courts have discretion to make decisions. However, this discretion can be abused, for instance, when the trial court makes factual findings that have no basis in the record at all. This requires that the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a clear error of judgment in reaching its decision. This standard is more deferential than clear error.
Under federal law, decisions of the Courts of Appeals can be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court under a petition for certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court has discretion over whether or not to take such cases.
Case Problems
Keith Forsyth alleges that Attorney General John Mitchell authorized warrantless wiretapping of Forsyth and other Vietnam War protestors causing damages to the protestors. Mitchell sought qualified immunity—a privilege that protects government officials from civil liability as long as their conduct does not violate established rights that a reasonable person would know. The trial court denied the request. Mitchell sought to appeal the issue of qualified immunity before final judgment issued this case because if the privilege existed, then there would be no trial as a matter of law. Can Mitchell appeal the decision of qualified immunity before a final judgment issues in his case?50
11 Corinthians 6:7.
2Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 2.
3Fed. R. Civ. P. 3.
4Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.
5Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
6Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.
728 U.S.C. § 1331 (2016).
828 U.S.C. § 1332 (2016).
928 U.S.C. § 1391 (2016).
10Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.
11Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 17(3) (1981).
12Id. at § 17(1)–(2)
13Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
14World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
15Sheehan v. Gustafson, 967 F. 2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1992).
16Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
17Jonah B. Gelbach, Measuring the Effects of a Heightened Pleading Standard under Twombly and Iqbal, Searle Civil Justice Institute (October 2013) available at: http://bit.ly/17JbQWf.
18Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
19Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
20Fed. R. Civ. P. 27.
21Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
22Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
23Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.
24Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
25Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
26Vais Arms, Inc. v. Vais, 383 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2004) but see Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F. 3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013).
27Fed. R. Civ. P. 38, 39.
28Fed. R. Civ. P. 47.
2928 U.S.C. § 1870 (2016).
30Fed. R. Civ. P. 48.
31Fed. R. Civ. P. 43.
32Fed. R. Evid. 401.
33Fed. R. Evid. 602.
34Fed. R. Evid. 701.
35Fed. R. Evid. 702.
36Fed. R. Evid. 802.
37Fed. R. Evid. 803–804.
38Fed. R. Evid. 901.
39Fed. R. Evid. 902–903.
40Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
41The trier of fact, whether a judge or jury, is the entity that determines factual matters in a case.
42Fed. R. Civ. P. 51.
43Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.
44Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.
45Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
