that it is often believed that the Stoics held a rather derisory attitude toward the rendering of the divine that was commonly advanced in the myths and rituals of popular Greco-Roman religion. Although Epictetus’ opinion of religion has been rarely scrutinized by his modern interpreters at length, several of his remarks on the topic have been highlighted as giving voice to this perspective. This chapter, however, argues that the contours of his thoughts regarding popular religion are more complex than has so far been appreciated by scholars and that it is in need of greater delineation.
Firstly, when isolating statements from Epictetus on religion that are critical in tenor, it should be noted that he ridicules the view that idols have qualities beyond those that are usually inherent to inert matter; he scolds his pupils for their intention to visit Olympia to see Pheidias’ famed statue of Zeus when they have still to perfect the divine traits that are within them. Secondly, regarding Epictetus’ more accommodating stance toward religion, after cataloguing such remarks, it is observed that he does not usually appeal to traditional religious sentiments in order to negate their worth or to redact them, but as a springboard from which he can launch an explication of Stoic philosophy. It is further highlighted that Epictetus attributes civic religion with having a role in educating and orienting individuals to accept correct patterns of thought, which he significantly holds parallels the intended results of philosophical tuition. In particular, his conviction that the mystery cults were established by wise ancients to provide education and amendment for their participants is noted and used to inform our discussion on the Stoics’ perspective regarding primitivism and the potential didactic function of religion. Thereafter Epictetus’ reflection that through mere habit Christians are steeled with a disdain for their physical security even to the point of facing death at the hands of the emperor’s soldiers, which is a stance that he argues his students should be able to hold through reason, is then commented upon. Finally, Epictetus’ conception of divination is probed, and his understanding that the mantic has been used to prompt self-reflection and philosophical inquiry among laypeople is documented. As with civic law, popular religion is, therefore, found to be another mechanism through which Epictetus believes that the differences between philosophers and laypeople can be reduced.
In chapter 7, after providing context regarding the prevalent use of exempla in classical literature, speeches, and pedagogy, the lack of studies that plot Epictetus’ (as opposed to Seneca’s) employment of exempla is observed, and is a gap in our knowledge that this study proposes to begin to redress. First, it is documented that Epictetus’ elucidation of moral principles from the lives of philosophers chiefly pivots around the figures of Socrates (whom Epictetus presents as being the moral exempla par excellence) and Diogenes the Cynic. Aside from these individuals, his general lack of interest in highlighting philosophers, including luminaries from his own school, as having exhibited moments of commendable moral worth is argued to be striking, especially given his privileging of noting actions from some of the most deprived and uneducated groups in society, such as slaves, gladiators, and laborers. In one notable instance, it is observed that Epictetus draws a direct equivalence between the mindset that slaves and menial laborers can assume and those of Socrates, Diogenes, Cleanthes, and what he terms “the legitimate philosophers” (οἱ γνησίως φιλοσοφοῦντες). He then further assesses that both groups (the laypeople and the philosophers) can show the proper exercise of their faculty of choice/will (προαιρέσει)—a key concept in his philosophy. Thereafter the actions of certain city-states; individuals such as Menoeceus of Thebes; an anonymous athlete; and figures from literature and mythology, such as Sarpedon, Odysseus, and Heracles, are seen to be praised by Epictetus and commended as being worthy of his students’ emulation and as revealing his belief in commendable lay actions and disposition. Epictetus’ conviction that the examples of people, particularly government officials, can help prompt moral advancement across society is then observed. In addition, his advice that philosophers should attempt to leverage the didactic ability of exempla and aim to first disclose their principles to laypeople through their praxis, instead of explicating philosophical doctrines to them, is documented. In the conclusion to the chapter, Epictetus’ extensive use of exempla is argued to firstly highlight his belief that laypeople can act and think in morally beneficial ways, and to secondly disclose his position that an individual can be influenced by exempla irrespective of whether they have the ability to correctly parse or comprehend philosophical teachings or not.
Sources
Regarding sources, the chief ones for the reconstruction of Epictetus’ views are the records that Arrian has left us—namely, the surviving Discourses and the Enchiridion. Occasionally, other classical authors, such as Aulus Gellius, who make references to Epictetus’ views will though be cited. As I noted at the beginning, it is beyond the scope of this book to provide a comprehensive study of the Stoic school and its representatives’ perception(s) of laypeople. Other Stoics’ thought apart from Epictetus’ as well as texts that are accepted to relay information about the school’s position will be occasionally referenced to reveal that there are indications that Epictetus’ stance is not particular to him, but instead might be reflective of a typical Stoic viewpoint. Where they can add particular clarity to a topic, or to help elucidate the broader architecture of Stoic thought, other Stoics philosopher’s opinions will be occasionally discussed at length within the main body of the text, and this is especially so in chapter 4.
Key Terms
Finally, it should also be noted that despite the central place that the word “layperson” holds in this study’s discussion and the attention that will be directed to understand the word choice of relevant primary sources, this book is not a philological study on the Greek word that is often translated as layperson—ἰδιώτης. The presence of laypeople in Epictetus’ discussions (and other relevant classical sources) will instead be considered conceptually, that is, wherever the context implies that a person of little/no philosophical awareness is in view. The primary reason for this conceptual approach is that ἰδιώτης was not the exclusive, or indeed dominant, way in which a classical author could signify a person’s lack of philosophical training or knowledge. As it will be observed in chapter 1, other words that have no direct semantic connections to ἰδιώτης could also be used in ancient literature to relay a similar meaning, for example απαίδευτος (uneducated/cultured), αγράμματοι (the uneducated), οἱ πολλοὶ and τὸ πλῆθος (the many/the multitude), ὁ λαός (the people), and so on. In addition, people who lacked philosophical instruction could often be described in a way that meant using a particular appellation to designate them as such would be superfluous. The precise nature of how laypeople are to be defined and their presence be discerned in ancient texts will be considered in the following chapter.
The decision to select the word “layperson” in this study to describe nonphilosophers should also be explained. The English word “layperson” (or “layman”) has two primary meanings, both of which relate to a person’s lack of technical knowledge or instruction. The first meaning is a nonordained member of a religious, usually mainstream Christian, movement, and, secondly, someone who lacks professional or specialized knowledge of a particular subject. As I will explore in more depth in the next chapter, the Greek word ἰδιώτης also holds dual, although more broader, meanings; firstly, the word is being used to designate a private rather than a political individual, and, secondly, to describe a person who is relatively unskilled or inexperienced in one or more range of activities, skills, or fields of knowledge, for example baking, warfare, oratory, and so on, and also used in a general way to refer to an uneducated or unrefined person.16 The overlap between the English and Greek terms might allow us to select either word to refer to nonphilosophers in this book. On balance, however, I suggest that the use of the English word “layperson” is preferential.17 The narrower semantic range of “layperson,” which is usually employed in English to describe a person’s lack of formal knowledge or training in a technical subject, in comparison with ἰδιώτης, which can be applied in more broader contexts, makes the former the more apt one for us to select given that this book’s topic revolves around people’s grasp of philosophical knowledge. Moreover,
