at it, as visitors to cities do.135
ἄξιον, ἔφη, τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἡμᾶς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσόφων πυνθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ τοὺς εἰς ξένην πόλιν ἐλθόντας παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ εἰδότων, τί κράτιστόν ἐστιν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἱστορήσαντες μετίωμεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ θεώμεθα.
In the above passage, philosophers are again pictured as being individuals who look and evaluate the world in a way that differentiates them from the nonphilosopher, a theme that Epictetus reprises in another discourse in which he labels the masses as being deluded (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν) and, elsewhere, when he reflects that they view philosophy and its paradoxes in a similar light to how an individual who has no medical knowledge might bemusedly look upon a physician who attempts to cure someone’s blindness by poking a lancet in their eye.136 In this regard, Epictetus elsewhere reflects upon the mutual confusion (φύρω) that can arise between philosophers and laypeople (ἰδιῶται) if they enter into dialogue with each other, with, he suggests, the nonphilosopher finding philosophical concepts to be obscure (δυσπαρακολούθητος) and to be vulgar/repulsive (φορτικός), while the philosopher is apt to revile (λοιδορέω) and openly laugh (καταγελάω) at their conversation partner and exclaim: “he is a layperson; there is no making anything of him,” ‘ἰδιώτης ἐστίν: οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι.137 Bearing this context in mind, it can surely be understood why Epictetus repeatedly feels the need to caution his students against entering into discussions on philosophical topics with laypeople,138 and at one point argues that if they recognize a person cannot understand or won’t accept philosophical truths, then they should hold their silence rather than announcing their views and prompting animus to occur. He similarly advises that they should clap along with laypeople as they enjoy their festivals instead of attempting to prompt a shift in their perception of the world.139 Epictetus even goes so far, as the following chapter will explore in more depth, to advise his students to limit their contact with nonphilosophically informed individuals, for example stating: “I would advise you to use discretion when involving yourselves with non-philosophers,” συμβουλεύω ὑμῖν εὐλαβῶς τοῖς ἰδιώταις συγκαταβαίνειν,140 and “avoid parties that are hosted by non-philosophers, but if you do have occasion to go, be sure that you don’t slip back into a non-philosopher’s frame of mind,” ἑστιάσεις τὰς ἔξω καὶ ἰδιωτικὰς διακρούου: ἐὰν δέ ποτε γίνηται καιρός, ἐντετάσθω σοι ἡ προσοχή, μήποτε ἄρα ὑπορρυῇς εἰς ἰδιωτισμόν.141
Notably, one of Epictetus’ students is also depicted as admitting that he is reluctant to conform to the behavior that Epictetus expects from him because of the opposition that this could arouse in members of the public (as later Marcus Aurelius will also reflect upon142), arguing:
Yes, but if I should place the good here, amongst things that lie within the sphere of choice, everyone will mock me. Some grey-haired old man with his fingers covered with gold rings will come up and shake his head, saying: “Listen to me, child, yes you should practice philosophy, but do not get carried away. This is ridiculous. You learn syllogisms from the philosophers, but you know better than they how you should act in life.”143
ναί: ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ἐνταῦθά που θῶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, πάντες μου καταγελάσονται.ἥξει τις γέρων πολιὸς χρυσοῦς δακτυλίους ἔχων πολλούς, εἶτα ἐπισείσας τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρεῖ “ἄκουσόν μου, τέκνον: δεῖ μὲν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν: ταῦτα μωρά ἐστιν. σὺ παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων μανθάνεις συλλογισμόν, τί δέ σοι ποιητέον ἐστίν, σὺ κάλλιον οἶδας ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι.
Finally, when his students raise their concern that people who lack a background in philosophy might judge them to be impious, Epictetus responds (in strikingly similar language to others philosophers,144 including one who was on trial a few decades later in this very circumstance145) by again contrasting the value of philosophical and lay thought, and arguing for the latter’s redundancy:
So, who is this person who has been given the power to pass such a judgement on you? Does he know what piety or impiety actually is? Has he studied and learned of it? Where? From whom? . . . The truly educated person is under no obligation to pay any heed to the uneducated one when he passes judgement on what is religious or irreligious, just and unjust.146
οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ σοῦ; οἶδεν τί ἐστι τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἢ τὸ ἀσεβές; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμάθηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ τίνι; . . . ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπιστραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός τι περὶ ὁσίου καὶ ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου.
It is important to highlight that the sense of division between philosophers and laypeople could be apprehended and even reinforced by the latter. Epictetus frequently portrays people (including slaves) who lack philosophical education as laughing (καταγελάω) at philosophers, being repelled if they hear that they are ignorant (ἀγνοέω) of what the good (ἀγαθός) is, openly reviling (λοιδορέω) philosophers—even having the propensity to become violent if they are confronted with philosophical exposition.147 As he warns one of his students:
If you commit yourself to philosophy, prepare from the beginning to be ridiculed and laughed at, to have many people jeering at you and to hear them say, “Look, he has returned to us a philosopher all of a sudden!”148
εἰ φιλοσοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖς, παρασκευάζου αὐτόθεν ὡς καταγελασθησόμενος, ὡς καταμωκησομένων σου πολλῶν, ὡς ἐρούντων ὅτι ‘ἄφνω φιλόσοφος ἡμῖν ἐπανελήλυθε’.
Less threateningly, Epictetus also notes that laypeople can conclude that philosophy scholars know nothing and speak gibberish (βαρβαρίζω) and advance nonsense (φλυαρέω), or accuse them of adopting a supercilious (ὀφρύς) look,149 and state that people say, “Nobody gets any benefit from going to [a philosophy] school,” οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς.150
