B.T. Batsford Ltd, London.
Pack, S. W. C. (1961), The Battle of Matapan, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London.
Scalzo, A. M. (2001), Battle of Cape Matapan: World War II Italian Naval Massacre, www.historynet.com./battle-of-cape-matapan-world-war-ii-italian-naval-massacre.htm.
BR. 1736 (35) Restricted
NAVAL STAFF HISTORY
SECOND WORLD WAR
BATTLE SUMMARY No. 44
THE BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN
28 March, 1941
This book is the property of His Majesty’s Government and is for the use of persons in His Majesty’s Service only. It must not be shown, or made available to, the Press or to any member of the public.
T.S.D. 72/49
Tactical and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, S.W.1
Abbreviations
A.A. Anti-Aircraft.
A/C Aircraft.
A.P.C. Armour-Piercing, Capped.
A/S Anti-Submarine.
A.S.V. Anti-Surface Vessel (Airborne Radar Set).
A.T.O. Assisted Take-Off (Launching Gear For A/C).
B/S Battleship.
C.S. Cruiser Squadron.
D.F. Destroyer Flotilla.
D/F Direction Finding (From W/T Reception).
E.B.I. Evershed Bearing Indicator.
F.A.A. Fleet Air Arm.
F/B Flying Boat.
G.A.B. General Alarm Bearing.
H.E. High Explosive.
R.A. (A) Rear-Admiral, Aircraft Carrier.
RAF Royal Air Force.
S.A.P. Semi-Armour-Piercing (R.A.F. Bombs).
T/B (A/C) Torpedo-Bomber.
T.O.O. Time Of Origin.
T.B.R (A/C) Torpedo-Bomber-Reconnaissance.
T.S.R (A/C) Torpedo Spotting Reconnaissance.
VALF Vice-Admiral Of Light Forces.
General Situation, March 1941
In June 1940 the sudden collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war gravely compromised the British situation in the Mediterranean. These events were followed in October 1940 by Mussolini’s treacherous attack on Greece with a view to gaining control over the Eastern Mediterranean. He met with an unexpected set-back and in January 1941 the Italian forces were falling back on Valona in Albania. Germany was already preparing to enter the lists. On 1 March, 1941 Bulgaria signed the Three Power Pact complying with Hitler’s demand to allow twenty fully mechanised German divisions to enter Bulgaria and take post along the Yugoslav frontier, a very evident warning of a German attack on Greece.
A lull had occurred in the Libyan Campaign. Tobruk and Benghazi had been captured from the Italians in January and the British Government decided to send two infantry divisions (one Australian and one New Zealand) and an armoured brigade from Libya to assist Greece in the impending attack. On 2 March, Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for War, and General Sir John Dill, C.I.G.S., were in Athens conferring with the Greek Government. The transfer of this force (Operation ‘Lustre’), which began to move on 4 March, absorbed for a time all the energies of the Mediterranean fleet. Its transport required, during March and April, 27 escorted convoys (15 northbound and 12 southbound) between Egypt and Greece, while the forces disembarked numbered 58,364 personnel and 8,588 vehicles, guns and tanks.
Enemy air forces were active; Italian submarines were on the move; mines laid by air in the Suez Canal blocked the passage of the Formidable on her way through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean to replace the Illustrious and she did not reach Port Said until 9 March. It is satisfactory to note that in spite of attacks by air and submarine not a soldier was lost on the way to Greece. Italian submarines failed to stop the convoys and one of them (the Anfitrite) attacking a convoy from the Aegean was sunk by the Greyhound on 6 March; but behind the submarines lay the Italian fleet, which might at any moment appear on the Aegean route. It is in the light of these circumstances that the Battle of Matapan was fought for nothing less than the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and all the vast commitments dependent upon it.
The Naval Situation, March 1941
In the nine months that had passed since Italy entered the war the Italian fleet had made very few major sorties, of which two led to running fights with out Fleet, viz.: the action off Calabria on 9 July, 1940 (Battle Summary No. 8) and the action off Cape Spartivento on 27 November, 1940 (Battle Summary No. 9). Both of these encounters had ended in dismal retreat. On another occasion, 30 September 1940, their retreat took place before action was possible, although their preponderance of force, i.e., battleships 5 to 2, cruisers 11 to 5, destroyers more than 2 to 1 might have tempted them to an encounter (Naval Staff History (Med.), Vol. I, Sec. 861). Furthermore, they had submitted tamely to the attack on Taranto (11 November, 1940), the bombardment of Valona (18 December, 1940), the bombardment of Bardia (3 January, 1941), the passage of a through convoy from Gibraltar to Greece on 7–10 January, 1941, and the bombardment of Genoa (9 February, 1941). What finally stirred them into action were the prospects of a great Spring offensive in the Balkans and the urgency of German protests.2 Signs of increasing activity became apparent about 25 March. There was increasing aerial reconnaissance to the south and west of Greece and Crete, accompanied by daily attempts to reconnoitre Alexandria harbour, and other indications all pointing to some prospective action by the Italian fleet.
In the opinion of the C.-in-C. this action might take one of three forms: (1) attack on the British convoy routes in the Aegean with the despatch of an Italian convoy to the Dodecanese; (2) a diversion to cover a landing in Cyrenaica or Greece; (3) an attack on Malta. The most vulnerable target, in his opinion, was to be found in the British convoys to Greece, whose passage had to be safeguarded at all costs.
Plan 3, detail of Battle of Matapan off Gavdo
Plan1, detail (2) of Battle of Matapan, General Plan
The Commander-in-Chief’s Plans
The threat from enemy surface ships might be met by moving our battle fleet into the area west of Crete, but from that area it would sooner or later be bound to return to harbour for fuel, leaving the enemy free to attack. The C.-in-C. therefore decided to clear merchant shipping out of the area between Crete and Egypt for a time, and to dispose all his available forces to bring the enemy to action.
As it was important, however, to avoid arousing his suspicions and it was hoped that convoys in the Aegean would draw the Italians out, one convoy was left
