φιλόσοφος: οὐκέτι δεῖ ταῦτα ποιεῖν;’ οὐχὶ δ᾽, ἂν λίαν εὐδοκιμῇς, λέγει πρός τινα ‘κομψῶς ἔφρασεν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ξέρξην,’ ἄλλος ‘οὔ: ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Πύλαις μάχην;’ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀκρόασις φιλοσόφου;
Through inference and direct censure, Epictetus seeks to expose the superficial nature of the envisaged speaker’s speech. He asserts that no introspection or anxiousness (ἀγωνιάω) is elicited from the audience regarding their behavior (ποιέω), only amusement at considering the figures and events that happened to be mentioned in the talk. Like with Arius Didymus above, Epictetus therefore expects that a person will not just seek to understand the theoretical points that they have encountered when they listened to an explication of philosophical themes, but they will utilize them to impact their life, here expressed through the language of the individual turning his attention onto himself (περὶ αὑτοῦ ἠγωνίασεν ἢ ἐπεστράφη). Given such qualities, it should not be surprising that Epictetus frequently calls the legitimacy of this hypothetical speaker’s philosophical status into question. For example, in response to the speaker’s professed intention to obtain a large audience, Epictetus mockingly replies: “Here is the language of a philosopher! Behold the frame of mind of a man who wants to benefit his fellow humankind!” ἰδοὺ φωναὶ φιλοσόφου, ἰδοὺ διάθεσις ὠφελήσοντος ἀνθρώπους, and “who ever heard Socrates say, ‘I know something and will teach it’? But instead he used to send people to different instructors,” διὰ τοῦτο τίς ἤκουσέ ποτε Σωκράτους λέγοντος ὅτι ‘οἶδά τι καὶ διδάσκω’; ἀλλὰ ἄλλον ἀλλαχοῦ ἔπεμπεν.64 In addition, Epictetus castigates the speaker’s intention of seeking to entertain an audience with philosophy, by saying: “Was this what Socrates used to do, or Zeno, or Cleathes?,” τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἐποίει, τοῦτο Ζήνων, τοῦτο Κλεάνθης.65 The mentioning of Zeno and Cleanthes gives this critique a decidedly Stoic point of reference and indicates that the lecturer might profess allegiance to the school. Of further interest is that Epictetus portrays an audience member praising the speaker by saying: “This man writes with more artistic style and in a more finessed manner than Dio’s,” οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος πάνυ τεχνικώτατα γράφει, Δίωνος πολὺ κάλλιον, and later the lecturer himself proudly notes the size of his audience by exclaiming: “Dio never had so great an audience,” Δίωνος οὐδέποτ᾽ ἤκουσαν τοσοῦτοι.66
The Dio who produces skillful writings, and who attracts a large audience is doubtless none other than Dio Chrysostom, Epictetus’ contemporary, who combined eloquent oratory with philosophical content that was largely drawn from the Stoic-Cynic tradition. Given that Dio is (apart from individuals who are cited as historical exempla) the only person who is named within the critique, and the audience and hypothetical speaker are presented as assessing the standards of public declamations and writing style against his example, if this discourse does not intend to directly attack Dio, it certainly includes him within its ambit. This means that the person who it was noted at the start of this chapter voices his irritation at individuals who falsely lay claim to being philosophers, here is cited by Epictetus as being a representative of this very phenomenon.
Although it is not my intention to comment upon whether Epictetus’ portrayal of the philosophical depth and purpose of Dio’s speeches and writings are warranted, it should be noted that with Dio having begun his career as a sophist and then apparently having a dramatic conversion to philosophy,67 this made him a sort of hybrid figure whose identity was, and indeed is, notoriously hard to define.68 Dio’s frequent critiques of inadequate philosophers (which will be reflected upon below again in more detail) and his reflection upon the criteria through which they might be exposed probably disclose Dio’s sensitivity about himself being subject to the type of criticism that Epictetus raises in this passage.69 This discourse, therefore, has salience both for apprehending the moral dimension of ancient philosophical identity, and also, as per my argument above, in highlighting its often fluid and contested nature.
In conclusion, from the passages that are assembled above, the expectation of suitably moral behavior from adherents of philosophy is hopefully evident, yet despite the injunctions against inappropriate conduct and charges against falsely called philosophers that sound from ancient texts, we should be cautious in understanding how deviation from a philosophical school’s teaching would, in reality, determine a person’s ability to associate themselves with it. All schools acknowledged that their adherents would have to strive to make moral progress, and (as will be explored in more detail in chapter 2) this stance is particularly prominent in Stoicism: while perfection in disposition and conduct was the prescriptive ideal, they conceded that such an objective was out of reach of many, if not all, people. True virtue was instead believed by the Stoics to alone belong to the sage, a rare and perhaps nonexistent figure, with most of humanity being fortunate if they could make some measure of moral progress. As Epictetus plainly states: “So is it possible to be entirely free from fault? No, that is not possible; but it is possible to strive persistently to not commit faults,” τί οὖν; δυνατὸν ἀναμάρτητον ἤδη εἶναι; ἀμήχανον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τετάσθαι διηνεκῶ.70 Meanwhile the academic philosopher Cicero similarly articulates: “Now, the men we live with are not perfect and ideally wise, but men who do very well, if there be found in them but the semblance of virtue,” Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis.71
It is, therefore, likely that only the most egregious or unashamed vicious behavior would lead to questions being raised over the legitimacy of a person’s claimed affiliation with a school. In this regard we might commend in passing Philostratus’ gracious comments regarding the Stoic Euphrates, who momentarily lost his temper, and that this should not effecting the renown in which he should be held.72 Furthermore, although it was noted earlier that Epictetus asserts that because of their misplaced desire for pleasure that most of his students are the devotees of the rival philosophical system of Epicureanism, he raises this not as a reason for them to conclude their studies, but to rather spur them to rededicate themselves to Stoicism.73 Of further interest, it can be observed that while in several passages Marcus Aurelius associates himself with the study of philosophy,74 he also discloses that he is free from the conceit that he has succeeded in living as a philosopher should.75 Correct praxis is, therefore, a vital, although perhaps subjective, criterion through which the legitimacy of a person’s adherence to a philosophical school would be determined.
Regarding people who vocationally instructed others in philosophy, it appears, however, that there was a more pressing concern to ascertain whether their teaching was primarily intending to meet their audience’s desire for entertainment, or to engender their moral introspection and self-improvement. The latter demands would, as per Epictetus’ critique of the hypothetical speaker that was noted above, likely be established on the basis of the tone of the lecture’s discussions, the presence of overt exhortations in their speeches for their audience to seek the moral reform of their lives, and in assessing the lasting effects that exposure to their remarks had upon their listeners’ behavior. Furthermore, as it will be further clarified when I explore Epictetus’ interaction with laypeople, when trying to ascertain if an individual was suited to begin receiving philosophical
