be mentioned is actually found at Diss. II.19, and not in the first volume of the Discourses as Gellius intimates.
39. Att. I.2.7-8.
40. Lauwers (2015, 35–36).
41. Att. 17.19.
42. Diss. III.16.11.
43. Diss. II.9.17.
44. Diss. III.15.10-12.
45. Diss. III.15.1-6. From this passage, as well as Diss. I.15.7-8, Hock (1992, 139) argues that Epictetus: “discourages other visitors and students from coming back with warnings about the amount of time it takes to become a philosopher.” On the need for prospective philosophers to consider whether they have the stamina to live philosophically, see also Diss. IV.8.34-36 and Ench. 51.
46. For example, see Diss. II.9.13-14 and the study by Hijmans (1959).
47. Diss. II.19.20-21, 23. Glucker (1978, 184) remarks on this passage: “The true test of affiliation to a philosophical αἵρεσις, says Epictetus, is whether or not one follows its moral precepts in everyday behaviour—and such a test is true Stoic practice, which would entitle a man to be properly called a Stoic, is described [in this passage].” See also a similar discussion in Sellars (2007, 116–117).
48. For Epictetus’s perception that Epicureans seek after hedonism, consider, for example, Diss. III.7.2-9.
49. Diss. II.19.28.
50. For example, Diss. I.8.14, where he appeals to his students: “Why will you not perceive and distinguish what are the things that make men philosophers and what belongs to them on other accounts?”: οὐ θέλεις αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διακρῖναι κατὰ τί οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται φιλόσοφοι καὶ τίνα ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν. See also Diss. IV.9.8, where Epictetus discusses an individual who has exchanged philosophy for a life of vice. Regarding Diss. III.15.10-13, Sorabji (2007, 143) reflects that for Epictetus: “If you choose to be a philosopher, then you must change your whole way of life and cannot live like a tax gatherer, an orator, or a procurator of Caesar.” Consider also Epictetus’ comments at Fr. 10.
51. Diss. II.13.23, III.5.1-4, 12-17, and 24.78-80.
52. Diss. II.21.10.
53. For example, Diss. I.28.9; II.17.3; III.10.10-19, 22.66; 23.22, 37-38; IV.4.3, 4.42.
54. Diss. I.4.22.
55. See Diss. II.914, III.19.4-6, and the discussion in Hijmans (1959, 64–65).
56. Diss. II.13.23, 25-26. See also Diss. I.1.31.
57. See Att. 9.2.8.
58. Diss. III.2.11. See the wider discussion at Diss. III.2.8-15, and also Epictetus’ comments at Diss. III.22.80 regarding Cynics, who fail to live up to their calling, as well as similar critiques at Dio. Or. 32.9, Lucian Pisc. 48, Apuleius Apol. 39.39, Julian Or. 6.
59. Diss. IV.8.5-6. See also Epictetus’ comments at Diss. IV.8.15-16, Seneca’ at Ep. 76.31-32, and Dio’s comments at Or. 49.11, and 70.6.
60. For example, see Diss. I.2.24.
61. Diss. IV.8.17-20.
62. Diss. III.23.1,19,23, 24 27, 35.
63. Diss. III.23.37-38.
64. Diss. III.23.20, 22.
65. Diss. III.23.32.
66. Diss. III.23.17, 19.
67. Syn. Dio 2-3.
68. For relevant discussions, see Swain (2000 passim), Van Sijl (2010, 183–187), and Lauwers (2015, 46–52).
69. For a similar point being made, consider Lauwers (2015, 49).
70. Diss. IV.12.19, see also the comments on this passage from Brunt (2013, 169). Consider also Epictetus’ comments at Diss. I.2.36-37 and III.7.15 in particular, as well as at I.2.34-37; 8.14, II.8.24-25, III.16.9, and Ench. 12;13; 48.2-3. Long (2002, 109) comments on Epictetus’ “insistence on choosing between the stance of philosopher or layperson . . . but his purpose in doing so is not to select a philosophical elite or to adopt a censorious attitude toward ordinary people. He acknowledges that he himself is no Socrates, and at the end of this chapter [Diss. III.15.8-13].” See also the discussion in Tsalla (2014, 110). From Diss. III.25.1-4, Long (2002, 112) also importantly remarks: “When Epictetus speaks in this vein, he mitigates the philosopher/layperson contrast. He includes himself and everyone else in the intermediate category of progressives or aspirants to the ideal happiness promised by philosophy.”
71. De Off. 1.46, trans. Walsh (2000, 18). See also Ep. 6.1, 116.5, Tranq 7.4, Const. 7.1, Stob. 2.66.14-67,4, Diog. Laert. 7.83, 120, Fin. 1.15, De Off. I.xv-46, and especially Marcus Aurelius’ comments at M. Aur. Med 5.10. On Seneca’s tripartite division of people who are making progress, see Ep. 75.8-18, along with the discussion in Ware (2008, 270) and Brunt (2013, 168). Consider also the fascinating recent study by Jones (2014) that explores Seneca’s portrayal of himself as being a hypocrite, wherein she argues that in their discourse Stoics realize that they are describing philosophical ideals to which they have not yet attained.
72. VA 1.488.
73. See also a similar passage at Diss. II.19.21-28.
74. See my discussion further in this chapter, as well as the discussion in Rist (1982).
75. M. Aur. Med 8.1.
76. On Cynicism’s lack of sophisticated intellectual content, and the debate in antiquity over whether it should be classed as a αἵρεσις or not, see, for example, Diog. Laert. 1.19, 6.103, Julian Or. 6.186B, and the discussion in Branham (2018, 597–602). Regarding Plato’s critique of the Cynics, see Papas (2016, 55–57).
77. For example, see Morgan (1998) and Bénatouïl (2006).
78. On such schools consult, for example, Von Staden (1982) and Cribiore (2007). On the competition between philosophy and rhetoric, as well as the Stoic critique of it, see the useful overview in Reydams-Schils (2015, 126), and on Epictetus’ criticism of rhetoric Diss. III.23.33-38, cf. III.1. On the variance of opinions in antiquity regarding the status of physicians Mattern (2013, 21–27) is useful.
79. On the propensity of education in antiquity to establish a “them and us” divide, see especially the comments from Watts (2006, 1–7) and Johnson (2010, 166–170).
80. See Cicero De. Part. Orat. 90; Tusc. II.1.4; Contra Cels. 1.27.13; Adv Prax 3; Lactantius Div. inst. 3.25. Carrier (2016, 11–31) estimates that 0.4 percent, or 1 in 250 people in the early Roman Empire would have undertaken higher education. Meanwhile, Brookins (2014, 132–146) argues that at least in urban areas 7–10 percent of the population would have undertaken training in a gymnasium, wherein some limited instruction in philosophy would have likely taken place.
81. Amm. 1.1.
82. VS 529, and Herm 21. See also Dio. Or. 32.8 and comments from Eshleman (2012, 44).
83. Arat. 5.2.
84.
