negotiations, Anthony Eden said that Great Britain promised Poland that its borders would be settled at the final peace conference after the war. Stalin suggested that «the western border of Poland will include East Prussia and Corridor (Gdansk). Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union has to go along the river Neman, and Tilsit should be in the hands of Lithuania, which is constituted as a portion of the USSR. Further to the south this border should go roughly along the Curzon line112, which can be partially modified to a certain point»113. By insisting on the immediate recognition of borders of the USSR by the British government, Stalin stated unequivocally that he «puts the conclusion of any kind of Anglo-Soviet agreement under condition of an agreement on this issue»114.
Thus, from the very beginning of the war the issue of East Prussia became a part of the Polish question, which was of strategic importance for the Great Powers in framing East European policy. Despite East Prussia being part of Germany, the fate of Konigsberg in times of negotiations was dependent on the Polish question.
The dynamics of the negotiations on the subject can be tracked in the course of major conferences and meetings of representatives of the USSR, the USA, the UK, as well as those of the Polish government-in-exile.
At one of the meetings of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and the UK (19—30 October 1943), which was actually a rehearsal for the Tehran conference, the issue of the fate of Germany was considered. This question was raised on the initiative of the US. Eden laid out the plan of the British government on the future of Germany: «We would like to divide the Germany into separate states; in particular, we would welcome the detachment of Prussia from the rest of Germany»115. According to Eden, Franklin Roosevelt told him about the need of formation on the territory of Germany of three new states – Prussia, the Federation of Rhineland, and the South-German Union. The US government was divided on the question of the forms of decentralization of Germany, but its influential members were in favour of the fragmentation of Eastern Prussia.
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in reply said that the public opinion of the Soviet Union, «speaks for the dismemberment of Germany by addressing this issue on top of allies»116.
The reference to public opinion in the Soviet Union is cynical, as it is obvious that it had no place and could not have any. However, this is a very important point, which is worth paying attention to. At that time, the military, party staff, and the civilian population began to form an idea of Prussia as a ’centuries-old bridgehead for aggression on Russia’, as «the main source of German militarism».
At the fourth session of the Tehran conference of the three Allied powers – the USSR, the USA and the UK (28 November – 1 December 1943), American President Roosevelt offered to discuss the issue of the partition of Germany. He said that in order to ’stimulate’ the debate on this issue, he would like to present the «plan for the dismemberment of Germany into five states» drawn up by him two months ago117. He suggested, «Prussia must be weakened and possibly reduced in size»118.
In Tehran, from the start of negotiations on the post-war borders in Europe, the issue of East Prussia was considered by the Allied powers as part of the Polish question.
Churchill strongly sought to reach the agreements that he could present to the representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London. According to his suggestion, a new Polish state should be located between the Curzon Line and the Oder, including East Prussia.
Stalin said, «Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea. Therefore, Russians would need to have ice-free ports of Konigsberg, Memel and some part of the East Prussia. Moreover, historically this is originally Slavic lands. If the British agreed to transfer us mentioned area, then we will agree with the formula proposed by Churchill»119. Churchill reacted to this proposal with benevolent curiosity: «This is a very interesting suggestion, which I will look into»120.
Indeed, the agreement reached in Tehran largely determined the post-war fate of Eastern Prussia. However, at that moment the Western Allies believed that much was still to come and that they would be able to win back some positions. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union took the irrevocable and uncompromising course for the future inclusion of Poland and East Prussia into its own sphere of influence.
The prevailing practice of the international law permitted withdrawal of certain parts of the state aggressor as a sanction against this state. In this case, the sanction was imposed primarily on the territory, which was used as a springboard for attack to prevent the revival of aggression in future.
On 1 February 1944, Churchill informed Stalin in a message about the meeting with representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London: «I told them that we went to war to protect Poland, we went for it not because of any particular borderline, but for the establishment of a strong and independent Poland…»121
On 4 February 1944, Stalin, in his reply to Churchill concerning borders of Poland, reiterated, «As for your statement to the Poles that Poland could considerably extend its borders to the west and north, then, as you know, we agree with it, but with amendment. About this amendment, I spoke to you and President Roosevelt in Tehran. We claim the north-eastern part of East Prussia, including the ice-free port Königsberg, which should be ceded to the Soviet Union. This is the only piece of German territory, which we claim…»122
In a letter to Stalin, which was received in Moscow on 27 February 1944, Churchill for the first time explicitly stated that the British government supported the transfer of Königsberg and surrounding area to the Soviet Union and considered this claim «as fair»… «The land of this part of East Prussia stained with blood of Russian… therefore, Russian have historical and well-founded claim to this German territory». In the same message, Churchill for the first time spoke in favour of «resettlement of the German population»123.
Winston Churchill and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antony Eden were on a visit to Moscow on the 9—18 October 1944. The head of the Polish government-in-exile Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was present during the conversations, asked if he could know which western boundary was defined for Poland in Teheran. Vyacheslav Molotov said that the border along Oder was considered without anyone’s objection. Eden said that «the idea had been that the frontier could be moved as far west toward the Oder as the Poles wished to go». Churchill assured him: «All of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg was to go to Poland»124.
In early 1945, Soviet troops arrived at the borders of East Prussia. Because of «the East Prussian strategic offensive» of the Red Army (13 January—25 April 1945) on 9 April, the garrison of Konigsberg surrendered. The surrender of Konigsberg actually reinforced the political arrangements over East Prussia. From that moment onwards, the region was under the control of the Soviet Army.
After heated debates on the Yalta conference, the Allies agreed that the eastern border of Poland would have to pass on the «Curzon Line». Therefore, it can be argued that at
The «Curzon Line» was recommended in December 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland. The project of boundary was named in honour of Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, who took into account the ethnic composition of population along boundary line. As a result of the offensive of the Red Army in August 1939 the state border of the USSR with Poland was set roughly along the Curzon line.
Rzheshevskij, Oleg: Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu v dekabre 1941. In: Novaja i noveishaja istorija, №2, 1994, p. 91.
Churchill, Winston: Vtoraja mirovaja vojna. Moscow 1991. Vol. 6, p. 325.
Sovetskij Sojuz na mezhdynarodnych konferencijach perioda Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Мoscow 1978. Vol. 1, p. 181.
Ibid, p. 183.
Sovetskij Sojuz na mezhdynarodnych konferencijach perioda Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945.Teheranskaja konferencija. Мoscow 1984. Vol. 2, p. 148—149.
Ibid, p. 149.
Ibid, p. 150.
Ibid.
Perepiska predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov USSR s prezidentami USA i premier-ministrami Welikobritanii vo vremia Velkoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Moscow 1976, Vol. 1, p. 230.
Ibid, p. 235.
Ibid, p. 242—243.
Feis, Herbert: Churchill. Roosevelt. Stalin. The war they waged and the peace they sought. Princeton 1957, p. 455.
