as has just been argued, people who had little interest in teasing out complex philosophical ideas could attempt to stake their claim to be philosophers, while some of the ancient world’s most notable philosophical thinkers had often declined to use the title, how, it might be wondered, was philosophical identity during the Roman period evaluated? Within this chapter I will explore this topic with reference to numerous ancient writers, but given the frequent illuminating remarks that he is recorded as making on the issue, my attention will chiefly focus upon Epictetus. Consideration will also be given to people who were viewed as being decidedly beyond the confines of philosophical identity—namely, laypeople. Finally, sections on whether representatives from rival schools recognized the legitimacy of each other’s philosophical status, and if students were acknowledged to be philosophers, will also be explored.
Conduct and Philosophical Identity
With regards to conduct, while instilling ethical behavior in students is (at least within a university setting) largely absent from the formal evaluation of modern philosophical instruction, in antiquity this objective propelled the entire enterprise.19 As Michael Trapp notes: “[ancient] philosophy, taken as seriously as it showed itself to want to be taken, posed an evangelical challenge, to life-changing commitment of a kind that could make awkward demands on the individual; in particular, it could demand the adoption of values and targets at odds with those of ordinary civic society.”20 This expectation can be seen being repeatedly emphasized across the records of the Stoics’ teachings,21 but note in particular the following passage from Arius Didymus:
For it is not the person who eagerly listens to and makes notes of what is spoken by the philosophers who is ready for philosophizing, but the person who is ready to transfer the prescriptions of philosophy to his deeds and to live in accord with them.22
Οὐ γὰρ τὸν προθύμως ἀκούοντα καὶ ὑπομνη ματιζόμενον τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἕτοιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἑτοίμως ἔχοντα πρὸς τὸ τὰ διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας παραγγελλόμενα μεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ κατ᾿ αὐτὰ βιοῦν.
In this passage, it argued that it is not an individual’s apprehension of philosophical theory in itself that is considered to be the goal of their education, but rather their successful application of philosophical doctrines to their life (or the philosophy’s orders/prescriptions—παραγγέλλω). For Arius Didymus, the tenets of philosophy should be transferred (μεταφέρω) to impact a person’s deeds (ἔργα) and how they live (βιόω) their life. Meanwhile Seneca, laconically but notably, states: “She [philosophy] is not a thing to be followed at odd times, but a subject for daily practice,” Non est res subsiciva, ordinaria est; domina est.23 Moreover, a catalogue of stories regarding individuals whose exposure to philosophy instigated a dramatic, lifelong reorientation of their lives, such as the effect that Plato’s philosophizing had upon Speusippus, that Diogenes’ had upon Crates, and that Xenocrates’ had upon Polemo, is documented in classical literature.24 In particular though, note Lucian’s portrayal of the effect that a lecture on Platonism had upon one audience member:
When he had said this and much more of the same sort, he ended his talk. Until then I had listened to him in awe, fearing that he would cease. When he stopped, I felt like the Phaeacians of old,25 for I stared at him a long time spellbound. Afterwards, in a great fit of confusion and giddiness, I dripped with sweat, I stumbled and stuck in the endeavor to speak, my voice failed, my tongue faltered, and finally I began to cry in embarrassment; for the effect he produced in me was not superficial or casual. My wound was deep and vital, and his words, shot with great accuracy, clove, if I may say so, my very soul in two.26
ταῦτά τε καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα διελθὼν κατέπαυσε τὸν λόγον. ἐγὼ δὲ `τέως μὲν ἤκουον αὐτοῦ τεθηπώς, μὴ σιωπήσῃ πεφοβημένος: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπαύσατο, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τῶν Φαιάκων πάθος ἐπεπόνθειν πολὺν γὰρ δὴ χρόνον ἐς αὐτὸν ἀπέβλεπον κεκηλημένος εἶτα πολλῇ συγχύσει καὶ ἰλίγγῳ κατειλημμένος τοῦτο μὲν ἱδρῶτι κατερρεόμην, τοῦτο δὲ φθέγξασθαι βουλόμενος ἐξέπιπτόν τε καὶ ἀνεκοπτόμην, καὶ ἥ τε φωνὴ ἐξέλειπε καὶ ἡ γλῶττα διημάρτανε, καί τέλος ἐδάκρυον ἀπορούμενος: οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος καθίκετο, βαθεῖα δὲ καὶ καίριος ἡ πληγὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ μάλα εὐστόχως ἐνεχθεὶς ὁ λόγος αὐτήν, εἰ οἷόν τε εἰπεῖν, διέκοψε τὴν ψυχήν.
In this vivid account, Lucian depicts the recounting of Platonic tenets as having induced an almost-epiphinal moral awakening in this student (eliciting wonder/awe τέθηπα), which produced a wound so deep that it cut his soul in two and manifested itself in his physical distress and immobilization.27 The significant impact that philosophy could have upon the character of its students is, however, perhaps most effectively relayed by Seneca’s profound remark: “I feel, my dear Lucilius, that I am being not only reformed, but transformed (transfigurari),” Intellego, Lucili, non emendari me tantum sed transfigurari. 28 Descriptions such as these, and others, regarding the reorientation of an individual’s values and aspirations because of their introduction to philosophical theory (e.g. see also Seneca’s description of the “burning” (flagro) desire that new adherents of philosophy can feel for learning all they can about their chosen philosophy and Marcus Aurelius’ reflections on the effect that the writings of the Stoic Aristo had upon him29) have led some scholars to conclude that “conversion” is often the most apt word in modern parlance to describe an ancient person’s decision to commit themselves to a philosophical school, regardless of the particular tradition that they opted to associate with.30
Conversely, people who failed to observe the robust moral principles that were advocated by the philosophy they professed to adhere to are censured by numerous classical writers, with particular criticism being made of philosophers who betray an interest in seeking glory and money, in feasting, or in pursuing acts of sexual deviance.31 Being wary of such duplicitous individuals, potential students (including Stoic ones) are recorded as carefully scrutinizing the conduct of their intended philosophical instructor for any signs of moral laxity before they would entrust their philosophical development to them.32 Seneca even portrays a friend of his seeking to counter Seneca’s attempts to persuade him of the value of the philosophical life by recounting examples of Stoics who chase after money and girls and who are gluttonous.33 What is of relevance to us here is that such venally oriented people are often asserted in our sources to not just be hypocrites, but to have ended their ability to legitimately identify themselves with their chosen philosophy. For example, this is bluntly stated in Dio Chrysostom’s writings,34 and in Plutarch’s account of his attempt to arbitrate between two brothers in a legal dispute, one of whom was reputed to be a philosopher, but—after observing his contemptuous behavior toward his sibling—Plutarch concludes has been assigned a false epithet (ψευδεπίγραφος).35
