It is not, however, my intention to opine upon Seneca’s stance regarding other philosophical schools’ thought, which is a debated point and is beyond the scope of this book to address, but to rather highlight that he views them as being a legitimate part of the philosophical community. One helpful indication of his use of other philosophers as dialogue partners that can be profitably drawn attention to is Tuen Tielemans’ catalogue of citations that Seneca makes to philosophers, which reveals (with the exclusion of Socrates) that a substantial 170 out of 277 of them are to non-Stoic thinkers, and that Plato and Epicurus (and to a lesser extent Aristotle) receive especially heavy reference.170
Given the lack of explicit reflections on the attitude toward other philosophies in our sources, two passages in Seneca’s writings are of particular value. In the first, Ep. 21.9, after quoting Epicurus counselling his student Idomeneus that he should restrain his desires (cupiditates), Seneca remarks that he feels able to appeal to Epicurus’ words because he considers them to be “public property” (publicae sunt).171 Seneca then helpfully proceeds to liken this situation to the liberty he has to vote for a senator’s motion that he agrees with, without this compelling him to vote for a second that he does not.172 In other words, if approached with discernment and selectivity, Seneca believes that Epicurus’ philosophy can be a resource wherein insight and the useful articulation of truth might be found—or at least in the way that Seneca believes he can constructively frame them.173
In the second passage for our interest, Constant. 1.1, Seneca asserts that Stoicism and other philosophies make an equal (tantusdem) contribution to society (societas), but that because of their soft (mollis) nature non-Stoic traditions should be compared to females, while the Stoic school is of recognizably manly (virilis) character.174 From this passage it is apparent that Seneca differentiates other schools from Stoicism, and likely considers them to be less effective in their philosophizing, but so too is his belief that they are, in theory, engaged in the same enterprise as Stoicism—namely, philosophical deliberation.175
Turning to Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, direct reflections on other philosophical schools do not feature within the text, but scholarly interest on whether its contents have been shaped by alternative streams of thought to those of Stoicism have been regularly piqued. The most recent studies that have explored this topic conclude that the influence of other schools upon Marcus’ thinking is largely idiomatic and not substantive in nature.176 No catalogue of the references he makes to non-Stoic philosophers, to my knowledge, exists, but it can be observed that he positively cites the opinions of Epicurus four times, Heraclitus three, Pythagoras and Plato twice, and the Platonist Phocion and Pre-Socratic Empedocles once.177 This allows us to suggest that Marcus’ approach toward other philosophies mirrors Seneca’s: both have evidently invested considerable effort to learn about the opinions of other schools, and they consider them to be useful dialogue partners when they deliberate upon philosophical themes, but neither attempts to utilize this interest to try and effect a substantial syncretic or eclectic refashioning of Stoic philosophy.
Regarding Epictetus, compared to Seneca and Marcus there has been less evaluation of his engagement and interaction with different philosophical schools. Deliberation over whether his understanding of theology, psychology, or philosophical contemplation reveals a Platonic imprint can, however, be drawn upon, and where the weight of scholarly opinion rests upon the conclusion that while there is idiomatic influence, Epictetus’ views firmly align with traditional Stoic ones.178 With regards to direct references that Epictetus makes to other schools, the value of Epicurean and Academic strains of thought are particularly heavily critiqued by him,179 and his brief mention of Peripatetic and Pyhrronic philosophy is also critical in tone.180 Stephen Williams has noted Epictetus’ positive assessment of non-Stoic proponents from ten references he makes to Plato (whom it can be observed Epictetus’ teacher Rufus is also recorded as praising181) and five to Xenophon.182 To this list it can be added that Epictetus cites Pythagoras and the Neopythagorean Apollonius approvingly,183 and in chapter 7 of this book the high estimation he has for several Pre-Socratic thinkers will also be outlined. Comparing Epictetus’ interaction with other schools to that of his Stoic counterparts who have been considered above, there is notable congruence in his appreciation of Platonic, Pythagorean, and Pre-Socratic thought, but not Epicurean or Peripatetic philosophy. The differing philosophical preferences that the Stoic thinkers considered above display likely reveals the flexibility they had—which was mentioned at the start of this discussion—to choose what schools or thinkers they could favor to employ as profitable interlocutors in their deliberations.
Although Epictetus does not explicitly expound upon his perception of the identity of non-Stoic philosophers, despite his firm misgivings about Epicurean philosophy that have just been noted, he does refer to a member of the Epicurean school as being a philosopher (φιλόσοφος), and challenges him for (at least in Epictetus’ opinion) not properly adhering to the behavior that his school would expect of him.184 Elsewhere, Epictetus also asks one of his students whether Plato was a philosopher or Hippocrates a physician, with the anticipated reply being an unhesitating yes.185 Therefore, along with his practice of portraying philosophy in broad terms rather than within scholastic boundaries,186 and in keeping with the prevailing expectation of the time that value might be extracted from other schools’ postulations, it does not appear that Epictetus delimits the identity of being a philosopher only to individuals who are associated with the philosophy of the Stoa.
Philosophical Students
Before our discussion of philosophical identity is concluded, consideration of philosophical students, whose status is obviously more ambiguous than that of professional teachers should also be briefly addressed. To my knowledge only Michael Trapp has directly addressed this topic,187 when he suggests (although without further deliberating upon it) that provided that the schools’ students abided by their philosophy’s ethical standards, they could lay claim to the identity of being philosophers during and after the completion of their philosophical training without much contestation:
The cohorts of pupils they [professional philosophical teachers] send out into the world, moreover, are “fellow professionals” not primarily in the sense that they will themselves claim the status of educators in their own right (though some of course will), but in taking with them a shared dedication to a style of life, and one that claims to provide the governing framework for everything else that they are and do.188
I suggest that Trapp’s proposal is indeed correct. Certainly, with regards to Epictetus it has been established here that he regularly frames his students as being included within the confines of philosophy vis-à-vis laypeople who are outside of its boundaries.189 Furthermore, it has been noted that Epictetus’ concern to include students in his school only if they have more than scholastic aims in mind and his frequent advice to them on how they can continue to live according to philosophical principles once their training has ceased certainly implies his expectation that they will have an enduring affiliation with philosophy.190 On the latter point, he will talk about the moral behavior and philosophical disposition that he expects should mark a person who has come out (ἐκ) of his school.191 Of additional importance, several remarks in the Discourses can be catalogued that reveal Epictetus’ students freely identified themselves as being philosophers, which Epictetus does not protest. For example, they are portrayed as discussing who among them is the best philosopher (τίς ἄριστός ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων), and Epictetus can even use their self-identifying as philosophers to spur them to evaluate whether they are truly acting as philosophers should,192 and he notes their frustration if members of the public do not recognize them to be philosophers.193 Finally, relaying his own stance, Epictetus refers to his being in front of his students to be standing in the company of philosophers (φιλόσοφοι) where the easy relaying of truths can be conveyed.194
It would seem, therefore, that for Epictetus provided that a
