καὶ διαφόρους λόγων λαβυρίνθους ἐπινοήσαντες.152 Furthermore, laypeople are recorded as believing that many of philosophy’s students “have assurance and a pose and a gait, and a countenance that is filled with arrogance and a disdain which spares nobody,” ἔχοντες θράσος ἔχουσι καὶ σχῆμα καὶ βάδισμα καὶ πρόσωπον ὑπεροψίας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας μεστὸν ἀφειδούσης ἁπάντων.153
Because of such derision from certain portions of society, and perhaps especially within a Roman context, Seneca reflects that people are often hesitant to start imitating philosophers in some areas of their life, in case they feel compelled to follow them in everything and end up a fully observant philosopher.154 This attitude is also documented by Epictetus, and to remarkably involve an individual who apparently did harbor philosophical pretensions:
If you want to know what Romans think of philosophers, just listen to this. Italicus, who was reputed to be amongst the greatest of them as a philosopher, once became angry with his friends in my presence. Claiming that his situation was desperate he proclaimed: “I cannot bear it!” “You are killing me. You will make me just like him”—and he then pointed to me!155
Πῶς ἔχουσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς φιλοσόφους ἂν θέλῃς γνῶναι, ἄκουσον. Ἰταλικὸς ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν αὐτῶν φιλόσοφος εἶναι παρόντος ποτέ μου χαλεπήνας τοῖς ἰδίοις, ὡς ἀνήκεστα πάσχων, “Οὐ δύναμαι,” ἔφη, “φέρειν: ἀπόλλυτέ με, ποιήσετέ με τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι,” δείξας ἐμέ.
Such an attitude is also apparent in the frequently documented phenomenon of Roman parents who attempt to prevent their children from either studying, or from becoming overly preoccupied with philosophy.156
Describing a more combative approach, and in one particularly extended portrayal of a layperson’s views, Seneca describes someone directly challenging the austere moralizing of philosophers by staunchly advocating that better benefits can be obtained through sensual pleasure such as gluttony, drinking, and adopting a lax attitude toward the disposal of money, that is, the inversion of usual philosophical convictions.157 Meanwhile, in a depiction of lay opinion Persius notes that the schools’ students were widely believed by the public to be fixated upon arcane and useless theories; with him imagining one layperson’s withering response after the details of Epicurean cosmology had just been detailed as being:
“What I know is enough for me. Personally, I have no desire to be like Arcesilas or those troubled Solons with their heads bent, eyes fixed on the ground, while they gnaw their mumbles and rabid silences to themselves and weigh words on their stuck-out lips, repeating the fantasies of some aged invalid: that nothing can come from nothing, that nothing can return to nothing. Is this why you’re so pale? Is this the reason for missing lunch?” These jibes make the rabble laugh, and with wrinkled nose the muscular youths redouble their quivering cackles.158
“quod sapio, satis est mihi. non ego curo esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones obstipo capite et Agentes lumine terram, murmura cum secum et rabiosa silentia rodunt atque exporrecto trutinantur verba labello, aegroti veteris meditantes somnia, gigni de nihilo nihilum, in nihilum nil posse reverti, hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est?” his populus ridet, multumque torosa iuventus ingeminat tremulos naso crispante cachinnos.
A similar reaction to the one above, but with the added threat of violence to ensure that the speaker would refrain from continuing to enunciate philosophical thought, is also described by Tacitus when Rufus apparently tried to introduce ideas of cosmopolitanism to Roman soldiers.159 Worthy of note is also Dio Chrysostom’s comments that the crowds “seize the initiative and abuse and jeer at them [philosophers] as being wretched and foolish, knowing that if they establish them as senseless and mad, they will prove themselves to be self-controlled as intelligent/of sound mind,” οὐκοῦν προκαταλαμβάνουσιν αὐτοὶ λοιδοροῦντες καὶ τωθάζοντες ὡς ἀθλίους καὶ ἀνοήτους, εἰδότες ὅτι, εἰ μὲν τούτους ἀποφανοῦσιν ἄφρονας καὶ μαινομένους, ἅμα καὶ αὑτοὺς ἀποδείξουσι σωφρονοῦντας καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντας.160 The verb προκαταλαμβάνω holds the sense of seizing, or occupying beforehand, and is usually employed in a military context. The sense in this passage is, therefore, of laypeople who attempt to stake out ground to combat and critique philosophers, before the philosophers have a chance to critique them. This two-way derision between philosophers and laypeople is a dynamic that classical authors could directly reflect upon, such as Sextus Empiricus, who states: “Just as the scholar (ὁ φιλολόγος) is ridiculed by laypeople (οι ιδιώται), so is the layperson (ή ἰδιωτική) ridiculed by scholars (οἱ φιλολόγοι).”161 People who conceived of philosophy and those with an interest in it in the manner that the above sources portray, would doubtless find it a matter of little concern if they found themselves prevented from being able to lay claim to the identity of the philosopher.
Of final interest for us in this section is Lucian’s portrayal of someone asking a student of Stoicism to relay philosophical truths to him, but to request that he do so simply, and by adopting the character of a layperson (ὁποῖος τότε ἦσθα ἰδιώτης, “now do so as a layperson”), for he is an outsider (οὕτως ἀπόκριναι) and so cannot easily comprehend the ideas that the student has been coached in.162 With the use of the verb ἀποκρίνω (to be set apart), we notably have an example of an ancient source which frames the philosopher/layperson divide explicitly in the language of the insider/outsider.
Philosophers from Other Schools
One topic that has not been touched upon, but which should be mentioned in a discussion of philosophical identity in antiquity is the stance that philosophers took toward people whose allegiances belonged to rival schools of thought, such as Platonic, Peripatetic, Stoic, or Epicurean ones (etc.), and specifically whether they consider such individuals to be genuine philosophers or not. Understanding cross-school opinions of each other is, however, complex for it is rarely a directly addressed topic in ancient texts, and our understanding of respective philosophers’ attitudes toward other schools and their members is largely an inferred one.163 Of potential help for this discussion though are studies which highlight that after the decentralization of the schools as institutions in the first century BCE164 the historical record often reveals individuals who, while assured and ready to defend the veracity and superiority of their chosen school’s viewpoints,165 are prepared to constructively engage with other philosophies’ ideas and writings.166
Scholars have frequently observed that this relatively open stance toward other schools’ thought is particularly strongly expressed within the Stoic tradition,167 and that it can be traced back at least as far as Panaetius’ and his student Posidonius’ (ca. 185–109 BCE/135–51 BCE) apparent respect for and proclivity to cite Platonic and Peripatetic thought.168
Exploring this issue firstly with reference to Seneca, numerous studies have also recognized the potential that his large volume of writings have for revealing
