Barnes (2002, 306) briefly avers that a philosopher in antiquity can be recognized from their interest in “logic, physics and ethics and you would recognize them by the congruence between their intellectual interests and those of the Greek masters.” On philosophical schools as institutions, and their relationships with their pupils, see, among others, Dorandi (1999), Snyder (2000, 14–121), and Dillon (2002, 2004). See also the fascinating study from Goulet (2013, 33–39). On the range of topics that would likely be included in a Stoic education (and the division between logic, ethics, and physics), and in particular under Epictetus’ tutelage, see Long (2002, 97–128) and Cooper (2007, 9–15). On the place of logic especially within Epictetus’ school, see Diss. I.7.9-12, II.21.20-21, II.25 (passim). On Epictetus’ students practice of openly deliberating on philosophical themes with each other, see also Diss. II.17.34, and 21.11.
86. Lucian Herm. 1.
87. See Trapp (1997).
88. Tab. Cebes 14.2-3.
89. Tab. Cebes 14.3-5.
90. Hilton (2018, 71).
91. Idyll. 4.18.22.47-50.
92. Math. 233-235.
93. Flor. 13.3.
94. Diss. III.23; III.21. Seneca. Ep. 80.10-11, and see the discussion in Dupont (2017, 171–173).
95. Pers. 5.63, Diss. II.21.19; IV.4.41, cf. Diss. III.15.11.
96. For example, see Diss. II.6.4, 17.34.
97. Diss. II.21.13.
98. On Manilius’ comments at Astron. 3.38-39 and his stated satisfaction regarding the impenetrableness of his work, consider the valuable discussion in Bartsch (2015, 166–167). Consider also reflections on the complexities of Stoicism at Cicero Parad. 2, Plutarch De virt. mor. 449AB, Gellius Att. 12.5.6, and discussions at Gowers (1993, 180–181) and Roskam (2005, 16).
99. See Diss. I.25.33, II.11.7-14.
100. Diss. II.12.10-12.
101. Diss. I.20.13. See, respectively, Diss. I.26.13-14; 10.13; 20.13. See also Diss. I.7.5-12, 30, along with the comments of Dobbin (2007, 115).
102. Diss. II.16.34. Regarding Epictetus’ frustration at people who cannot properly identify a philosopher, consider Diss. I.8.14.
103. Or. 70.1.
104. See the useful discussion on the use of δίαιτα in antiquity in Bartoš (2015).
105. Flor. 7.9-10.
106. Epit.1.52.11-22. On this point, see the discussion in Lauwers and Roskam (2012, 185).
107. Eun. 4-5, 9. Regarding this passage, see the useful commentary in Frede (1999, 792) and Eshleman (2012, 36). Consider also Pl. Sym. 174 on the selection of Xenocrates to be Speusippus’ successor in the academy.
108. Pedersen (1976).
109. Cribiore (2007, 198).
110. On this, see also the reflections of Haake (2015, 76, 78).
111. Herm. 21. On the Stoic idea of belonging to a city consider Schofield (1991).
112. Dion 1.1. On this passage, see also Trapp (2007, 15), cf. Apul. Apol. 64, 536, and Galen Aff. Pecc. Dig. II.68.9-10.
113. Boys-Stones (2018, 10) and Baltzly (2014).
114. On this practice with regards to Bion’s school, see the valuable comments at Dorandi (1999, 62). At Herm. 82, 86, Lucian implies that students of Stoic philosophy might grow their beards to mark themselves out as being philosophers. On the importance of uniforms and shared symbols for social identity theory, see Jenkins (1994, 145).
115. For example, see Plut. Demetr. 45, Jos. BJ 1.209, Ath. 6.78, and Dio Or. 1.43.
116. Respectively, Polyb 1.69.11, Thuc 2.48.3, Isocr 4.11, Plato Theag. 124c, Xenophon Hiero 6, Plu. Symp IV.2.3, and Sextus adv Theag. 124c.
117. For example, see 1 Cor. 14.16, 23, 24. For further uses of ἰδιώτης that are not derogatory, see also Galen Affect. 1 and the discussion in Kraus (1999).
118. For example, see De Anima 81.27 and Plut. Cic. 26.6.
119. Luc. Dom. 2, Plut. Compar. 1, and Ath. 9.20.
120. For example, respectively, Ps.-Xenophon Const. Ath. 1.5, Rep. 6.494, 489, Med. 11.23. As Maxwell (2006, 16) notes: “aristocratic condescension toward ordinary people is often cited as an indication of the gulf separating elite and mass culture . . . Remarks about ‘masses’ usually indicate an unquestioned sense of superiority over ordinary people.”
121. Stock (1982, 28–29).
122. For example, at Parat. Orat 90 Cicero contrasts the indocti (uneducated) and agrestes multi (uncultured/rustic majority) with the humani (well educated) and politi boni (good/refined men).
123. Diss. I.3.3-4.
124. Diss. II.14.23, 25, 39. This analogy appears to have been first used by Pythagoras (Diog. Laert. 8.8, Iamblichis, V.P. 12.58-59), from which Fitzgerald (2013, 136) argues that Pythagoras must have “believed that ‘philosopher’ was sufficient to distinguish the minority who devoted themselves to the contemplation and discovery of nature from the majority who gave themselves to other pursuits.”
125. Diss. I.2.22. Stephens (2007, 120, 121) significantly comments: “this quotation is essential for establishing that Epictetus believes Stoicism is for the few, not the many. . . . His judgment, which probably derives from empirical observations, is that the multitude judge themselves wretched because they judge their physical condition to be wretched . . . only a rare few, as it turns out, have the prowess to stand out from the crowd like this.” See also Epictetus’ remarks at Diss. III.1.18-19.
126. See. Diss. I.18.
127. Diss. II.17.5, 21.8, III.23.28, IV.7.32.
128. Diss. I.12.35, 27.5; 29.22-23; II.14.2; 17.4; III.16.6-7, Ench. 51, and consider especially Diss. III.19, a discourse that is entitled “What is the Position of the Layperson, and What That of the Philosopher?” Τίς στάσις ἰδιώτου καὶ φιλοσόφου.
129. Diss. III.15.13. Eshleman (2012, 73–74) comments in this regard are worth quoting at length: “Echoing Socrates, he [Epictetus] repeatedly cautions against chasing after the meaningless approval of lay people, which no specialist heeds when it comes to his own art (2.13.3; 14.2; 4.1.117, 5.22, 12.14). Why would a philosopher care if he is admired by non-philosophers (1.21.3-4; cf. 2.7.4-7, 13.16-19, 2.9.50-4) or despised by the ignorant (4.5.22), whose behavior betrays their incomprehension of true moral value? . . . [For Epictetus] exclusion of lay voices serves to marginalize inappropriate (sophistic, crowd-pleasing) modes of philosophy.” See also the discussion in Hock (1993, 139) and Boter (2010, 327–331) and similar comments to Epictetus’ from Seneca at Ep. 5.6, 7.1-8, 10.5, 20.3, 23.8, 25.7, as well as Muson. 18b. Okell (2005, 193), also notes that in Seneca’s play Hercules: “Hercules is struggling to save mankind from the restriction of fear and tyranny, but mankind (in the form of the chorus) is clearly not interested in being saved or in being heroic.”
130.
