both confront the challenge from U.S. and its allies, so they depend on each other in global and regional affairs. To some experts, Russia and China are quasi-allies right now.69
On May 24, 2016, in a statement of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia, China and all the other member states supported the Chinese stance on the issues of South China Sea.
On June 9, 2016, around the same time, Chinese and Russian warships sailed into the waters of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
On September 5, 2016, China and Russia held talks on the sidelines of G20 Summit. Russia agreed with China that it is inappropriate for a third party to meddle in other countries’ affairs.
On September 12, 2016, China and Russia began to launch “Joint Sea-2016” naval exercise in South China Sea.
Cambodia
For Cambodia, China is the largest trading partner; China is also the largest source of FDI.70 In the process of establishing national stability, Cambodia has been depending on China. In the U.S.–China competition, Cambodia takes the Chinese side.
After meeting with the Chinese ambassador to ASEAN, Cambodian Foreign Affairs Minister Hor Namhong said “Cambodia wants to mediate in order to reduce the tense atmosphere between ASEAN and China” on July 20, 2015.71
On June 20, 2016, Prime Minister Hun Sen implied that Cambodia would not support the anti-China ruling of the Arbitration of South China Sea and the Court’s decision.72
Countries actually supporting China
As most regional countries depend on U.S. and China to realize their interests, they do not want to irritate either of the two. For them, a hedging strategy is better than taking sides. For China, hedging means less pressure than taking the U.S. side, so the countries adopting hedging strategy could be seen as the countries that actually support China.
ASEAN countries
Southeast Asia consists of ten countries. Both U.S. and China want to win the support of the ASEAN countries for their respective stances. But most ASEAN countries have been hedging in the U.S.–China competition. As they all have significant interests with one of the two countries, they do not want to see their interest suffering from the non-neutral stance they hold.
The neutral countries adopting hedging strategy include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Brunei, Duterte Philippines (2016–), and Singapore, since Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s visit of China in September 2017.
The changed Singapore
Singapore is a U.S. quasi-ally. It has close ties with U.S. in terms of security. Although Singapore depends on China in terms of economy, it still needs U.S. for security. At the same time, China has become assertive in regional affairs and changed the status quo in the South China Sea. Singapore experienced a period of accepting the new situation in the Sea. In getting accustomed to the new status quo in the Sea and the assertive China, Singapore changed itself from siding with the U.S. to hedging again in the U.S.–China competition.
Taking the U.S. side
In 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen confirmed the deployment of P8 spy plane in Singapore.73
In 2016, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong visited U.S. saying all countries should respect international law and accept the result of the Arbitration of the South China Sea.
Singapore’s support of the U.S. disadvantaged China in regional affairs and hurt Singapore-Sino relations. China was irritated and began to treat Singapore coldly.
In November 2016, nine Singaporean armored troop carriers were seized by Hong Kong customs en route back from Taiwan. China lodged a protest with Singapore.74
On May 14, 2017, the paramount leaders from 29 countries attended the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing.75 The Chinese decision not to invite Singapore’s Prime Minister highlighted the strained ties between the two countries.76
Hedging again in the U.S.–China competition
In 2013, China replaced Malaysia as Singapore’s largest trading partner.77 Singapore shows much interest in Chinese initiatives. On June 29, 2015, Singapore signed the agreement with China and 48 others to found AIIB.78 Singapore has its advantage in international finance and wants to play a role in the Chinese Belt and Road initiative.79
Obviously, Singapore has great interest in Sino-U.S. relations. As the Trump Administration gave up the strategy of rebalance in March 2017, Singapore also changed its position and began to engage China. It is the hedging strategy popular in ASEAN countries. By diplomatic shuttles, Singapore took on a hedging role before U.S. rebalancing towards the region.
On June 11, 2017, Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan began his two day visit to Beijing. During his visit, he praised Singapore–China relations saying that they were in “good working order” and that both countries had agreed to work together on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).80
On September 19, 2017, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong arrived in Beijing for a three-day official visit to China. The mission was to patch up Singapore–China relations.81
On October 19, 2017, speaking with CNBC ahead of his visit to the U.S., Lee Hsien Loong said Singapore did not want to pick sides between the U.S. and China.82
The changed Philippines
The anti-China Aquino III Philippines
Aquino III was the Philippines President from 2010 to 2016. The Philippines led by him deeply enhanced bilateral relations with the U.S. and made Philippines a strategically pivotal point in the West Pacific for the U.S. At the same time, Sino-Philippines relations deteriorated to unprecedented proportions.
In 2013, Philippines filed its dispute with China on the South China Sea issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.83 Then, the Philippines united U.S., Japan and Australia to pressurize China to abide by the ruling of the Court.
The Duterte Philippines
Duterte has been the President of Philippines from June 30, 2016. He changed the pro-U.S. stance of Aquino III and made Philippines take on a hedging role again in terms of the U.S.–China competition.
On August 23, 2016, Duterte said he expected talks with China on the dispute of South China Sea and he would not raise the ruling result of the Arbitration in “ASEAN Summit 2016.”84
On October 18, 2016, Duterte began his four-day visit to China.85 The visit also showed Duterte’s efforts to engage China.
Generally speaking, ASEAN is changing to the state that China wants. Of all the 10 countries, Cambodia openly supports China; seven have been actually supporting China while the other two have changed to actually supporting China. The changes of ASEAN in this direction means the regional situation becomes more advantageous for China than for the U.S. The change would disadvantage U.S. in the future competition with China.
Conclusions on the U.S.–China Competition in East Asia
For
