a shared identity.113 In addition, it might be noted that although it has not been widely deliberated in scholarly discussions, there is evidence that some schools’ students (including the Stoics’) might have adopted a shared dress code.114
The feeling of connection to fellow adherents and the exacting scholastic demands of philosophical study naturally created a divide between individuals who were and were not familiar with deep philosophical thought. A frequent way in antiquity to refer to people who were not philosophers was to employ the word ἰδιώτης. Iδιώτης has two primary meanings: firstly, a private as opposed to a political person, and, secondly, someone who lacks familiarity or skill in a certain activity or field of expertise.
Regarding the first use, ἰδιώτης is frequently utilized in ancient literature to designate someone who does not hold political office. When used in this sense, ἰδιώτης is obviously being employed in a way that places it outside of the concerns of this book. It should, however, be noted that while ἰδιώτης might be used to signal a person’s lesser status in comparison with an individual who holds political office, scholars have noted that it does not often appear to carry derogatory connotations.115
With regards to its second meaning, the ignorance or inabilities of ἰδιῶται in relation to, for example, the skills of military officers, physicians, orators, craftsmen, sophists, and philosophers is also frequently described in classical literature.116 When used in this way ἰδιώτης can again sometimes seem to lack derogatory intention, for example when it is employed to refer to people who were not part of early Christian circles.117 More often than not, however, when ἰδιώτης is used in ancient literature to negate someone’s skill, experience, or knowledge, then demeaning descriptions of their capabilities or intelligence are attendant,118 and ἰδιῶταί are referenced in order to set up a contrast with and amplify the talents of the skilled or cultured.119
As it was noted in the Introduction, aside from ἰδιῶται, words that relate to crowds, the masses, or humanity in general (such as δήμῳ, the people of a country/the general masses; ὄχλος, crowd/throng; οἱ πολλοί, the many) are also frequently used by classical authors as a way to describe people who lack philosophical education or awareness.120 Regarding Latin, the Greek word ἰδιώτης was transliterated into the language as idiota, and was commonly used to designate an individual who was ignorant of a particular area of study, whether that be science, philosophy rhetoric, etc.121 The language of crowds or the commonality of humanity could also be appealed to by Latin writers to refer to generally (and especially philosophically) uneducated people.122
Turning now to explore Epictetus’ portrayal of laypeople, where it will be seen that many of the words and concepts that have been earlier looked at are employed, we can note that even a quick perusal of his discussions discloses that he holds there is a marked difference between the lay majority and the few philosophically minded members of society, so, for example, he clearly opines at one stage:
only a small number of us [incline] towards the divine and the blessed. And since every person must by necessity deal with each matter in accordance with the belief that they hold regarding it, the few of us who think that they are born for fidelity, self-respect, and confidence in their use of impressions, will entertain no abject or ignoble thought about themselves, while the majority of people will think the opposite.123
ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαντασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία.
Here the few (ὀλίγοι), namely the philosophers, are openly contrasted against the multitude (πολλοὶ)—the nonphilosophers. Utilizing the same language, Epictetus elsewhere compares philosophers to be like a small (ὀλίγοι) number of people who attend a cattle market to observe and reflect upon the procedures that govern its operation, but who find themselves being laughed at by the bemused multitude (πολλοὶ):
Only a few people come with the purpose of looking at the fair, and observe how it is organized, who set it up and for what purpose. . . . Few are those who attend the fair because they enjoy looking on considering it . . . and what is the result? They are mocked by the multitude.124
ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι . . . ὀλίγοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πανηγυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεάμονες . . . τί οὖν; καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν.
Often though Epictetus’ estimation of the narrow constitution of philosophically observant/aware members of humanity is relayed through his employment of analogies, such as his appeal for his listeners to consider philosophers to be like the narrow line of purple is in a senatorial toga (the latus clavus) in comparison to the color white which that chiefly constitutes the garment, and that he depicts as representing the nonphilosophically minded majority of society.125
Although Epictetus cautions that hostility should never be directed toward laypeople as their vices are the result of ignorance,126 he consistently uses evocative language to describe them, such as referring to them as being confused, ignorant, wretched, miserable, children, slaves and fools, and deluded.127 He also consistently presents laypeople as being the antithesis of the philosopher,128 candidly stating, for example, to his pupils: “you must assume either the stance of a philosopher or that of a layperson,” τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι φιλοσόφου στάσιν ἔχειν ἢ ἰδιώτου.129 An important point to highlight here is that his advocacy for his students to assume the same attitude (στάσις, standing state) of either a philosopher or a layperson is framed around moral rather than intellectual attributes, specifically whether his students’ ruling faculties (ἡγεμονικόι) and desires are for the things that are inside of them/concerning them (περί), rather than outside (ἔξω), that is, to be focused upon internal attributes rather than external circumstances or appearances. As our preceding discussion would suggest, here it is clearly seen that in Epictetus’ estimation being a layperson is not solely based upon whether the individual in view is ignorant of philosophy’s doctrines, but also if they neglect to let these principles impact their life.130 Similarly, it can be observed that he considers the status of being educated, παιδευομένοις, to include a person’s successful implementation of philosophical teachings into their daily life, as he defines “to be properly educated,” ὄντι παιδευομένοις, to be marked by an individual’s possession of “tranquility, fearlessness, freedom,” ἀταραξία, ἀφοβία, ἐλευθερία.131 If readers miss this point, however, they might conclude that Epictetus makes perplexing, perhaps even contradictory, statements, such as that a person who has learned about syllogisms and eythmemes,
