harbour. The reality was that the British had in fact three operational battleships and the aircraft carrier Formidable had arrived on station earlier in March.
According to the Battle Summary, it was at 1220 on 27 March that an RAF Sunderland Flying Boat reported a force of enemy cruisers, which subsequently persuaded Cunningham to proceed to sea himself.10 However, it is now known that ULTRA decryptions of German and Italian signals had already alerted the British to the Regia Marina’s intentions; the deployment of a reconnaissance plane in clear view of the Italians being intended to deflect any suspicions among the enemy that their signals were being read.11 Forewarned, Cunningham had subtly suspended all but one convoy sailing, allowing his forces to focus on searching for the enemy. Meanwhile, despite the loss of surprise Iachino was ordered to continue, although he was now to concentrate his forces south of Crete and sweep north past Cape Matapan. For the Supermarina the political imperative to engage the British outweighed any military considerations.12
The proceeding Battle Summary provides the most comprehensive account of ship and aircraft movements from 27 to 29 March and therefore does not require repeating here. However, given the complications and intricacies of the engagement an overview of the battle is nonetheless useful. The British fleet was divided into two main Forces. Cunningham led the battleship squadron, based at Alexandria and composed of the three battleships, a carrier and four destroyers. The second cruiser and destroyer force, based at Piraeus (Greece) was led by Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippell, referred to throughout the summary as Vice Admiral Light forces (VALF). Two additional forces constituted a further flotilla of destroyers and two submarines. The Regia Marina was similarly divided into two cruiser/destroyer forces and the Vittorio Veneto battle group.
The VALF set out first to hunt for evidence that the Regia Marina was at sea; by 27 March it became apparent that it was and that evening, unnoticed by the Italians and Germans, Cunningham’s fleet departed Alexandria to rendezvous with Pridham-Wippell. The first positive sighting of the enemy came around 0745/28 when Vice-Admiral Sansonetti’s cruiser force spotted the VALF and opened fire. Knowing himself to be outgunned Pridham-Wippell altered course in an attempt to draw his opponent towards the big guns of Cunningham’s battle fleet. After an hour of gunfire and chasing, Iachino, suspicious of the British retreat ordered his own ships to join the Vittorio Veneto battle fleet in a similar attempt to lure his enemy towards greater fire-power; he was still unaware of Cunningham’s ever closer presence at sea. By the time of the next encounter at 1050 VALF was trapped between Iachino’s and Sansonetti’s forces. Pridham-Wippell’s only option was again to beat a hasty retreat behind clouds of smoke. Relief finally arrived at 1127 in the shape of a group of Albacore torpedo bombers, originally launched from Formidable in an attempt to slow down the faster Italian ships. Without air cover of his own, Iachino had little choice other than
