task, and is not achievable within the space of a single monograph. To render the goal of this book more manageable, its focus will narrow upon exploring the mid-first to early second century CE Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ views of them. The reason for selecting Epictetus is that, as will become evident, he mentions laypeople with notable frequency, and so a robust reconstruction of his views of them can, quite uniquely for an ancient philosopher, be obtained.
Epictetus
Epictetus (ca. 55–135 CE) led, as one of his recent commentators has reflected, “(perhaps) not a strikingly eventual life, but yet a memorable one.”1 Born in Hierapolis in Asia Minor, Epictetus spent his formative years as a slave in the household of Epaphroditus (ca. 25–95 CE), who was a freedman and secretary to the Emperor Nero. This placed Epictetus close to the heart of the Imperial government, which was an experience that he would sometimes draw upon to help add color to his philosophical explications. For example, when he talking about the misplaced concern for wealth that humans can exhibit, Epictetus recalls that a man had once approached his master in palpable distress because he had only a million-and-a-half sesterces (a sizeable sum) left.2 Little else is known about Epictetus’ early life, and only once in the extant portions of his discussions does he explicitly refer to his previous servile status.3
Epictetus would almost certainly have remained in obscurity had his aptitude for philosophical thought, the provision of leisure time that was afforded to him by his master, and the presence of the engaging Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus in Rome not coincided. Attending Rufus’ lectures while he was still a slave,4 Epictetus seems to have formed a close bond—at least in terms of intellectual deference—with the Stoic scholar. As he would later relay to his own circle of pupils regarding the effect that Rufus had upon his audience:
He [Rufus] used to address us in such a manner that each of us sitting there imagined that some person had informed on him; such was his grasp of understanding how people behave, and his ability to set each person’s private faults before their eyes.5
τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἴεσθαι, ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν: οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν γιγνομένων, οὕτως πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά.
Epictetus also established himself as a well-regarded and popular philosophical figure during his lifetime, with, for example, several high-ranking political figures, including the procurator of Epirus and the corrector of the free cities in Greece,6 visiting his school in Nicopolis so they might hear him lecture or to solicit his advice. In addition, if Aelius is to be believed, even the Emperor Hadrian visited Epictetus’ school.7
With Epictetus never having secured his teachings in written form, his influence would have almost certainly dissipated had one of his pupils, Arrian, not endeavored to document their contents.8 These exist in a series of books entitled the Discourses, which originally spanned eight volumes, but unfortunately only the first four are extant, in which Epictetus’ discussions on a variety of philosophical topics are relayed. Arrian also compiled the Enchiridion, which is a gnomological text that appears to be a mnemonic aid that was crafted to help Arrian, or his envisaged audience, to apply Epictetus’ teachings in a daily life setting.9 Outside of his lifetime perhaps Epictetus’ most famous and influential admirer was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, whose own philosophical interests are well known.10 Epictetus’ name, and a brief account of his ideas, especially regarding the concept of freedom ἐλευθερία, is also preserved in a second-century epigraph that was constructed by a slave/freedman, or at least someone who adopted the guise of a slave/freedman.11 Furthermore, and rather beguiling given the topic of this book, the third-century Christian philosopher Origen reflected that Epictetus was the only philosopher who was read by many (πολλοὶ),12 a remark that probably indicates the accessibility and popularity of the Encheiridon. Post-antiquity during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, Epictetus’ teachings enjoyed a remarkably wide reception, with, among others, figures such as Thomas Jefferson, René Descartes, Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, the third Earl Shaftsbury, and Tolstoy all appealing and favorably referencing him in their writings or speeches.13
Regarding Epictetus’ views of laypeople, currently no study of extended length exists which explores the issue. Given how frequently Epictetus’ remarks upon laypeople punctuate his discussions, this is, I suggest, a surprising lacuna in Epictetan scholarship.
There are a couple of shorter studies in which the presence of lay visitors to his school are noted. In the first, within Ronald Hock’s 1992 journal article which seeks to analyze the Discourses through the prism of social network analysis, he catalogues the recorded visitors to Epictetus’ school.14 Hock highlights if any of these visitors are nonphilosophers, but aside from arguing that their presence testifies to Epictetus’ popularity, as well as observing the often abrasive manner in which he tended to deal with them, Hock is not concerned to explore Epictetus’ opinion(s) of laypeople, or to elucidate any broad framework of thought that might have influenced his views regarding them. In addition, within his 2010 book chapter, Gerald Boter notes a few instances where Epictetus interacts with laypeople, and the advice he offers to his students to not be frustrated when nonphilosophically trained individuals exhibit faltering moral awareness. Boter, however, offers little reflection on these passages beyond briefly narrating them, and commenting that they reveal the varied success Epictetus could have when he engaged with philosophically inexperienced individuals.15
Outline of the Book
In chapter 1, it is highlighted that over the past two decades research has shown that after the rise of Rome in the first century BCE philosophical schools became evermore decentralized from their traditional bases on the Attic mainland, and that the autonomy and disparate location of its affiliates across the now-sprawling Roman Republic becomes increasingly apparent in our sources. The resulting ambiguity over who was, and who was not, a legitimate adherent of philosophy and how this status could be affirmed or contested is probed at length with reference to numerous classical authors’ opinions. It is concluded that the authenticity of a person’s claim to be a philosopher would be determined, firstly, by how faithfully their behavior conformed with their chosen philosophy’s ethical principles, and, secondly, by the depth of their comprehension and the fluidity of recall they could display in annunciating its central tenets. Finally, that philosophers who were affiliated with rival traditions of philosophical thought and students who were being coached in philosophical precepts were both accepted as having a genuine claim to a philosophical identity is documented.
In chapter 2, Epictetus’ understanding of the extent and enduring nature of vice in society is explored. This chapter, therefore, highlights the most negative aspect of Epictetus’ evaluation of laypeople, and where the differences he believes exist between them and philosophically observant individuals are at their starkest. Firstly, it is demonstrated that Epictetus holds that the body’s powerful registering of pain and sensory pleasure often prompts people to channel their effort and volition in solely securing their physical comfort, and to consequently let their capacity for introspection, reasoning, and the freedom of their internal disposition atrophy. Furthermore, while it is seen that Epictetus affirms traditional Stoic monism and is not (beyond idiomatic borrowing) influenced by Platonic dualism, his repeated disregard for the body and advocacy that his students should dislocate their identity away from their flesh is deliberated at length, and the scholarly conversation on this topic is reframed. Secondly, Epictetus opines that most children are mentored by nonphilosophically informed guardians, which systematically entrenches the embedding and normalization of vice and misunderstanding across humanity, which an individual can only hope to expunge (although almost certainly not entirely) by submitting themselves to a laborious philosophical process. It
