together before such a refining effect can take place. His commendation of therapeutic exercises (such as role-playing and memorizing of moral maxims) to help catalyze such a harmony in his students’ lives is then documented. Epictetus’ position that a philosophical education is limited to a small number of individuals who can apportion extended periods of free time and resources to its study and who need to have previously obtained skills such as literacy is then interacted with.
The question addressed in chapter 3 is if Epictetus perceives that the vast majority of people who surround him to be laypeople, what is his opinion regarding widely communicating philosophical knowledge to them, and in encouraging people to begin philosophical study? After framing the exploration of this question with reference to two competing portrayals of the early Stoics’ stance toward public engagement which Diogenes Laertius’ Lives document, it is seen that Epictetus uniquely signals that a change in his perspective on this issue has occurred, namely that his youthful optimism in the possibility of impacting and enthusing laypeople with philosophical insight has been displaced by the conviction that such attempts are futile and more than likely are counterproductive. With empathy for his students’ apparently frequently felt conviction to relay the messages of the lecture room to a wider audience, it is documented that Epictetus instead repeatedly seeks to dissuade them from bringing philosophical deliberation to the public.
In this chapter, it is further established that Epictetus’ perspective on public engagement parallels his teacher Musonius Rufus’, and can be seen firsthand in the attitude that Epictetus had toward visitors who sought to glean philosophical insight from him. The question is then posed, and which the rest of this book seeks to address: Does Epictetus show any concern for those individuals whom he believes will never obtain philosophical awareness?
In chapter 4, it is noted that Stoic thinkers who claim moral progress is contingent upon the provision of philosophical instruction can also state that nonphilosophical (or layperson-like, ἰδιωτικόν) techniques can be of assistance. Whether such remarks should be understood to articulate a broader schema of thought regarding the possibility that people might gain moral awareness through nonscholastic routes is then explored. In addressing this question, our efforts are primarily centered upon the Stoic philosophers Posidonius’ and Seneca’s portrayal of primitive humanity, wherein they state that our distant ancestors exhibited uniform moral excellence which required no theoretical or epistemic underpinnings (i.e., they were proto-virtuous nonphilosophers). These Stoics posit that early humanity’s remarkable conformity to virtue was due to the absence of vicious and corrupting ideas, and the lack of material comfort which could monopolize our ancestors’ attention. Once vice began its slow installation over humanity’s affections, however, Seneca and Posidonius depict a second age where wise, although likely still not philosophically aware, leaders moderated the advance of misapprehension in society by offering guidance to people.
In turning to contemporary society, it is argued that the features the Stoics believed prompted primitive humans to live according to virtuous principles are not thought by them to have concluded. Indeed, the adoption of atavistic traits and the observing of legislation that certain wise ancients laid down is held by the Stoics to remain impacting nonphilosophically aware people in contemporary society. In this regard, the correlation between primitive circumstances and the manifestation of preferred indifferent actions in the lives of nonphilosophers is strongly seen in the remarks of Musonius Rufus and Epictetus.
Chapter 5 is prefaced with a discussion of Stoic epistemology, and then brings Epictetus’ position regarding preconceptions into focus. In this regard it is noted that several times in his discussions he reflects that people who lack philosophical awareness nevertheless hold that principles such as justice, honor, familial fidelity, and so on are self-evidently good and should hold normative force across society. He further observes that humans have an instinctive sense of shame (αἰδώς), which is often able to compel people to behave correctly without any period of contemplation or self-reflection having to be undertaken. These phenomena are understood by Epictetus within the context of the Stoic doctrine of preconceptions (προλήψεις), which posits that humans have an innate, although largely unrefined, understanding of virtuous principles. His confidence in the furnishing of preconceptions in humanity is also suggested to be observed by his frequent employment of the dialectical/elenctic method: a type of discourse that seeks to induct people through a series of questions that will throw the contradictions that exist between their moral preconceptions and daily praxis into sharp relief. A conversation that Epictetus has with an affiliate of Epicurean philosophy is proposed to have particular salience for understanding his confidence in the efficacy of preconceptions. In their exchange, when Epictetus reflects that his dialogue partner exhibits familial devotion and care, he remarks that with (as he understands it) Epicureanism mandating a range of antisocial commitments from its adherents, his dialogue partner’s instinctive sense of family obligations has evidently proved strong enough to incubate him from some of the more damaging influences of Epicurean philosophy.
The limitations that Epictetus holds preconceptions have is then considered—in particular his stance that while concord is easily established between people regarding the importance of concepts such as “justice” or “honor,” the implementation of these ideals into legislation or normative customs is evidently frequently fallible and contradictory. It is concluded that in Epictetus’ view preconceptions only provide people with a high abstraction of what the good is and that the moral insights they offer should be systematized and elucidated in an intellectually coherent framework, that is, the philosophy of the Stoa. It is argued that although Stoics believe that in the absence of philosophical guidance the ability of preconceptions to help humans structure their lives according to virtue is significantly constrained, they are confident that they maintain a role in mediating error in society and in steering individuals toward performing suitable or appropriate actions.
In chapter 6, it is noted that apprehending Epictetus’ attitude toward civic legislation can be challenging. The topic is not made a matter of explicit deliberation in either the Discourses or the Enchiridion, and it has rarely been the object of sustained scholarly inquiry. In addition, Epictetus’ remarks about the law can appear to voice conflicting sentiments. On the one hand, he can deride the value of various pieces of legislation and openly question the integrity of the officials who are charged with enforcing them. Furthermore, he openly avers that his students should focus their concentration on how to live upon the parameters that have been established by philosophical insight, and not to those that have been borne from legal deliberation.
On the other hand, it is seen that Epictetus considers obedience to the law to be a duty that every citizen should assume and to only neglect if a particular piece of legislation is in conflict with their philosophical principles. More significantly, he praises Spartan polity for having been instituted by an ancient wise leader, Lycurgus, and for its expressing ideals that are commensurate with philosophical teachings which he believes successfully engrained themselves into the Spartan people’s character. Additionally, while referring to contemporary Roman law, a pronouncement of marriage by the legislator is claimed by Epictetus to laudably restrain men’s attempts to acquire another person’s wife, and in another passage the connection that exists between civic law and the correct understanding of ownership, material possessions, and marital relationships that are found in its citizenry is observed by him. Furthermore, regarding his friend Agrippinus Paconius’ tenure as a governor, Epictetus reflects that he was able to exercise his judicial duties so that he became like a moral physician (ἰατρός), protector (ἐπιμελητής), and guardian (κηδεμών) to the people who were arraigned before him, and that he succeeded in instigating the moral reform of their lives. It is evident, therefore, that it is not just the state’s legal doctrines that Epictetus views as having the potential to affect beneficial change in people, but, depending upon the official, also the act of dispensing justice itself. The conclusion reached is that although Epictetus believes civic law is frequently flawed or confused in its logic, he holds that it can have a useful role in highlighting and delimiting what is, and what is not, correct behavior and in influencing individuals to act according to virtuous precepts. It is, therefore,
