occasion; however, a second strike from the carrier, conducted between 1510–1525 proved more effective, with one torpedo hitting the battleship, causing it to stop temporarily and take on water. The price of this strike was the loss of the attacking aircraft and its crew of three, including the squadron leader Lieutenant Commander J. Dalyell Stead RN; remarkably these were to be the only losses suffered by the British during the battle. However, it was not long before Iachino was underway again, albeit at a much slower rate of knots. Meanwhile land-based RAF bombers from Greece and Fleet Air Arm bombers from Crete also joined in the attacks, but to little effect. A third and final strike launched from Formidable met with more success, hitting the heavy cruiser Pola and causing her to stop dead in the water; the significance of this hit was to prove far greater than could initially have been imagined. An hour later, onboard Vittorio Veneto, Iachino, unaware of the relative proximity of British ships, finally made the fateful decision to send Vice Admiral Cattaneo with the cruisers Zara and Fiume and four destroyers to assess Pola’s situation and render assistance as necessary. Iachino’s motives for making this decision are considered in some detail in the Battle Summary, for it was to turn the events of the following night from tragedy to disaster for the Regia Marina.13
Meanwhile, disappointed to have missed the Italian flagship yet again, Cunningham had despatched eight destroyers, led by Captain P. J. Mack in Jervis, to continue the hunt. It had now become clear to the British Commander-in-Chief that if he was to engage the enemy with minimal risk to his own ships he would have to attack at night to avoid heavy aerial bombardment from land-based aircraft from Sicily. However, as the destroyers and VALF both continued to close in on the Vittorio Veneto, Cunningham’s battle fleet came across Cattaneo’s rescue party. With Pola fixed on Valiant’s radar, Cattaneo’s ships were sighted close by; the battleships opened fire at such a range, Cunningham remarked, that ‘‘even a gunnery officer cannot miss’’.14 That they were able to do so was in no small part due to the searchlights from the British ships that illuminated their targets. One of these searchlights, midship on Valiant, was manned by a young Prince Philip, whose dedication to his duty earned him a mention in despatches.15 Soon after, Zara, Fiume and the destroyer Alfieri were all fatally hit. Fiume sank shortly after while Zara, Alfieri and the destroyer Carducci were later finished off by RN and RAN destroyers from Cunningham’s escort group, the battleships having withdrawn to safety. Finally, having removed survivors, the stricken Pola was sunk by two torpedoes.
Meanwhile, Mack and Pridham-Wippell had continued their pursuit of Vittorio Veneto; however the chase was unintentionally lost when VALF responded to Cunningham’s signal for all forces not engaged in sinking the enemy to retire north eastwards to avoid attack from the Luftwaffe once daylight returned. The next day (30 March) the British Mediterranean Fleet returned safely to port having dealt a devastating blow to the Regia Marina’s surface fleet: for the loss of just one British aircraft and its three-man crew the Italians had lost three heavy cruisers, and two destroyers; their newest battleship had suffered significant damage while some 3,000 men had been killed, injured or captured. Nevertheless, in Cunningham’s final analysis, quoted in the Summary: ‘‘The results of the action cannot be viewed with entire satisfaction since the damaged Vittorio Veneto was allowed to escape’’.16
Certainly the war for control of the Mediterranean was far from won and the Royal Navy and its allies would continue to suffer devastating losses. But these losses would be at the hands of aircraft and submarines. Had the Regia Marina’s surface fleet survived, Allied casualties could only have been greater, not least during the subsequent evacuations from Crete and Greece. The failure of such operations could have proved fatal for the future of campaigns around the Mediterranean. By the time of the Battle of El Alamein in October – November 1942, the British Eighth Army was better armed and better supplied than Rommel’s Afrika Korps, despite a considerably longer supply route.17 It may be a truism but ultimately a war between nations can only be won on land. A war can, however, be lost at sea when the survival of peoples and their fighting forces is dependent upon safe and open access to the seas.
References
1. Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London, pp.120-121.
2. Greene J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, pp.143-144. Provides a detailed examination of Italian fuel supplies and their impact on Italian operations; ultimately it is impossible to know if the Regia Marina would have ventured out more if there had been a greater supply of fuel available.
3. See following Battle Summary, for ratio of RN/RAN to Regia Marina ships.
4. Pack, S. W. C. (1961), The Battle of Matapan, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.7.
5. Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941.’ In Grove, E. (ed.) (1994) Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London, p.198.
6. Brown, D. (2001), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II November 1940–December 1941, Frank Cass, London, p.xiv.
7. Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London, p.123.
8. Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, p.146.
9. See following Battle Summary. The Admiral is also quoted complaining at not been consulted with regard to the preceding Italo-German naval conference held at Merano, 13-14 February.
10. See following Battle Summary.
11. Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, pp.159-160. It was widely suspected by the Italians that the loss of the element of surprise was due to the presence of a traitor.
12. Scalzo, A. M. (2001): Battle of Cape Matapan: World War II Italian Naval Massacre, www.historynet.com./battle-of-cape-matapan-world-war-ii-italian-naval-massacre.htm.
13. See following Battle Summary.
14. Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941’ in Grove, E. (ed.) (1994) Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London, p.203.
15. Brandreth, G. (2004), Philip and Elizabeth: Portrait of a Marriage, Century, London, p.152-153.
16. See following Battle Summary.
17. Macintyre, D. (1964), The Battle for the Mediterranean, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.15.
Bibliography
Brandreth, G. (2004), Philip and Elizabeth: Portrait of a Marriage, Century, London.
Brown, D. (2001), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II November 1940–December 1941, Frank Cass, London.
Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941’ in Grove, E. (ed.) (1994), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London.
Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, Chatham Publishing, London.
Grove, E. (ed.) (1994), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. Bramley Books, London.
Holloway A. (1993), From Dartmouth to War: A Midshipman’s Journal, Bucklands Publications Ltd, London.
Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London.
Macintyre, D. (1964), The Battle
