0400/28 the C.-in-C. with Force A, on a course of 310° at 16 knots, was in 32° 22’ N., 27° 12’ E., roughly 205 miles from the rendezvous of the cruiser force. The latter at 0600/28, steering to the south-east at 18 knots, sighted an enemy aircraft, identified later as an R.O.43. This type, used chiefly with catapults, indicated the presence of surface ships, and accordingly VALF as soon as Ilex and Hasty joined his screen, turned at 0645 to 200°, away from the direction of probable reconnaissance.
Meanwhile the Formidable, an hour before, at 0555, in 32° 44’ N., 26° 57’ E., had flown off a number of aircraft, A/S and fighters, to search the area between Crete and Cyrenaica as far west as longitude 23° E.
An air search had started even earlier from Maleme, in Crete, where four T.B.Rs. armed with torpedoes took off at 0445 to search to the west of Crete. One of them experienced engine trouble and had to jettison its torpedo and return; the others continued in company and, sighting nothing, returned at 0845.
It was 0720 when the enemy was first sighted south of Crete by aircraft 5B of HMS Formidable, which at 0722 amplified her report of four cruisers and four destroyers in 34° 22’ N., 24° 47’ E., steering 230°. The next report was made by Formidable’s aircraft, 5F at 0739, which announced four15 cruisers and six destroyers, course 220° in 34° OS’ N., 24° 26’ E. (see Appendix D). These were part of the Italian Fleet, which at 0800 was south of Gavdo Island (Crete), steering 130°. It was disposed in three groups, termed by us Forces Z, X and Y as follows:
Force Z16 i.e. (1st Cruiser Division, 3 Zara cruisers and (first sighted 0722, 8th Cruiser Division, 2 Garibaldi cruisers). A/C B)
Force X16 i.e. 3rd Cruiser Division, 3 Trieste cruisers. (first sighted 0739, A/C F)
Force Y16 Vittorio Veneto. (first sighted 1058 by VALF)
As the force first reported by aircraft 5B at 0722 was identical in composition with the British Cruiser Force B and was only some 35 miles north-east of it, it seemed to the VALF and to the C.-in-C. that Force B (British) had been mistaken for the enemy, and the C.-in-C. asked R.A. (A) whether his aircraft knew the position of our cruisers. When the second report came in, only 25 miles from the position of the first, it seemed again that it might be referring to our own cruisers. In actual fact the two air reports referred to two separate enemy cruiser forces, some 25 miles apart. One (designated Force X in Plan 1) was some 15 miles north of VALF; the other (designated Force Z) was some 30 miles north-east of him. The uncertainty was soon resolved for at 0745 the Orion (flagship) sighted smoke astern bearing 010° and a minute later identified enemy ships, which belonged to enemy Force X. It was then 0746.
Plan 2
Commencement of Action
(Plan 2)
When 25 miles south of Gavdo at 0600/28 March and on a S.E.’ly course the VALF – as already noted – had sighted an enemy aircraft and, after the Ilex and Hasty had joined his screen, turned at 0645 to course 200°, speed 20 knots, with the intention of avoiding further enemy air reconnaissance. The 0739 enemy report from the Formidable’s A/C ‘F’ was still being studied by VALF at 0745 when the Orion sighted the enemy astern, and at 0752 the VALF altered course to 140° and increased speed to 23 knots. Shortly afterwards (0755) the ships astern were seen to be three cruisers with some destroyers, and speed was increased to 28 knots. Suspecting them to be 8-in. cruisers of the Zara class, which were faster than his own and could outrange them, he decided to try to draw them towards our battleships, some 90 miles to the eastward. At 0802 he reported their position17 and his own. Though not aware of it at the time he was “very uncomfortably placed” with a second powerful enemy cruiser squadron (Force Z) out of sight to the north-east in a position to cut him off from our battle fleet; also, the Vittorio Veneto was some 16 miles on his port quarter, steering S.E. His first enemy report was amplified at 0812 and simultaneously the enemy (3rd Division) opened fire, range 25,000 yards. Admiral Iachino comments on the opening range:
“The Trieste Division opened fire at 22,000 metres and the first salvoes fell very short... the distance between the two groups was in fact never less than 24,000 metres (i.e., 27,000 yards). Atmospheric conditions were most unfavourable for range finding at great distance, especially with the old range finders fitted in the Trento and Trieste. These instruments actually did not succeed in giving any reading before opening fire,18 and even afterwards their observations were ‘jumpy’, uncertain and inaccurate.”
The sea was smooth and visibility good (15 miles). The enemy concentrated on the Gloucester, which zig-zagged to avoid being hit. At 0829 the range had decreased to 23,500 yards and the Gloucester fired three salvoes which, though falling short, caused the Italian cruisers to alter course away and draw outside the British gun range; there resuming a parallel course the Italian cruisers continued firing, though their salvoes were all falling short. Both forces continued speeding to the south-east when at 0854 the aspect of affairs was abruptly changed by a report of enemy battleships. This originated from British aircraft 5F which had seen at 0805 what appeared to be a force of three enemy battleships in a position 34° N., 24° 16’ E., steering to the south-west (210°) at 20 knots. As Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell at 0805 had been only seven miles from that identical position and must have sighted them himself had they been there, he considered the position was “manifestly incorrect”,19 but there remained the possibility of enemy battleships being somewhere in the vicinity. At 0855 the enemy cruisers ceased fire, and turning to port went off to the north westward on an approximate course of 300°, having been ordered by the Italian C.-in-C. to break off the engagement, as he considered that his cruisers were being drawn too far into waters under control of our aviation. The VALF reported the enemy’s alteration of course and decided to follow and try to maintain touch. At 0936 he reported the enemy still in sight bearing 320°, 16 miles, course 320° speed 28 knots. During this phase of the action the Vendetta developed engine trouble, and was detached to Alexandria.
Fig 2
The C.-in-C.’s Movements, 28 March
Meanwhile the C.-in-C.,20 after receiving at 0827 the Vice-Admiral’s sighting report of 0802, had increased speed to 22 knots (0832) and altered course to 310°. The situation did not for the moment appear “unduly alarming”, but twenty minutes later he ordered the Valiant (0851) to proceed at her utmost speed to join VALF, detaching the Nubian and Mohawk to accompany her. The Warspite (with slight condenser trouble)21 and the Barham remained in company with the Formidable (Plan 1), which had been ordered at 0833 to range a torpedo striking force, while the aircraft at Maleme were also ordered at 084922 to attack the enemy cruisers (See Attack by Maleme Striking Force on the 3rd Division). Aircraft reports were then coming in indicating another enemy force to the northward, though their presence was by no means certain. Aircraft 5F’s report (at 0805) of battleships might be correct, or on the other hand she might be mistaking cruisers for battleships, a not uncommon error at the time arising from the similar silhouettes of the Cavour class battleships and the cruiser Garibaldi class, two of which were with Force Z. At 0847 the C.-in-C. received a report from aircraft 5F that touch was lost with the enemy cruisers and destroyers (probably enemy Force X), which she had reported at 0839 well to the southward of the 0722 position given by aircraft 5B.
By 0918, the C.-in-C. knew that the enemy cruisers: (Force X) had broken off action and were retiring to the north-west, being reported by VALF and aircraft 5H as steering 320° or 300° respectively, speed 28 knots. At about this time the Gloucester’s aircraft, which had been catapulted for spotting duty at 0831, reported another enemy force23 to the northward of Force X. This report was not received in any other ship as the aircraft did not use the correct frequency nor was it passed
