Strikingly, Gellius also documents that Herodes sought to expose a pompous and self-affected student of Stoicism by appealing to the records of Epictetus’ discussions in a way that both disclose the ancient expectation that a philosopher should adhere to a high standard of moral behavior and also reveal a near contemporary of Epictetus framing his stance on this topic in a way that parallels the one that will be supplied in this chapter.
“Allow me, mightiest of philosophers, since we, whom you call laypeople, cannot answer you, to read from a book of Epictetus, greatest of Stoics, what he thought and said about such big talk as that of yours.” And he bade them bring the first volume of the Discourses of Epictetus, arranged by Arrian, in which that venerable old man with just severity rebukes those young men who, though calling themselves Stoics, showed neither virtue nor honest industry, but merely babbled of trifling propositions and of the fruits of their study of such elements as are taught to children. Then, when the book was brought, there was read the passage which I have appended,38 in which Epictetus with equal severity and humor set apart and separated from the true and genuine Stoic, who was beyond question without restraint or constraint, unembarrassed, free, prosperous and happy, that other mob of triflers who styled themselves Stoics, and casting the black soot of their verbiage before the eyes of their hearers, laid false claim to the name of the holiest of sects.39
‘Permitte inquit, philosophorum amplissime, quoniam respondere nos tibi, quos vocas idiotas, non quimus, recitari ex libro quid de huiuscemodi magniloquentia vestra senserit dixeritque Epictetus, Stoicorum maximus’ iussitque proferri Dissertationum Epicteti digestarum ab Arriano primum librum, in quo ille venerandus senex iuvenes qui se ‘Stoicos’ appellabant, neque frugis neque operae probae, sed theorematis tantum nugalibus et puerilium isagogarum commentationibus deblaterantes, obiurgatione iusta incessuit. Lecta igitur sunt ex libro qui prolatus est ea quae addidi; quibus verbis Epictetus severe simul et festiviter seiunxit atque divisit a vero atque sincero Stoico, qui esset procul dubio ἀκώλυτος, ἀνανάγκαστος, ἀπαραπόδιστος, ἐλεύθερος, εὐπορῶν, εὐδαιμονῶν, vulgus aliud nebulonum hominum qui se ‘Stoicos’ nuncuparent, atraque verborum et argutiarum fuligine ob oculos audientium iacta1 sanctissimae disciplinae nomen ementirentur.
In the above passage, people who present themselves as being Stoics, and who have the ability to recount the school’s doctrines to a great and even irritating length, but who do not concede to follow its ethical principles, are asserted to be false (ementior) members of the school, and it is argued that—at least conceptually—they should be separated (seiungo) from true (verus) Stoics.
Further revealing the force that Epictetus’ remarks were understood in antiquity to have in challenging the discordance that exists between many purported philosophers’ teachings and their actions, Gellius later remarks that Favorinus (whose own philosophical enterprise it can be noted was vulnerable to charges of sophistry40) records that Epictetus declared most individuals who give the appearance of practicing philosophy were: “without deeds, only so far as words,” id significat factis procul, verbis tenus.41
Turning to consider the records of Epictetus’ discussions for ourselves, it can first of all be observed that he provides evidence that the wider public were, at least to some extent, aware that to declare a philosophical identity required that the claimant should follow a high level of moral behavior; as he comments to his students: “We cannot bear to have those who meet us say, ‘Look, so-and-so has become a philosopher, who was like this or that,’” οὐδὲ φέρομεν τοὺς ἀπαντῶντας καὶ λέγοντας ‘εἴδ᾽ ὁ δεῖνα φιλοσοφεῖ, ὁ τοῖος καὶ ὁ τοῖος.’42 That is, their previous behavior did not suggest a life that would naturally come to be dedicated to philosophical study. Meanwhile, Epictetus depicts a bystander, observing a philosopher who was disturbed by a noise and whose reflexes disclosed his concern for his physical safety, as exclaiming: “Philosopher, what has become of what you were saying? Where did it come from? From your lips only?” ποῦ ἐστιν, φιλόσοφε, ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἔλεγες; πόθεν αὐτὰ προφερόμενος ἔλεγες; ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν αὐτόθεν.43
Secondly, Epictetus’ own high expectation of his students’ behavior is repeatedly evidenced; for example, he trenchantly informs one of them:
Do you think that you can act as you currently do, and still be a philosopher? That you can eat, drink, and burst forth with anger and irascibility as you do now? You must conquer certain desires, must be aloof to your familiars, be derided by a slave, be mocked by the people you meet; come off worse than others in everything, whether that be in power, in honor, in the courts. When you have diligently weighed all these things then, if you think it suitable, come to philosophy, and be willing to exchange all of this for serenity, freedom and an unperturbed mind. Otherwise do not come near.44
καίτοι τίς οὕτως δύναται εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐκεῖνος; θέλουσιν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἄνθρωπε, σκέψαι πρῶτον τί ἐστι τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἶτα καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ φύσιν, τί δύνασαι βαστάσαι. εἰ παλαιστής, ἰδού σου τοὺς ὤμους, τοὺς μηρούς, τὴν ὀσφῦν. ἄλλος γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλο τι πέφυκεν. δοκεῖς ὅτι ταῦτα ποιῶν δύνασαι φιλοσοφεῖν; δοκεῖς ὅτι δύνασαι ὡσαύτως ἐσθίειν, ὡσαύτως πίνειν, ὁμοίως ὀργίζεσθαι, ὁμοίως δυσαρεστεῖν; ἀγρυπνῆσαι δεῖ, πονῆσαι, νικῆσαί τινας ἐπιθυμίας, ἀπελθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων, ὑπὸ παιδαρίου καταφρονηθῆναι, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπαντώντων καταγελασθῆναι, ἐν παντὶ ἔλασσον ἔχειν, ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἐν τιμῇ, ἐν δίκῃ. ταῦτα περισκεψάμενος, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ, προσέρχου, εἰ θέλεις ἀντικαταλλάξασθαι τούτων ἀπάθειαν, ἐλευθερίαν, ἀταραξίαν. εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ πρόσαγε.
In this passage, everything from eating and drinking habits to the conquering of desires are asserted by Epictetus to be under philosophy’s oversight. If the student cannot manage to undertake this effort, he is told that he must not (μὴ πρόσαγε) come near engaging in the study of philosophy. Epictetus similarly proceeds to caution that individuals should not consider commencing philosophical study in the same lighthearted manner as children do when they envisage their possible future careers, such as vacillating between aspiring to be a wrestler one moment, a gladiator the next, and a trumpet player the next. In Epictetus’ view, philosophy’s candidates should instead manifest a similar disposition to athletes who manage to achieve success at the Olympic Games: namely, a steely resolve and an unbaiting fixation upon obtaining this hard-won goal.45 Furthermore, one of Epictetus’ frequently utilized words to express the training that his students should undertake is ἄσκησις, a word that holds the sense of a drill, or a routine that entails strenuous physical exercise.46
Additionally, in a discourse that is entitled To Those Who Take Up the Teachings of the Philosophers For the Sake of Talk Alone (Πρὸς τοὺς
