then he would view them as being on the philosophical side of the philosopher–layperson divide.
Conclusion
In conclusion, with their inability to depend upon institutional or formalized means of verification, the criteria by which philosophers, at least after the rise of Roman power, would usually judge the authenticity of another person’s philosophical status are, firstly, their depth of knowledge of their chosen school’s tenets, and, secondly, their faithfulness in adhering to its ethical demands. There was, however, no agreed-upon schema that a person could employ to reveal if someone else was a philosopher or not; instead, this evaluation would be decided on a person-person basis and would be prone to variance and be vulnerable to contestation.
Furthermore, a firm distinction is found to have been made by philosophers between people who do, and who do not belong within philosophy’s ranks. Some evidence that laypeople could reciprocate by negatively evaluating the characteristics of philosophy, and that they hold philosophers to be engaged in a largely pointless and needlessly austere pursuit has also been found. Finally, it has been revealed that philosophy’s students, and adherents from rival schools appear to have been widely held to be legitimate claimants of a philosophical identity.
NOTES
1. See Papas (2015).
2. With regards to the Romans’ varied, and occasionally hostile, reception of philosophy, see the discussion in Trapp (2007, 226–257; 2014) and Rivière (2017).
3. Scholarly reflection on this area is, of course, substantial, but in particular see the useful discussions in Rawson (1985, 282–297) and MacGillivray (2012). Sedley (2003a, 186) also asserts: “It is difficult to think of a society where members of the upper class were more generally aware of philosophy than seems to have been the case in Imperial Rome.”
4. On philosophical sculpture and art, see Zanker (1995); the touring of philosophical schools, Cicero Fam. 13.1.2, Fin 1.16, Brut. 89.306-91.316, Lucian Menipp. 4-5, cf. Diss. II.14; and on Roman patrons of philosophy, see Damon (1997, 235–252). On the diffusion of philosophy across Roman society, see the important collection of essays in Vesperini (2017).
5. On abridged philosophical texts, consider Thom (2012), MacGillivray (2015), as well as numerous studies of interest in Horster and Reitz (2010). Regarding the popularity of public talks on philosophy, see the extensive and insightful discussions in Maxwell (2006, 11–41) and Wright (2017, 63–115).
6. See Sedley (2003b).
7. That identifying an ancient philosopher should be done on a case-by-case basis, see Curnow (2006, 1), Trapp (2008, 1, 21), Goulet (2013, 13), and the discussion in Lauwers (2015, 183–190).
8. On this, consider the excellent discussion from (Glucker 1978), as well as from Trapp (2014, 45–47). Ahlholm (2017, 7–15) remarks upon the difficulty we have in establishing whether many epigraphs which depict people as having a philosophical identity were intending to portray themselves as being professional philosophers, or, in Ahlhom’s words (2017, 10), rather “intellectual laypeople.” For similar reflections, consider also Dillon (2002, 29, 33), Haake (2008, 151), and Lauwers (2015, 27, 265). See also Cicero Off. 2.5 and Tusc. 1.1 along with the comments of Hine (2015, 15). Barnes (2002, 304) argues that in antiquity the title of philosopher could be used to: “designate non-professionals . . . part-time amateurs, men of diverse talents,” while Goulet (2013, 38) notes that poets, musicians, historians, architects, and even shoemakers and barbers (etc.) could identify themselves as being philosophers. Regarding Stoic philosophy, Rist (1982, 23) claims: “Many Stoics had merely read their Stoicism or talked to Stoicizing individuals, and then claimed to be Stoics or desiderant Stoics.” In this regard, see also Mann’s (2011, 89) insightful comments on the Stoic astronomer Manilius (fl. first century CE).
9. For example, see Lucian Fug. 4.14, Peregr. 24, Pisc. 31; Philostratus VA 2.29, 6.3.
10. Respectively, Or. 70.10, and 49.12, 70.8, cf. Lucian Pisc. 42.
11. Flor. 7.9-10.
12. See Diss. III.24.41 and also IV.8.16-17.
13. Hine (2015).
14. Att. 1.18-31, Acad. 1.10, Fam. 9.17.2, Hine (2015, 19).
15. Hine (2015, 13).
16. On Seneca presenting himself as a Stoic, see Conradie (2010, 103–105), along with Constant. 2.1, and the commentary in Asmis (2015, 224).
17. Hine (2015, 22). See a recent study, Ahlholm (2017), which might cast Hine’s proposal into doubt.
18. Hine (2015, 29).
19. On this topic, see especially the reflections of Hadot (1995), Pavie (2012), and Sharpe (2014); and on this aim in the Stoic tradition, see in particular Sellars (2003). Sellars (2007, 117) also usefully states: “For a Stoic such as Epictetus, it seems that philosophy is not merely a matter of words or arguments, but also a matter of deeds or actions. This suggest a conception of philosophy which is quite different from the implicit conception that seems prevalent today.” Meanwhile, Reydams-Schils (2010, 567) argues: “Presumably Epictetus would measure his own success as a teacher by the actual moral progress of his pupils.”
20. Trapp (2014, 55).
21. E.g. Diss. I.1.25; 8.10-16; 12.17.
22. Epit.11k, trans. Pomeroy (1999, 81, 83).
23. Ep. 53.9, trans. Gummere (1917, 359). See also Ep. 106.12, and Med. 12.9. On the Stoics’ belief in the interconnectedness of contemplation (δόγμα), reason (λογικός), and action (πρακτικός), consider also Diog. Laert. 9.130, along with the comments of Reydams-Schils (2017, 188).
24. Regarding Plato’s reputed effect upon Speusippus see Plut. De frat. Amor 491f-492a; on Diogenes’ effect upon Crates Apul. Flor. 14, and Ep. Diog. Ep. 9; and on Xenocrates’ impact upon Polemo Diss. III.1.4, III.11.30, Seneca Ep. 108.23, Horace Sat. 2.3.253-257, and Diog. Laert. 4.16.
25. On Odysseus holding the Phaeacians spellbound, see Od. 2.333-334.
26. Nigr. 35, trans. Harmon (1913, 135).
27. See also Plutarch’s comments at Max. princ. 776c.
28. Ep. 6.1, trans. Gummere (1917, 25).
29. Ep. 108.1, Ad Marc. 4, 13.
30. The most complete consideration of this topic is still Nock (1933, 164–186). Consider as well more recent discussions in Rousseau (1996, 386–387) and Stowers (2011, 231–232), cf. Sedley (1989).
31. For critiques of philosophers who were interested in money, see for example Plutarch De Tuenda 16 and Galen San. Tu. 16; regarding feasting Att. 2.55.d, 3.103.d, 4.163-164, 13.607; sexual deviance Martial Ep. 7.58, Juvenal Sat. 2.8 13, and Seneca Ep. 123.15.
32. See Ep. 6.6, and Lucian Herm. 21.
33. Ep. 29.5-6.
34. For example, Or. 31.3 “For no-one is a philosopher who belongs among the unjust and wicked” trans. Cohoon and Crosby (1940, 339): οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδεὶς φιλόσοφος τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ πονηρῶν.
35. De Frat. 479E.
36. Respectively Att.
